Whitley v. Prince George's Cnty.

Decision Date03 November 2014
Docket NumberCase No.: GJH-12-03428
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
PartiesEVERETT WHITLEY Plaintiff, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, ET AL., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by Plaintiff Everett Whitley ("Whitley") against Prince George's County and Detective Thomas Harley ("Detective Harley") and Maurice Talley ("Detective Talley") arising out of the alleged improprieties surrounding Whitley's arrest on November 23, 2009. This Memorandum and accompanying Order address the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Detective Harley and Detective Talley (collectively, "Defendants"), ECF No. 25, Whitley's Opposition thereto, ECF No. 29, and Defendants' Reply in support of its motion, ECF No. 32.1 The Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this case. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

An individual named Eric Jamal Harper was shot on October 24, 2009 at the entrance to an apartment building located at 6802 Atwood Street, District Heights, Maryland, by someoneother than Whitley. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 11. That same day, Detective Talley, a member of the Prince George's County Police Department, interviewed an eyewitness who described the shooter as a wearing a "white shirt" and "blue jeans with dreads to his shoulders." ECF No. 25-3 at 10. That witness later identified Whitley as the shooter during a six-picture photo array conducted by Detective Harley, also a member of the Prince George's County Police Department. See ECF No. 1 at ¶12. Based on the witness's identification of Whitley as the shooter, Detective Harley, on November 4, 2009, applied for and obtained an arrest warrant for Whitley. See ECF No. 25-1 at 3. The only information in the arrest warrant linking Whitley as the shooter was the witness's identification. See ECF No. 25-5. Similarly, on November 18, 2009, Detective Harley swore out an affidavit for a search warrant for Whitley's apartment. See ECF No. 25-2. Just like the arrest warrant, the search warrant application relied heavily on the witness's identification of Whitley as the shooter. See id. The state judge found that probable cause existed to search Whitley's apartment and issued the search warrant. See id. According to Whitley, however, "the eyewitness statement and photographic identification relied upon by the Defendant Detectives was improper and incorrect." ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12.

Nevertheless, on November 23, 2009, Defendants executed the search and arrest warrants, during which Whitley claims he was "physically attacked." See id. at ¶ 14. Whitley was ultimately charged with violations of Maryland law in conjunction with the shooting. See id. at ¶¶ 14-15 & 19. Whitley spent more than forty days incarcerated before he was released and had all charges terminated in his favor. See id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Following Whitley's release, he filed suit against Defendants claiming that his constitutional rights were violated when they "arrest[ed] him without probable cause, search[ed] him without probable cause, and subject[ed] him to excessive and unreasonable force." Id. at ¶ 65. Whitley's complaint contained twenty-fivecounts, most of which were dismissed by Judge Grimm on July 11, 2013 following Defendants' (including Prince George's County) first motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 11 & 12. Four counts, however, remain, including (1) a § 1983 claim for violation of Whitley's Fourth Amendment rights; (2) a § 1983 claim for violation of Whitley's Fifth Amendment (Miranda) rights; (3) a §1985 claim for a conspiracy to violate Whitley's constitutional rights; and (4) a §1986 claim for a failure to prevent a conspiracy to violate Whitley's constitutional rights. Defendants have filed their second motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 25. For the reasons discussed more fully below, Defendants' motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if there are no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 2006). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is only "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. However, the nonmoving party "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1986). The Court may only rely on facts supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings, in order to fulfill its "affirmative obligation . . . to prevent 'factually unsupported claims or defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Grave-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983 Claim - 4th Amendment (Count II)

Whitley asserts a claim under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 52-78. Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983, however "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). In his complaint, Whitley identifies the Fourth Amendment as the underlying source of his § 1983 claim. Specifically, Whitley claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants "arrest[ed] him without probable cause, search[ed] him without probable cause, and subject[ed] him to excessive and unreasonable force." ECF No. 1 at ¶ 65. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 25. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not there was probable cause to issue either the search warrant or the arrest warrant. As such, the Court will deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count II to the extent that claim relates to Defendants' wrongful arrest and unreasonable search. The Court will, however, grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count II to the extent that claim relates to Defendants' use of excessive force, as Whitley has failed to demonstrate the existence of disputed material facts regarding Defendants' use of force.

1. False Arrest & Unreasonable Search

Whitley contends that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting and searching him pursuant to warrants that contained false and/or misleading statements without which the warrants would not have contained probable cause. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 65. To succeed on a claim that a search or "seizure was unreasonable because it followed from a warrant affidavit that was deficient because it was dishonest," a plaintiff must prove that the attesting officer (in this case Detective Harley) "deliberately or with a 'reckless disregard for the truth' made material false statements in his affidavit, or omitted from that affidavit 'material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.'" Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). "Reckless disregard" can be established by evidence that an officer acted "with a high degree of awareness of [a statement's] probable falsity," that is, "when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported." Id. Violations of the Fourth Amendment, however, are not limited to misrepresentations or omissions; a misleading statement contained in a warrant affidavit can also violate the Fourth Amendment so long as there is "evidence that this statement . . . was sufficiently likely to mislead the issuing magistrate . . . ." Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1373 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a statement in a warrant affidavit need not be "literally untruthful" to violate the Fourth Amendment). Additionally, a plaintiff must prove that the false or misleading statement was material to the judicial officer's finding of probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978); Tincher v. Fink, No. 03-0030, 2005 WL 1845319, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 2, 2005) ("As the Fourth Circuit has noted, a false or misleading statement made while obtaining a warrantconstitutes a Fourth Amendment violation only if the statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.").

First, with respect to the arrest warrant, the Application for Statement of Charges, prepared by Detective Harley on November 5, 2009 states, in full, that:

On 10-24-09 the victim (Eric Harper) was shot by the defendant (Whitley, Everett) in front of the above address. The victim was on his wa[y] home when the defendant stood in front of 6802 Atwood Street and pointed a handgun at him and shot two rounds striking the victim twice in his leg. The Victim was transported to a local hospital where he was treated and released. The victim is waiting for surgery to have the bullet removed from his right leg. The witness [Ms. Nedia Boodie] saw the event and later
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