Whitely v. New Mexico State Personnel Bd.

Decision Date01 April 1993
Docket NumberNo. 20662,20662
Citation115 N.M. 308,1993 NMSC 19,850 P.2d 1011
PartiesRonald WHITELY, Mary Utton, Robert Silva, Richard M. Padilla, Douglas D. Mitchell, Ysmael Gomez, Ray Garley, Ray Anaya, Jo Ann F. Salcido, Pete Padilla, Reynaldo Garcia, Arnold Martinez, Solema Olga Herrera, George DiRe, and Sharon Bowen, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court
OPINION

FROST, Justice.

This appeal requires us to determine whether plaintiffs-appellants juvenile probation officers and their staffs ("JPOs") who were recently transferred from the New Mexico judicial branch to the New Mexico executive branch pursuant to the Youth Authority Act, 1988 N.M.Laws, chapter 101, Section 47(C),1 continue to accrue annual vacation leave at judicial branch rates under the Act. Granting Defendant-appellee New Mexico State Personnel Board's ("Personnel Board") motions for summary judgment and dismissal, the district court held that the judicial branch rates of accrual for annual leave are not preserved by the Act's grandfather clause and that no unconstitutional impairment of contracts or diminution of compensation results. The district court also held that two documents containing statements of state legislators offered to prove legislative intent were inadmissible. We affirm the district court's decision in all respects.

The Personnel Board, an executive agency, administers the executive branch personnel system pursuant to the Personnel Act, NMSA 1978, Secs. 10-9-1 to -25 (Repl.Pamp.1992). Based upon its interpretation of Section 47(C) of the Youth Authority Act ("Section 47(C)"), the Personnel Board decided that transferred JPOs should accrue annual leave from the time of their transfer at rates specified under the Personnel Act regulations for the executive branch. The JPOs disagree, contending that Section 47(C) entitles them to continue accruing annual leave at the more generous judicial branch rates. The Personnel Board concedes that transferred JPOs retain earned but unused annual leave under Section 47(C) and that the JPOs' years of service in the judicial branch will count as continuous service for the purpose of calculating their new rate of accrual of annual leave under the Personnel Act.

The JPOs' complaint alleged that the Personnel Board's acts violated Section 47(C), impaired their contracts in violation of Article II, Section 19 of the New Mexico Constitution, and diminished their compensation in violation of Article IV, Section 27 of the New Mexico Constitution. The district court granted the Personnel Board's motion for summary judgment regarding the Section 47(C) and contract clause claims, and it dismissed the illegal diminution of compensation claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The JPOs appeal this decision. They also contend that the district court improperly excluded from evidence two documents expressing legislative intent to preserve the judicial rates of accrual, a letter by State Representative Raymond Sanchez and an affidavit by Chief Juvenile Probation Officer Mary Utton.

I. Statutory Interpretation

The Youth Authority Act transferred juvenile probation officers and personnel from the judicial branch of state government to a newly created agency within the executive branch of state government called the Youth Authority. Youth Authority Act, 1988 N.M.Laws, ch. 101, Sec. 8 (codified at NMSA 1978, Sec. 9-2A-5 (Supp.1992)). Section 47 of the Act specifically requires that transferred employees retain their classification, salary, and other "accrued benefits" enjoyed during their tenure as part of the judicial branch. The Act does not expressly define "accrued benefits," and the main issue on appeal is whether or not the rate of accrual of annual leave is a retained "accrued benefit." Section 47(C) of the Youth Authority Act states:

C. At the time of transfer, the juvenile probation officers, support staff and chiefs shall retain their current classification and salary. Benefits including but not limited to annual leave, sick leave, pension and insurance benefits shall be established in accordance with the Personnel Act, provided no accrued benefits shall be forfeited. Those juvenile probation officers and chiefs employed after July 1, 1988 shall be subject to a classification and compensation plan that will be established in accordance with the Personnel Act.2

Youth Authority Act, 1988 N.M.Laws, ch. 101, Sec. 47(C).

In addressing issues of statutory interpretation, we must determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature, State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988), using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76, 703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985). The words of a statute, including terms not statutorily defined, should be given their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 111 N.M. 4, 5, 800 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1990). No part of a statute should be construed so that it is rendered surplusage. T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354, 357, 630 P.2d 753, 756 (1981).

Contrary to the JPOs' contentions, the rate of accrual of annual leave is not an "accrued benefit" under the plain meaning and structure of Section 47(C), which clearly requires transferred JPOs to accrue annual leave at Personnel Act rates from the time of transfer to the executive branch. We agree with the trial court that "accrued" ordinarily and particularly in the context of the second sentence of Section 47(C) means accumulated, and that the term "accrued benefits" relates to benefits that were earned but unused at the effective date of transfer. This interpretation employs the ordinary meaning of the statute's terms, and it gives effect to Section 47(C) in its entirety. Adopting the JPOs' contention that "accrued benefits" include rates of accrual would effectively nullify the mandate that "[b]enefits including but not limited to annual leave ... shall be established in accordance with the Personnel Act," because this phrase is rendered meaningless surplusage if it does not refer to rates of accrual. See T.W.I.W., 96 N.M. at 357, 630 P.2d at 756. Our interpretation effectuates the intent of this legislation as primarily evidenced in its clear terms, and it does not cause accrued benefits to be forfeited in violation of Section 47(C). The transferred JPOs retain "accrued benefits" because their earned but unused annual leave will transfer with them to the executive branch, and their years of service in the judicial branch will count as continuous service for the purpose of calculating their new rate of accrual of annual leave under the Personnel Act.

To support their contention that the rate of accrual of annual leave is an "accrued benefit," the JPOs cite several public and private pension cases from other jurisdictions which state that pension plan interest rates or other terms are "accrued benefits" under various statutes, regulations, and pension agreements. See, e.g., Hauck v. Eschbacher, 665 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.1981); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 563 F.Supp. 653 (D.C.Cal.1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2678, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985); Flisock v. State, Div. of Retirement and Benefits, 818 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1991). While these pension cases might establish that sometimes a rate or formula may be considered "accrued," they do not convince us that our legislature meant "accrued benefits" to encompass the rate of accrual of annual leave in Section 47(C). Clear statutory language is more probative of legislative intent than authority from other jurisdictions defining an isolated term in different contexts. See General Motors, 103 N.M. at 76, 703 P.2d at 173. The district court's dismissal of the JPOs' claim alleging violation of Section 47(C) is affirmed.

II. Constitutional Challenges

The JPOs contend that interpreting Section 47(C) of the Youth Authority Act to change their rate of accrual of annual leave to conform with Personnel Act regulations infringes their state constitutional rights in two respects. They argue that their contract rights embodied in Section 47(C) and created by their previous status as judicial branch personnel are unconstitutionally impaired in violation of New Mexico Constitution Article II, Section 19,3 and that their compensation as public officers is unconstitutionally diminished in violation of New Mexico Constitution Article IV, Section 27.4

A prerequisite to a finding that a contract obligation is unconstitutionally impaired is proof of the existence of a contract, the benefits of which are somehow denied to the claimant due to the effect of legislation or other governmental action. See Grant v. Nellius, 377 A.2d 354, 356 (Del.1977). The clear defect in the JPOs' contract clause claim is that they are unable to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to retain the judicial branch rates of annual leave accrual.

It is well established that statutes fixing the compensation or terms of public employment are presumed merely to establish public policy subject to legislative revision, and not to create contractual or vested rights. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937). Contractual rights are not created by statute unless "the language of the statute and the circumstances ... manifest a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State." Wage Appeal v. Board of Personnel...

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