Whiteman v. El Paso Criminal Justice Ctr.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10-cv-02430-WYD-KLM |
| Parties | BRIAN WHITEMAN, and SYLVIA WHITEMAN Plaintiffs, v. EL PASO CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, EL PASO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, EL PASO COUNTY, JOHN DOES 1-3, whose true names and identities are unknown, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on review of Defendants El Paso Criminal Justice Center, El Paso County Sheriff's Office, and John Does 1-3 [collectively "County Defendants"] "Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 33) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), and 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)" filed March 07, 2011. The County Defendants' motion seeks to dismiss Claims One, Two, Three, Five, Six and Seven of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs Brian Whiteman and Sylvia Whiteman [hereinafter "Mr. Whiteman" and "Mrs. Whiteman", respectively, or "Plaintiffs" collectively] bring claims arising out of an accident which occurred on or around October 7, 2008, while Mr. Whiteman wasincarcerated for a parole violation at El Paso Criminal Justice Center [hereinafter "the Jail"] in Colorado Springs . Mr. Whiteman asserts that he suffered serious injuries as a result of falling down steel stairs at the Jail while he was heavily medicated and in a confused state. (Third Am. Compl., ¶¶ 18-23). Mr. Whiteman further asserts that this accident occurred at a time when "he was supposed to be, or should have been adequately and closely supervised by employees" of the Jail. (Id., ¶ 17.)
The complaint alleges that the accident occurred when Mr. Whiteman, "[a]lthough heavily medicated, and being an obvious danger to himself, . . . was allowed outside of his room, and allowed to climb the stairs unsupervised." (Third Am. Compl., ¶ 18.) It is alleged that a guard, John Doe 1, "who was also in charge of observing and supervising numerous inmates, was seated at his desk, approximately 100 feet away" from Mr. Whiteman when the accident occurred. (Id., ¶ 20.) That guard, "who was supposed to be supervising MR. WHITEMAN did not notice MR. WHITEMAN, who had been heavily medicated and left unsupervised, slowly walking up a set of steel stairs." (Id., ¶ 21.) When John Doe 1 did notice that Mr. Whiteman had climbed to the top of the stairs, the complaint alleges that instead of getting up and physically assisting Mr. Whiteman down the stairs", he "merely shouted at MR. WHITEMAN from his desk, to come back down." (Id., ¶ 22.) Soon thereafter, Mr. Whiteman fell down the steel stairs and was seriously injured. (Id., ¶ 23.)
The complaint asserts various claims related to the alleged violations of Mr. Whiteman's civil rights by Defendants. The First Claim asserts a violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant John Doe 1 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Second Claim asserts failure to train and/or lack of policies resulting in constitutionalviolations pursuant to § 1983 against John Does 2-3, the Jail, El Paso County Sheriff's Office ["Sheriff's Office"] and El Paso County ["the County"]. The Third Claim asserts a violation of the right to equal protection against John Doe 1 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Fourth Claim asserts a claim for attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Fifth and Sixth Claims assert state law claims of negligent operation of a correctional facility against all the Defendants. The Seventh Claim is a loss of consortium claim by Mrs. Whiteman.
County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss seeks to dismiss the enumerated claims in the Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either: (1) a facial attack on the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint as to subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a challenge to the actual facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). In a factual attack, a party may go beyond the allegations of the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based. Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). The court may consider matters outside the pleadings in connection and the motion is not converted to a motion for summary judgment. Id. Here, the County Defendants mount a factual attack to subject matter jurisdiction regarding the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh claims for relief. Thus, their reliance on materials outside the pleadings as to their argument does not require that the motion be converted to a Rule 56 motion, and I will consider those materials under Rule 12(b)(1).
As to the portion of the motion that seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Arapahoe, 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege that 'enough factual matter, taken as true, [makes] his claim for relief ... plausible on its face.'" Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [pleaded] factual content [ ] allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009). Plaintiff "must include enough facts to 'nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Dennis v. Watco Cos., Inc., 631 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009).
The Tenth Circuit has stated that "if matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. . . ." David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996). Conversion of a motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion is also proper where the plaintiff's response attaches materials outside the pleadings which are considered by the court in deciding the motion. See Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2000). However, courts have broad discretion in determining whether or not to accept materials beyond the pleadings. Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs in this caseattached materials to their response which they argued should be considered in connection with claims sought to be dismissed under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). While I will consider them for purposes of whether dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1), as discussed previously, I will not consider them as to claims sought to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, I am not required to convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.
Finally, "[u]nder Rule 8, a plaintiff must provide a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Tuttamore v. Lappin, No. 10-1524, 10-1558, 10-1050, 2011 WL 1468369, at *2 (10th Cir. April 19, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). As with Rule 12(b)(6), "to overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's allegations must move from conceivable to plausible." Id. Indeed, "Rule 8(a)'s mandate. . . has been incorporated" into the 12(b)(6) inquiry." U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, 614 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs' First Claim asserts that John Doe 1's deliberate indifference subjected Mr. Whiteman to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment provides protection against cruel and unusual punishment. This protection imposes a duty on prison officials to maintain humane conditions of confinement, including a duty to provide inmates with reasonable protections from bodily harm. Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). In order to establish that John Doe 1 violated Mr. Whiteman's Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must allege facts that, if taken to be true for purposes of the motion, wouldsupport the contentions that 1) an inhumane condition of confinement existed, and 2) John Doe 1 acted with "deliberate indifference" to Mr. Whiteman's safety and rights. Id.
"To prevail on a 'conditions of confinement' claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that (1) the condition complained of is 'sufficiently serious' to implicate constitutional protection, and (2) prison officials acted with 'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal quotations marks omitted). As to the first requirement, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id.
The deliberate indifference requirement provides that a prison official must act wanton or willfully and have a "'sufficiently culpable state of mind'". Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-35 (quotation omitted). "[T]he Supreme Court has explained that 'deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence ... [but] something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result.'" DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 972 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). "The Court defined this 'deliberate indifference' standard as equal to 'recklessness,' in which 'a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.'" Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37).
The test for deliberate indifference is both objective and subjective. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082,...
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