Whitfield v. Fraser

• Decision Date: 17 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02 Civ. 9790(RWS).,02 Civ. 9790(RWS).
• Citation: 272 F.Supp.2d 340
• Parties: Darrick WHITFIELD, Plaintiff, v. William J. FRASER, Correction Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction; New York City Department of Correction; and the City of New York, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

272 F.Supp.2d 340

Darrick WHITFIELD, Plaintiff, v.William J. FRASER, CorrectionCommissioner of the New York City Department of Correction; New York City Department of Correction; and the City of New York, Defendants.

No. 02 Civ. 9790(RWS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 17, 2003.

Koehler & Isaacs by Mercedes Maldonado, New York City, for Plaintiff.

Honorable Michael A. Cardozo, CorporationCounsel of the City of New York by Nabisubi Musoke, Assistant CorporationCounsel, New York City, for Defendants.

OPINION

SWEET, District Judge.

The defendants the New York City Department of Corrections("DOC"); William Fraser, Commissioner of the DOC ("Fraser"); and the City of New York("City")(collectively "Defendants") have moved under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the complaint of plaintiffDarrik Whitfield("Whitfield").For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

Prior Proceedings

This action was commenced on December 11, 2002.The motion was heard and marked fully submitted on May 28, 2003.

The Complaint

Whitfield was a tenured correction officer with the DOC.(Compl. ¶ 30.)On December 1, 1999, Whitfield was arrested on charges involving his then tenant.(Compl. ¶ 31.)As a result of the arrest, the DOC instituted disciplinary charges against him (Compl. ¶ 32.), and on March 24, 2000, the DOC served Whitfield with disciplinary charges (Compl. ¶ 33).On March 30, 2000, following a bench trial Whitfield was convicted of Sexual Abuse in the third degree, a class B misdemeanor.(Compl. ¶ 34.)

On June 8, 2000, Whitfield entered into a proposed negotiated plea agreement with the DOC regarding the disciplinary charges, but all parties understood that this agreement would not become final unless it was accepted by the Correction Commissioner's Office.(Compl. ¶ 40.)The Correction Commissioner's Office rejected this proposed plea agreement.(Compl. ¶ 41.)On February 13, 2002, Whitfield accepted a second proposed negotiated agreement, incorporating a more stringent penalty, but this agreement was likewise rejected by the Commissioner's Office.(Compl. ¶¶ 45-47.)

On August 12, 2002, the DOC terminated Whitfield's employment, pursuant to New York Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e)(POL § 30(1)(e)).(Compl. ¶ 49.)Whitfield brings this action against the DOC, Fraser, and the City of New York.He challenges the constitutionality and application of POL § 30(1)(e) and argues that decision to terminate his employment was arbitrary and capricious under New York Civil Practice Rules and Regulations ("CPLR")Article 78.(Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.)

The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court should construe the complaint liberally, "accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,282 F.3d 147, 152(2d Cir.2002)(citingGregory v. Daly,243 F.3d 687, 691(2d Cir.2001))."The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien,56 F.3d 375, 378(2d Cir.1995)(quotingScheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232, 235-236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90(1974)).Dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief."Sweet v. Sheahan,235 F.3d 80, 83(2d Cir.2000).

A.POL § 30(1)(e)

POL § 30(1)(e) has been unchanged since its enactment in 1892.It provides for the automatic termination of public office when an employee commits "a felony, or a crime involving a violation of his oath of office."

The New York Court of Appeals interpreted "a crime involving a violation of [the] oath of office" in the Matter of Duffy v. Ward,81 N.Y.2d 127, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213(1993).The court based its interpretation on the underlying purpose behind this statute — that "the public has a `right to rest assured that its officers are individuals of moral integrity in whom they may, without second thought, place their confidence and trust.'"Id. at 131, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213(quotingMatter of Toro v. Malcolm,44 N.Y.2d 146, 152, 404 N.Y.S.2d 558, 375 N.E.2d 739(1978)).The court thus concluded that the statute reaches "only those misdemeanors that demonstrate a lack of moral integrity."Id. at 134, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213.A crime demonstrating a lack of "moral integrity""must be one involving willful deceit or a calculated disregard for honest dealings.More than intent or a criminal mens rea is needed for summary dismissal; there must be an intentional dishonesty or corruption of purpose inherent in the act prohibited by the Penal Law."Id. at 135, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213.

