Whitfield v. Hill
Decision Date | 30 June 1860 |
Citation | 58 N.C. 316,5 Jones 316 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | HATCH WHITFIELD v. BUCKNER L. HILL AND ANOTHER. |
A purchaser (even with notice) from one purchasing fraudulently, at a sheriff's sale, (as by preventing a fair competition among bidders,) who has had the land in possession for more than seven years before a suit in equity is brought for a reconveyance, is protected by the statute of limitations.
An action of ejectment, predicated on the assumption that a deed made by a sheriff for land sold, is void on account of a fraudulent suppression of bidding, is not the same cause of action with a right asserted in a court of equity to have the purchaser converted into a trustee, and to have a reconveyance, which assumes that the sheriff's deed is valid to pass the title; and, therefore, the pendancy of the former is not a good answer to the plea of the statute of limitations.
If it appear on the face of the bill that the plaintiff's case is barred by the statute of limitations, advantage may be taken of it by motion on the trial.
CAUSE removed from the Court of Equity of Wayne county.
Lemuel H. Whitfield had been the guardian of the defendant, William A. Whitfield, and the plaintiff, Hatch Whitfield, was his surety on his guardian bond. The plaintiff, in 1839, removed to the State of Mississippi, and was residing there in the year 1840, when a writ was taken out against the said Lemuel H. and himself on account of the said guardian bond. This was served upon the former, but the plaintiff not being found, a judicial attachment was taken out, which was levied on six tracts of land, lying contiguous to each other, containing about 5973 acres, and two lots in the town of Waynes borough--and on advertisement being made, a judgment was taken against Lemuel H. Whitfield and himself for $2325,66. There was an execution taken out as to L. H. Whitfield, and levied on his land and slaves, and a venditioni exponas taken out to sell the lands of the plaintiff, which had been levied on by the judical attachment, and they were sold for $2000. At the sale of the lands, the defendant, W. A. Whitfield, declared, publicly, that he did not wish any one to bid against him for the land about to be offered; that he only wanted to bring his brother, Hatch Whitfield, who was then in Mississippi, to a settlement, and he was afraid if any one else bought the land, he would not let his brother have it back; that he would sell the outskirts of the land and let his hrother have the home plantation. In consequence of these assurances, and others of the same kind, made before, several persons abstained from bidding, and amongst others, the defendant, Buckner L. Hill, and the defendant, W. A. Whitfield, was thus enabled to buy the land at greatly below its value, to wit, at $2000. A part of the land in question adjoined the defendant, Hill, and he was very solicitous to buy this part, and went to the court-house on Monday, the day advertised for the sale, with the view and purpose of bidding for the land, but he was dissuaded from doing so by the representations made to him by the defendant, Whitfield, of the character above set forth, so that he was not present at the sale at all. Afterwards, (in a short time) he got from the defendant, Whitfield, the land he wanted, amounting to about 1902 acres, by paying him a full price for it, to wit, $2377,50. W. Whitfield also sold a small portion of it to one Herring.
The bill alleges that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the proceeding in Court, upon which the judgment was taken against him, until after the sale of his lands, living, as he then did, in a distant State, and having received no information on the subject; that Lemuel Whitfied, the other defendant in the execution, and the real debtor had abundant means within the bailiwick of the sheriff, consisting of lands and slaves, to satisfy the judgment; that he went forward and insisted that if any one's property was to be sold to satisfy this debt, it should be his; that the land, bought in by W. A. Whitfield, was worth, at least, $10,000, and that several of his friends, who were present at the sale, urged that the land should be sold in separate tracts, and that if this had been done, and a fair competition allowed, there would have been no necessity for selling more than the town lots and one of the tracts, but that all this was met by the assurance that Lemuel Whitfield had put money into the hands of the plaintiff to pay the debt, and that all he wanted was to force his brother to a fair settlement of the claims he had against him, and that the sheriff, in his course, was influenced by this assurance; that there was a fraudulent combination and agreement between the defendants, W. A. Whitfield and Hill, for the former to buy the land, and for the latter to have it from him at nearly the price he might give for it, and that a few days after this sale, this fraudulent arrangement was consummated by the defendant, Whitfield's, conveying a part of the land set forth, distinctively, in the pleadings, for the sum above stated. This bill was filed in 1856.
The defendant, W. A. Whitfield, did not answer the bill, and a judgment pro confesso was taken, and the bill heard ex parte as to him.
The defendant, Buckner L. Hill, answered, denying that he made any arrangement, or had any understanding with his co-defendant as to stifling competition in the bidding for the land; or was cognizant of any trust or arrangement between the brothers; or of any equitable claim the plaintiff had to have the land levied on, or any part of it, reconveyed; that he did desire to have a part of the land, and went to the place appointed for the sale, in order to bid for it, but the sale was postponed, as he then understood from a friend of the plaintiff, because of some defect in the advertisement, and he gave himself no further concern about the matter until after the sale, (at which he was not...
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...by demurrer or motion to dismiss. Under the former system, it could have been done in equity (Robinson v. Lewis, 45 N. C. 58; Whitfield v. Hill, 58 N. C. 316; Smith v. More-head, 59 N. C. 360); but it cannot be under the new procedure, for the law provides that "an objection that the action......
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Oldham v. Rieger
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