Whitney v. Cassidy
| Decision Date | 12 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-00038-NT |
| Parties | SCOTT WHITNEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK D. CASSIDY and MEDUXNEKEAG RAMBLERS SNOWMOBILE CLUB, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Before me is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ( ) (ECF No 11). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND [1]
On the morning of February 10, 2019, Plaintiff Scott Whitney was traveling southbound on a snowmobile on ITS Trail 86 in Webbertown, Maine. Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1). That same morning, Defendant Mark D. Cassidy was heading north on the trail operating a Tucker Snow-Cat groom machine (a “groomer”). Compl. ¶ 6. Mr Cassidy stopped the groomer just before a blind curve at the bottom of a hill in a spot that blocked the trail but was not visible to oncoming snowmobilers. Compl. ¶ 7.
Traveling from the other direction, Mr. Whitney was not able to see the groomer blocking the trail. Compl. ¶ 7. As he approached the groomer, Mr. Whitney had to maneuver the snowmobile onto a snowbank on the side of the trail to avoid a head-on collision. But he lost control and collided with a dragger connected to the groomer, sustaining severe injuries. Compl. ¶ 8.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Cassidy worked as a trail groomer for Defendant Meduxnekeag Ramblers Snowmobile Club (“MRSC”). Compl. ¶ 6. MRSC is a non-profit organization involved with maintaining and grooming snowmobile trails. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 11, 15 19. MRSC owned the groomer involved in the collision. Compl. ¶ 14.
On February 8, 2022, Plaintiff Whitney brought this lawsuit against Defendants Cassidy and MRSC. Defendants Cassidy and MRSC move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, I take “as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.” Alston v Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011)). To be able to get past the motion to dismiss stage, the Plaintiff need not put forward “detailed factual allegations,” but must offer more than “ ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The Plaintiff also cannot make “ ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.' ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“[A] complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Alston, 988 F.3d at 571 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is “plausible” if the facts alleged give rise to a reasonable inference of liability. Id. “Plausible” means “more than merely possible.” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)).
The Defendants claim that they are immune from suit under Maine's Recreational Land Use Statute, which provides that occupants of land that is open to the public owe no duty of care to keep premises safe or to warn of dangerous conditions to recreational users of the land. Defs.' Mot 3-6. The Plaintiff contends that the Recreational Land Use Statute does not protect the Defendants from the claims that he asserts. Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) 1-4 (ECF No. 13). I. Legal Background
There is an exception to the limitation of liability for injuries resulting from “willful or malicious failure to guard or to warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.” 14 M.R.S. § 159-A(4)(A).[2] The Recreational Land Use Statute goes on to provide that: “Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability of injury to a person or property.” 14 M.R.S. § 159-A(5).
For purposes of this case, several other provisions are relevant. First, “recreational activity” is defined to include “operating snow-traveling and all-terrain vehicles” as well as “entry of, volunteer maintenance and improvement of, use of and passage over premises” to pursue snow-traveling activities. Id. § 159-A(1)(B). Second, “premises” include “improved and unimproved lands.” Id. § 159-A(1)(A). Third, an “occupant” includes a “legal entity that constructs or maintains trails or other improvements for public recreational use.” Id. § 159-A(1)(C).[3] Finally, occupants who are found to be not liable under the section will be awarded “direct legal costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.” Id. § 159-A(6).
To understand the present version of the Maine Recreational Land Use Statute, it helps to understand the common law duties that landowners and possessors owe to persons on their land. Historically, the duty that landowners[4] owed depended on the entrant's legal status. Poulin v. Colby Coll., 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979). A landowner owed invitees, “persons present on the land through an owner's express or implied invitation, either for a purpose connected with the owner's business, or for a social visit,” a duty to “exercis[e] reasonable care in providing reasonably safe premises for their use.” Id. In contrast, a landowner owed licensees, those “who are neither passengers, servants, nor trespassers, and do not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and are permitted to come upon the premises for their own interest, convenience or gratification,” the duty to “refrain[] from wilfully, wantonly or recklessly causing [them] harm.” Id. As to a third class of entrants-trespassers-landowners are not liable for bodily harm caused by their “failure to exercise reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them.” Restatement (Second) Torts § 333. Landowners do, however, have a duty to abstain from wantonly injuring trespassers. See, e.g., Dixon v. Swift, 56 A. 761 (Me. 1903).
Maine's Recreational Land Use Statute was originally enacted in 1961 when Maine's common law distinguished between invitees, licensees, and trespassers.[5] P.L. 1961, ch. 276 (). The original law provided that “landowners owed no duty to others who used their premises for ‘hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, hiking or sightseeing.' ” Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc., 541 A.2d 951, 952 n.2 (Me. 1988) (quoting P.L. 1961, ch. 276; R.S. ch. 37, § 152 (1954)).
The original law was overhauled in 1969[6] and 1979,[7] and amended multiple times with each change expanding the scope of protections for landowners. “One of the purposes of the limited liability rule of the recreational use statute [was] to encourage landowners to allow recreational use of the Maine woodlands that are rich with opportunities for hunting, fishing, and other recreational activities.” Robbins v. Great N. Paper Co., 557 A.2d 616-17 (Me. 1989). As originally proposed, the 1979 bill contained the following Statement of Fact section:
The purpose of this bill is to make clear that a landowner who permits others on his land without charge to hunt, fish, hike, camp or for other recreational purposes should not be subject to liability for injuries incurred, except as may be caused by the willful or wanton action of the landowner. Someone who opens his land for recreational use by the public without charge should not be subject to greater liability than one who excludes the public from his land.
L.D. 288 (109th Legis. 1979).[8]
Although it has been amended many times throughout the years, the Recreational Land Use Statute's limitations on liability have remained constant. The limitation language that the Maine Legislature has used throughout-relieving landowners of the duty to keep the premises safe for entry and use by recreational users and the duty to warn of hazardous conditions, uses, structures or activities- and the exception to the limitation of...
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