Whiteside v. Colvin, 6:13-cv-1739-LSC
| Decision Date | 04 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | 6:13-cv-1739-LSC |
| Parties | DAVID S. WHITESIDE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
The plaintiff, David S. Whiteside, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Mr. Whiteside timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Mr. Whiteside was forty-one years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") decision, and he has a high school education and finished three years of college. (Tr. at 29.) His past work experiences include employment as aninsurance salesman, a mobile home salesman, and a professional baseball player. (Tr. at 29-31.) Mr. Whiteside claims that he became disabled on January 5, 2008, due to back pain, resulting from impairments to his lumbar and spine and from thoracic radiculitis, and due to anxiety and situational depression. (Tr. at 13, 28.)
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the evaluator moves on to the next step.
The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of the plaintiff's medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of impairments that is not classified as "severe" and does not satisfy the durationalrequirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) ().
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") before proceeding to the fourth step. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff's impairment orcombination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.
The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Whiteside met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through her date of decision. (Tr. at 12.) She further determined that Mr. Whiteside had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff's post lumbar fusion is considered a "severe" impairment based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Tr. at 12-13.) In addition, she found that Mr. Whiteside's anxiety and situational depression were "nonsevere" because they did "not cause more than minimal limitations in [his] ability to perform[.]" (Tr. at 13.) The ALJ then found that the "severe" post lumbar fusion neither meets nor medicallyequals any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ did not find Mr. Whiteside's representations to be totally credible, and she determined that he has the RFC to perform light work, except that he can only occasionally climb, crouch, crawl, stoop, and kneel, and he requires an option to sit or stand at will. (Tr. at 15.)
According to the ALJ, Mr. Whiteside is able to perform some of his past relevant work as an insurance salesman and as a mobile home salesman. (Tr. at 19.) She determined he is unable to perform his past relevant work as a baseball player since that work requires the ability to perform at a medium exertional level. (Id.) However, since his RFC to perform light work activity does not disturb his ability to perform his past relevant work as an insurance or mobile home salesman, he retains the capacity to do that work both as he actually performed it, and as it is generally performed in the national economy. (Id.) The ALJ concluded her findings by stating that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 5, 2008, through the date of this decision[.]" (Tr. at 20.)
This Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there issubstantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App'x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and 'the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
However, no decision is automatic, for "despite th[e] deferential standard [for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
Mr. Whiteside alleges that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded for two reasons. First, he believes the ALJ failed to assign enough credibility to his testimony about his pain and was therefore inconsistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not satisfy her duty to fully develop the record. (Id. at 9-10, 12.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility of his testimony of his disabling symptoms in a manner consistent with the standards of the Eleventh Circuit. (Id. at 3). Specifically, Mr. Whiteside alleges that "[t]he ALJ articulates several reasons for refusing to credit the Plaintiff's testimony of disablingback pain, none of which are supported by substantial evidence." (Id. at 7.) He contends that the ALJ's opinion is not supported by substantial evidence because she failed to attribute proper weight to certain facts in the record. (Id. at 7-11.)
Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms, the claimant must produce "(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence...
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