Whitfield v. Nev. State Pers. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 79718,79718 |
| Citation | 492 P.3d 571 |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michael WHITFIELD, Appellant, v. NEVADA STATE PERSONNEL COMMISSION; State of Nevada Department of Administration; Lorna Ward, Appeals Officer; and The State of Nevada Department of Corrections, as Employer, Respondents. |
Snell & Wilmer LLP and Gil Kahn and Kelly H. Dove, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Kevin A. Pick, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondents.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
NRS 233B.130(2)(a) requires petitions for judicial review to name "all parties of record to the administrative proceeding" as respondents. In Washoe County v. Otto, we held that NRS 233B.130(2)(a) ’s naming requirement is "mandatory and jurisdictional" and that strict compliance therewith is necessary. 128 Nev. 424, 432-33, 282 P.3d 719, 725 (2012). More recently, in Prevost v. State, Department of Administration, we concluded the petitioner's failure to name one party of record in the caption of a petition for judicial review was not jurisdictionally fatal under NRS 233B.130(2)(a) because the petitioner named the missing respondent in the body of the petition, attached the administrative decision naming the missing respondent in the petition, and served the missing respondent with the petition. 134 Nev. 326, 328, 418 P.3d 675, 676-77 (2018). As a result, Prevost forces the courts to deviate from NRS 233B.130(2)(a) ’s plain language and determine whether the facts of each case are more like Otto or Prevost, a problem foreshadowed by Prevost’ s dissent. Because courts should not be making this kind of determination where the statute plainly requires petitioners to name all parties as respondents, we overrule Prevost . And because appellant Michael Whitfield failed to strictly comply with NRS 233B.130(2)(a), we affirm the district court's dismissal of his petition. Whitfield also failed to timely file his amended petition, which named all parties as respondents, pursuant to NRS 233B.130(2)(d) ; accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of his motion to amend.
Michael Whitfield was employed by the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) as a correctional officer for approximately 13 years. NDOC regulations required Whitfield to carry a firearm and maintain Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certification, and in order to maintain his POST certification, he had to biannually qualify with a firearm.
In August 2017, a California court entered a domestic violence restraining order against Whitfield, making it illegal for Whitfield to use or handle firearms for a three-year period. The order made no allowance for Whitfield's employment as a correctional officer. NDOC gave Whitfield until January 2018 to resolve the protection order issue and regain the ability to carry a firearm. Whitfield was unable to get the restraining order modified, and following multiple notices and a hearing, Whitfield was dismissed from state service for failing to maintain his POST requirements.
Whitfield appealed his dismissal to the Nevada State Personnel Commission (the Commission). Hearing Officer Lorna Ward affirmed the termination. Whitfield, acting pro se, timely filed a petition for judicial review. Whitfield's petition cited the correct administrative case number and named the judgment from the Commission, but did not name any party as a respondent in the caption or body of the petition. Whitfield timely served the petition, and also summonses, upon the Attorney General's Office, the director of NDOC, and the Nevada Department of Administration.
NDOC moved to dismiss the case, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because Whitfield's petition failed to comply with NRS 233B.130(2)(a). NDOC argued that the statute required Whitfield to name NDOC, the Commission, Hearing Officer Ward, and the Nevada Department of Administration as respondents. NDOC further contended that because NRS 233B.130(2)(d) ’s 30-day window to petition for judicial review had passed, the district court no longer had jurisdiction.
Four days later, Whitfield filed an amended petition for judicial review. The caption to this amended petition included the entities and individuals that NDOC argued in its motion were required to be named as respondents. Whitfield also filed an opposition to NDOC's motion to dismiss, arguing that under Prevost v. State, Department of Administration, 134 Nev. 326, 418 P.3d 675 (2018), the failure to name a required respondent in the petition's caption does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Whitfield further contended that his amended petition, filed pursuant to NRCP 15, mooted NDOC's motion.
The district court granted NDOC's motion to dismiss. The court held that (1) Whitfield's original petition did not comply with NRS 233B.130 because he "failed to name any respondent in the caption or the body" and (2) the amended petition was not filed within 30 days after the agency's final decision as required by NRS 233B.130(2)(d). Whitfield appeals.
