Whitlock v. State, 1282S499
Citation | 456 N.E.2d 717 |
Decision Date | 12 December 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 1282S499,1282S499 |
Parties | Robert L. WHITLOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Robert L. Whitlock entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter in Marion Superior Court on January 14, 1980. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. A hearing was held on the defendant's pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Ind.R.P.C. 1 on April 9, 1981, and the present appeal follows.
The only issue the defendant raises is that the guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims that he was inadequately advised by trial counsel as to the actual time he would have to serve on his sentence and that trial counsel was not properly prepared to present his defense of self-defense and had not adequately advised him about that defense. The defendant claims that his attorney told him if he accepted the plea bargain he would serve a term of only three or four years. He also claims his attorney did not subpoena the witnesses by the morning of trial that the defendant states could have testified about his self-defense claim.
The burden of proof in a post-conviction hearing is on the petitioner to establish grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Robinson v. State, (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 73, 74; Herman v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 680, 684, 395 N.E.2d 249, 252. The trial court is the trier of fact and sole judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. A judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless the evidence is without conflict and leads inescapably to a conclusion which is contrary to that reached by the trial court. Robinson, supra; Herman, supra.
The only evidence that supports the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is the testimony of the defendant and his mother. Both testified that by accepting the plea agreement, the defendant was assured by counsel that he would serve only three or four years of a twenty year sentence. The defendant also testified that defense counsel did not adequately advise him about the self-defense issue and told him there was no claim of self-defense in Indiana. The defendant did not call his trial counsel as a witness at the post-conviction hearing.
When incompetency of counsel is alleged there is a presumption that an attorney has discharged his duty fully; strong and convincing proof is necessary to overcome this presumption. The presumption is overcome only by showing that the attorney's action or inaction made the proceedings a mockery of justice and shocking to the conscience of the court. Brown v. State, (1983) Ind., 443 N.E.2d 316; Lenoir v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 212, 368 N.E.2d 1356. In regard to the defendant's failure to call his trial counsel as a witness at the post-conviction hearing, the trial court would be justified in inferring that the trial counsel would not have corroborated the acts and omissions which led to the alleged inadequate representation. Cobbs v. State, (1982) Ind., 434 N.E.2d 883; Lenoir, supra. In addition, Howland v. State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1081, 1083.
The record here shows that the defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights, the consequences of entering a plea of guilty, that he was satisfied with trial counsel, that he understood the charges against him, and that he admitted he committed the crime. The trial court advised the defendant of the possible penalty and the maximum and minimum sentences for the offense charged. The record shows that the trial court completely fulfilled its obligation to advise the defendant pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns Repl.1979) (now repealed). During the guilty plea hearing, the defendant discussed his rights with the trial court in detail. Defendant indicated he understood he was receiving a possible twenty year sentence and told the trial court he had had ample time to discuss the plea with his...
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Robinson v. State
...489 N.E.2d 594. For purposes of post-conviction relief, there is a strong presumption of adequate legal assistance. Whitlock v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 717. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective by failing to present meritless claims or defenses. Hill v. State (1984), Ind., 462 N.E.......
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Young v. State
...of ineffective representation must overcome the presumption that counsel afforded defendant effective representation. Whitlock v. State, (1983) Ind., 456 N.E.2d 717; Metcalf v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 321;, Gosnell v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1153. The trial court's determinati......
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Foster v. State
...attorney's action or inaction made the proceedings a mockery of justice and shocking to the conscience of the court. Whitlock v. State, 456 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind.1983).A. Trial Counsel According to Foster, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in four respects: counsel failed to ......
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Bohannon v. State
...action or inaction made the proceedings a mockery of justice that is shocking to the conscience of the court. Whitlock v. State, 456 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind.1983).A. Mistakes and Mitigating Factors The State argues, and we agree, that Bohannon has failed to present a cogent argument with respe......