Whitman v. Department of Transportation

• Decision Date: 05 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-1131.,04-1131.
• Parties: WHITMAN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

547 U.S. 512

126 S. Ct. 2014

164 L. Ed. 2d 771

WHITMAN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.

No. 04-1131.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued December 5, 2005.

Decided June 5, 2006.

Without first pursuing his collective-bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, petitioner filed suit alleging that his constitutional rights and 49 U. S. C. § 45104(8) were violated when his employer, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), tested him for drugs and alcohol in a nonrandom manner. The District Court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), whose grievance rules the FAA has adopted. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated that petitioner's claims were precluded because 5 U. S. C. § 7121(a)(1) did not confer federal-court jurisdiction.

Held: This case is remanded for the Ninth Circuit to address whether the FAA's actions constituted a "prohibited personnel practice," see 5 U. S. C. § 2302(b); 49 U. S. C. § 40122(g)(2)(A), as well as to address the ultimate preclusion issue. The question is not whether 5 U. S. C. § 7121 confers jurisdiction, but whether it removes the jurisdiction given to the federal courts or otherwise precludes employees from pursuing remedies beyond those set out in the CSRA. Deciding the jurisdiction and preclusion questions requires ascertaining where petitioner's claims fit within the statutory scheme, as the CSRA provides different treatment for grievances depending on the nature of the claim. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether petitioners' allegations state a "prohibited personnel practice." Other issues raised in this Court, but not decided below—e. g., whether petitioner has challenged final agency action— may also be addressed on remand, for a decision on those issues can obviate the need to decide the more difficult preclusion question.

382 F. 3d 938, vacated and remanded.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Pamela S. Karlan argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, and Kevin K. Russell.

Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, John P. Elwood, William Kanter, Jeffrey A Rosen, Paul M. Geier, Jerome M. Mellody, Mark A. Robbins, Steven E. Abow, and Robin M. Richardson.^*

PER CURIAM.

Terry Whitman, the petitioner, is an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and is subject to the agency's drug and alcohol testing program. Without first seeking to pursue grievance procedures under his collective-bargaining agreement, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, alleging the FAA tested him in a nonrandom manner, in violation of his constitutional rights and 49 U. S. C. § 45104(8).

The FAA has its own procedural framework for the resolution of claims by its employees; and for this purpose it adopts certain sections of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), including Chapter 71 of Title 5, which sets forth the rules for grievances. 49 U. S. C. § 40122(g)(2)(C). The District Court held that, under the provisions of the CSRA, it was without jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that because "5 U. S. C. § 7121(a)(1), as amended in 1994, does not expressly confer federal court jurisdiction over employment-related claims covered by the negotiated grievance procedures of federal employees' collective bargaining agreements," his claims are precluded. 382 F. 3d 938, 939 (2004). This Court granted certiorari to review the judgment. 545 U. S. 1138 (2005).

The Court of Appeals was correct to say that 5 U. S. C. § 7121(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction. Another statute, however—a very familiar one—grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 1331. The question, then, is not whether 5 U. S. C. § 7121 confers jurisdiction, but whether § 7121 (or the CSRA as a whole) removes the jurisdiction given to the federal courts, see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 642 (2002) (holding that "even if [47 U. S. C.] § 252(e)(6) does not confer jurisdiction, it at least does not divest the district courts of their authority under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law"), or otherwise precludes employees from pursuing remedies beyond those set out in the CSRA, cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 443-444 (1988); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) ("The question is phrased in terms of `prohibition' rather than `authorization' because ... judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress").

In deciding the question of jurisdiction and preclusion, the Court would be required first...