In applying this definition, it is necessary to look "not to the facts of the particular case but solely to the elements of the crime."Duffy,81 N.Y.2d at 130, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213.This is the case because in making convictions of certain crimes grounds for immediate dismissal, "the Legislature implicitly acknowledged that no factual showing by the officeholder was needed, for under no circumstances could facts unique to the incident mitigate the violation of the public trust."Id. at 133, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213.To construe the law otherwise — "as giving the Commissioner unbridled discretion to make a fact-based determination about dismissal but foreclosing the opportunity to develop the facts" — would "risk the potential for arbitrary government action."Id.Thus, there is no need for a hearing under this statute.As explained by the New York Court of Appeals, "Underlying the necessity for a due process hearing is some factual dispute impacting upon the employer's right to discharge....When the operative facts are not in dispute, a hearing is unnecessary."In the Matter of Economico v. Village of Pelham,50 N.Y.2d 120, 128, 428 N.Y.S.2d 213, 405 N.E.2d 694(1980)(holding in the context of a POL § 73 discharge that there is no need for a hearing when there is no dispute that an employee was absent from work for over a year on account of a non-service related disability).See alsoMatter of Miller v. Facilities Dev. Corp.,199 A.D.2d 727, 605 N.Y.S.2d 478(1993)(holding that a former resident inspector, who confessed to accepting money from an outside contracting company on the very project on which he was assigned to work in violation of POL §§ 73-78, could be summarily dismissed and was not entitled to a hearing).

1.The Statute is not Unconstitutionally Vague

Whitfield argues that "a crime involving a violation of [the] oath of office," even with the Duffy interpretation, is unconstitutionally vague and potentially all-inclusive.A law is void for vagueness "where one could not reasonably understand" what conduct it purports to proscribe.United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp.,372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561(1963).To be constitutional, a statute must define prohibited conduct with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."Kolender v. Lawson,461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903(1983).

"In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged."Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp.,372 U.S. at 33, 83 S.Ct. 594.Although, as Whitfield points out, the DOC follows no written guidelines in determining what misdemeanors violate the oath of office, Whitfield was on sufficient notice that sexual abuse was a crime in violation of the oath of office, subjecting him to POL § 30(e)(1).First, in committing a crime while holding public office, Whitfield was already on notice of POL § 30(e)(1)'s potential applicability.Furthermore, sexual abuse is a crime clearly "demonstrating a lack of moral integrity" and "intentional dishonesty or corruption."Duffy,81 N.Y.2d at 135, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213.Cases have held crimes of sexual abuse to be particularly "heinous."E.g., Eze v. Senkowski,321 F.3d 110, 112(2d Cir.2003);Lindstadt v. Keane,239 F.3d 191(2d Cir.2001);People v. Harrington,108 A.D.2d 1062, 485 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634(3d Dep't1985).

2.The Delegation of Legislative Power is Not Unconstitutional

Whitfield further claims that the statute's phrasing, "a crime involving a violation of [the] oath of office," is so vague as to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the courts.

Statutes have "strong presumptive validity," and they"are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language."Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp.,372 U.S. at 32, 83 S.Ct. 594.Courts seek "an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation."Id.(citingUnited States v. Rumely,345 U.S. 41, 47, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770(1953);Crowell v. Benson,285 U.S. 22, 63, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598(1932)).However, "[t]he primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature."Riley v. County of Broome,95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98(2000)(citations omitted).See alsoMatter of Sutka v. Conners,73 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 541 N.Y.S.2d 191, 538 N.E.2d 1012(1989)("[T]he court's objective is, of course, to discern and apply the will of the Legislature, not the court's own perception of what might be equitable....In matters of statutory interpretation ..., legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.").

The courts have taken care to respect the language and intention of the POL § 30(1)(e).In Duffy,the Court of Appeals carefully considered and rejected...