Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, 17290.

Decision Date24 February 1959
Docket NumberNo. 17290.,17290.
PartiesBennie L. WHITFIELD et al., Appellant, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 2708, et al., Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Roberson L. King, Dent, King, Walker & Wickliff, Houston, Tex., for appellants.

George Rice, Butler, Binion, Rice & Cook, Houston, Tex., for appellees Sheffield Steel Corp. and Armco Steel Corp.

Chris Dixie, Dixie & Schulman, Houston, Tex., for appellee Local No. 2708 United Steelworkers of America, and Claude Baldree.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and RIVES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge.

Five negro members of an integrated union assert that their union, under the guise of equalizing job opportunities at their employer's plant, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that subtly but effectively discriminates against negro employees.

Plaintiffs-appellants work at the Houston steel plant of the Sheffield Division of Armco Steel Corporation. They are members of Local 2708, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, the certified exclusive bargaining agent for production and maintenance workers at the plant. The plaintiffs brought a class action against the Union and the Company attacking the validity of a collective bargaining agreement dated May 31, 1956, and seeking an injunction, a declaratory judgment, and damages. The case was tried to the court without a jury. After a lengthy trial and after findings and an opinion that reflect careful consideration of all the facts, the able district judge held that the contract was fair and free from racial discrimination. We affirm.

The complaint is based on the principle that a certified bargaining agent is under a duty to represent all employees fairly. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173.1 The Union and Sheffield do not take issue with the theory on which the case is brought. Their position is that the contract is fair and nondiscriminatory. In the Steele case the Supreme Court stated:

"The duty imposed on the bargaining representative does not mean that the statutory representative of a craft is barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects upon some members of the craft represented. Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical in their interest or merit."

Thus, the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement must be relevant to the conditions of the particular industry and company to which they are to be applied. An agreement will be judicially condemned only in the case of "discriminations not based on such relevant differences. Discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."

The question before the Court is whether the May 31 contract is fair, not only to the five negro plaintiffs but to all Sheffield employees. If there are distinctions between the treatment of negro employees and the treatment of white employees, do such distinctions have their basis in relevant and reasonable differences or are the distinctions invidious discriminations based on race? What is fair is a moral decision resting on the conscience of the Court. To reach a just decision, it is necessary to examine and weigh the facts that produced the May 31 contract.

Background.

The steel mill started operations in 1942. Since that time the Union has been the exclusive bargaining agent for production and maintenance workers. Almost without exception, all negroes employed at the mill belong to the Union. This membership is voluntary, since Texas laws prohibit union shops. Of approximately 3,000 employees in the bargaining unit 1,700 are white and 1,300 are negro employees. The Union has always been integrated. Negro members hold office in the Union, particularly the key office of Plant Grievance Chairman, and have always participated actively and responsibly in all features of the collective bargaining process.

When the Company commenced steel-making in 1942 it employed white persons for skilled jobs and negroes for unskilled jobs, in accordance with local custom but chiefly because the only available skilled workers were white. From 1942 through 1946, by government regulation, the Company hired employees only through the United States Employment Service.

Collective bargaining contracts between the Union and the Company are master contracts covering the operations of steel plants throughout the country. These contracts, which are common in the steel industry, provided that at each local plant seniority units, lines of progression, would be established within a department.

For purposes of seniority, the Houston plant, like other steel mills in the country, is divided into departments. In accordance with the master contract, each department is divided into two lines of progression, each line constituting a seniority unit. Each line of progression encompasses a distinct operation and is composed of a series of interrelated jobs. The jobs start with the easiest in terms of skill, experience, and potential ability and progress step by step to the top job in the line. The knowledge acquired in a preceding job is necessary for the efficient handling of the next job in the progression.2 Throughout the years, the skilled jobs within a department were grouped together in logical sequence and called the Number 1 Line of Progression. The unskilled jobs were also logically grouped together and called the Number 2 Line of Progression. Until the 1956 contract, the Number 1 lines were staffed by white employees and the Number 2 lines by negro employees.

Before the 1956 Agreement, those who applied for jobs in a Number 1 line were closely screened. Even after Sheffield was satisfied that an applicant possessed the qualities needed to progress in the line, he was subjected to a probationary period of two hundred and sixty hours. Any employee who failed to meet with the Company's approval could be discharged at the will of the Company during that period.

As to the Number 2 lines, from 1949 to 1956 all negroes started in the labor pool, or labor department. From the labor pool they bid into the starting jobs in the Number 2 lines. When laid off, a negro employee went back to the labor pool instead of losing a job altogether. Only negroes were hired into the labor pool.

In November, 1954, the first complaints of racial discrimination were made. Some negro employees were dissatisfied with the fact that they could not bid on jobs in the Number 1 lines of progression. As a result of the grievances, negotiations were commenced immediately between the Union and Sheffield. Negotiations were conducted between Company representatives and a Joint Seniority Committee composed of two negro and two white members of the Union. One of the two negro representatives was the Plant Grievance Chairman. In negotiations that lasted for almost a year the Union and Company representatives explored extensively a sound and fair basis for permitting negro employees to enter Number 1 lines of progression. The result of the negotiations was the agreement of May 31, 1956.3

The May 31, 1956 Agreement.

The agreement made substantial changes in the Company's employment practices. Each bottom job in a Number 1 line was changed from a starting job, subject to the Company's uncontrolled screening, to a bid job. In doing this the Company had to give up its right of original selection. Under the agreement, no pool of white employees can be maintained to fill vacancies in a Number 1 line. Employees in Number 2 lines, negroes, are given preferential rights to fill vacancies in Number 1 lines. Any vacancy in a Number 1 line must now be filled by offering the job first to the bid of an employee in a Number 2 line in the same department, provided the employee first passes a qualifying test. If there is no employee in a Number 2 line in the same department who has passed the qualifying test, then a man in the labor pool who has passed the test may bid for the job. Both whites and negroes now must start in the labor pool. The Company relinquished all screening rights and terminated the 260 hour probationary period. A qualification test takes the place of rigid screening.4 Once an employee passes the test, he is subject to no more investigation or screening. If he bids from a Number 2 line to a Number 1 line, he is entitled to fill the vacancy, if he has passed the test. The test is given to all employees who enter starting jobs in a Number 1 line, whether they are white or negro. Thus, under the agreement, openings in starting jobs in a Number 2 line are filled from the labor pool. Openings in starting jobs in a Number 1 line are filled first from the Number 2 line in the same department, then from the labor pool if there are no qualified Number 2 line employees. If there is racial discrimination under the new contract, it is discrimination in favor of negroes.

The appellants complain that the agreement preserves the old inequalities. (1) They object to the qualification test for Number 1 lines. The effect is to require all negro applicants to take the tests since on May 31, 1956, all employed negroes were in the Number 2 lines. (2) They object to the fact that one who bids into a Number 1 line from a Number 2 line must start at the bottom job. This will mean a wage cut in a case where the negro is up the ladder in a Number 2 line.

The Requirement of a Qualification Test.

The appellants complain that they are discriminated against because the incumbents in a Number 1 line are not required to take the test...

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