Whitney v. Franklin Gen. Hosp.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. C 13-3048-MWB,C 13-3048-MWB |
| Parties | NICOLE WHITNEY, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN GENERAL HOSPITAL; MERCY HEALTH SERVICES—IOWA CORP.; MERCY HEALTH NETWORK, INC., and KIM PRICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Despite the parties' voluminous statements of facts, I find that the facts sufficient to put in context plaintiff Nicole Whitney's claims and the parties' arguments concerning summary judgment can be set forth rather briefly. In 2006, Whitney was hired as a medical records receptionist at defendant Franklin General Hospital (the Hospital), and she continued in that position until she was terminated on December 3, 2012. Whitney was employed and paid directly by the Hospital, but Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp., and Mercy Health Network, Inc., (the Mercy Defendants) controlled operations of the Hospital under agreements pursuant to which Mercy would provide management services and certain key personnel, including a chief executive officer/administrator, to operate the Hospital. The parties dispute whether the Mercy Defendants, or their employees, had the authority to terminate employees of the Hospital or merely had "input" on hiring and firing decisions of employees employed directly by the Hospital. The Mercy Defendants hired defendant Kim Price to serve as Chief Executive Officer of the Hospital in July 2010.
Whitney alleges that, from 2006 through 2009, Dr. Brian Hansen, the Hospital's Medical Director and her personal physician, engaged in sexual harassment and sexual exploitation of her. Whitney did not report any sexual misconduct by Hansen while it was occurring and did not know that Hansen was sexually exploiting other female employees at the Hospital during and after the time that he harassed and exploited her. On May 18, 2012, two other women reported sexual harassment by Hansen, and, after an investigation revealed that Hansen had sexually harassed at least eight women, Hansen was fired on June 1, 2012. On June 7, 2012, after Hansen had already been fired, Whitney reported to the defendants' investigator what she described as a "consensual" sexual relationship with Hansen, although Whitney contends that her statements and conduct during that report should have indicated that the sexual relationship was not "consensual." It was not until August 2012 that Whitney expressly reported to her superiors that Hansen had actually sexually harassed and exploited her. Whitney admits that "nobody knew" about Hansen's conduct with her, or any relationship between them, until 2012.
Between December 5, 2011, and September 26, 2012, Whitney used twelve weeks of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, including leave for treatment for depression, anxiety, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in August 2012. Upon her return from leave in the fall of 2012, Whitney began working half days. Although Whitney had requested a reduced schedule, she contends that the defendants dictated that she start by working half days "for a week or two." Whitney also asserts that, in October and November of 2012, she requested leave on a number of specific days, because of anxiety and depression, and that she requested intermittent leave as an accommodation, but that the defendants never engaged in any dialogue with her about her possible leave arrangements, just documented her absences. The defendants contendthat Whitney never told them more about her condition or what leave arrangements would accommodate her.
The defendants contend, and Whitney disputes, that throughout her employment, Whitney displayed problems with attendance, productivity, and "professionalism" in the workplace, which distracted her co-workers. Whitney contends that her performance reviews were good, although they admittedly included identification of areas for improvement. The defendants contend that Whitney took excessive time off and violated the Hospital's time-keeping procedures by failing to "clock out" for lunch. After a third disciplinary action, Whitney was given a "last-chance" warning on November 5, 2012, which notified her that further discipline could result in termination. During a meeting on November 5, 2012, with the clinic manager and the Hospital's human resources manager, Whitney was presented with a Performance Action Plan that required her to limit the amount of time that she spent visiting co-workers and visitors, to treat co-workers with respect, and to improve her productivity. A follow-up meeting pursuant to the Plan was scheduled for December 6, 2012. Whitney was not given any negative feedback after the November 5, 2012, meeting, but she was terminated on December 3, 2012, before the scheduled follow-up meeting occurred.
Whitney filed an administrative charge of discrimination on September 12, 2012, with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), then amended that administrative charge on January 17, 2013. After Whitney received a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC, she filed this lawsuit.
Whitney filed her original Complaint (docket no. 2) in this matter on August 29, 2013, and her Amended Complaint (docket no. 4) on September 23, 2013. Only certainclaims in her Amended Complaint1 remain pending in this case, after voluntary dismissals of certain parties and after I granted in part and denied in part the defendants' December 3, 2013, Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice (docket no. 28). See Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Hospital Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 44), published at Whitney v. Franklin Gen. Hosp., 995 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Iowa 2014). The remaining claims against the Hospital and the Mercy Defendants are the following: sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), IOWA CODE CH. 216, in Count I; sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, in Count II;2 disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ICRA in Count III; failure to accommodate disabilities, disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., in Count IV; and "discrimination" in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., based on adverse action allegedly taken because Whitney took FMLA leave, within the scope of § 2615(a)(1) and Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1007 (8th Cir. 2012), in the remaining part of Count V. The remainingclaims against Price are Count I, Count II, and the remaining part of Count V. A jury trial on these claims is set to begin on June 1, 2015.
This case is before me on the defendants' February 2, 2015, Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 74). Whitney filed her Resistance (docket no. 79) to that Motion on February 26, 2015, the defendants filed their Reply (docket no. 89) on March 16, 2015, and Whitney filed her Sur-Reply (docket no. 100), with leave of court, on April 13, 2015. This case is also before me on Whitney's March 9, 2015, Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint (docket no. 87). The defendants filed their Resistance (docket no. 97) to that Motion on March 26, 2015, and Whitney filed no timely reply. Although the defendants requested oral arguments on their Motion For Summary Judgment, I have not found oral arguments to be necessary, in light of the applicable law and the parties' briefing and other submissions. Therefore, I will resolve both motions before me on the parties' written submissions.
Despite the voluminous briefs by the parties concerning the defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, I find that the determinative issues on that Motion can be addressed far more briefly. I will begin with a summary of the applicable standards for summary judgment, then turn to consideration of the various grounds for summary judgment asserted by the defendants.
Summary judgment is only...
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