The fundamental question before us is the interpretation of NRS 233B.130. In this opinion, we first address whether Prevost , 134 Nev. 326, 418 P.3d 675, conflicts with the plain language of NRS 233B.130(2)(a). We conclude it does and therefore overrule Prevost. We also conclude Whitfield's petition failed to comply with NRS 233B.130(2)(a) and the district court appropriately dismissed the petition. Finally, because Whitfield's amended petition was untimely filed under NRS 233B.130(2)(d), we conclude NRCP 15 did not allow him to amend the petition and the district court did not err by granting the motion to dismiss.
NRS 233B.130(2)(a) requires every party of record to be named as a respondent in the petition
Whitfield argues that his petition for judicial review satisfied NRS 233B.130(2)(a) and Prevost because he named the Commission and NDOC in the body of the petition. NDOC argues Whitfield did not properly name the Commission and NDOC as respondents anywhere in his petition as required under NRS 233B.130(2)(a) and Otto, 128 Nev. 424, 282 P.3d 719.1
NRS 233B.130(2)(a) provides in pertinent part that "[p]etitions for judicial review must ... [n]ame as respondents the agency and all parties of record to the administrative proceeding." As we explained in Otto, courts have appellate jurisdiction over the acts of administrative agencies only where the Legislature provides for judicial review by statute. 128 Nev. at 431, 282 P.3d at 724. Nevada's Administrative Procedure Act (the APA) controls judicial review of many administrative decisions, and the Legislature's procedure is controlling. Id. If a party fails to strictly comply with the statutory requirements for judicial review, the courts have no jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 431, 282 P.3d at 725.
In Otto , we concluded that NRS 233B.130(2)(a) ’s plain language required strict compliance, and that its naming requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. at 432-33, 282 P.3d at 725. There, the petitioner failed to name the respondents individually in the caption, in the petition's text, or in an attachment, and we held that the petition was properly dismissed and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to allow the petitioner to amend its petition. Id. at 429, 434-35, 282 P.3d at 723, 726-27.
Subsequently, in Prevost, we distinguished Otto and concluded that the petitioner's failure to name a respondent in the petition's caption was not jurisdictionally fatal under NRS 233B.130(2)(a). Prevost, 134 Nev. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676-77. Pointing to Otto ’s language faulting the petition for failing to name the respondents "in the caption, in the body of the amended petition, or in an attachment," we concluded Otto recognized that the failure to name a respondent in the petition's caption was not a fatal jurisdiction defect. Id. at 328, 418 P.3d at 676 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we concluded the petitioner in Prevost met the requirements of NRS 233B.130(2)(a) by attaching the administrative decision to the petition and thereby named the respondent "in the body of the petition through incorporation by reference." Id.
"[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis , we will not overturn [precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing." Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) (footnote omitted). But while we are loath to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis, we also cannot adhere to the doctrine so stridently that the law is everlasting. Adam v. State, 127 Nev. 601, 604, 261 P.3d 1063, 1065 (2011) ; Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 400, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974). A prior holding that has proven "badly reasoned" or "unworkable" should be overruled. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 750, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Whitfield failed to name any respondent in the petition's caption and did not refer to any person or party as a "respondent" in the body of the petition. Although Whitfield's petition for judicial review mentions the Commission's judgment, his inability to be reinstated at NDOC, and his request to reverse the Commission's decision, it failed to identify those parties as respondents. Under Otto, Whitfield's petition clearly fails, as he did not name every party as a respondent anywhere in the petition. However, Prevost introduces confusion in this situation, as seen by Whitfield's argument that his citation to the administrative appeal number and reference to the Commission is the equivalent of attaching a decision identifying the missing respondent and therefore his petition adequately names the respondents. But we never intended to create a sliding scale where parties are required to argue whether their case is more like Otto or Prevost , nor should courts make this determination where the statute plainly requires the petitioner to name all parties as r...
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