Whitney v. Lea, 84-76
| Decision Date | 07 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-76,84-76 |
| Citation | 134 Vt. 591,367 A.2d 683 |
| Parties | Clarence C. WHITNEY et al. v. Brian LEA. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., Bishop & Crowley, Inc., Rutland, for plaintiffs.
Joseph W. Kozlik, Rutland, for defendant.
Before BARNEY, C. J., DALEY, LARROW and BILLINGS, JJ., and SHANGRAW, C.J. (Retired), Specially Assigned.
In Early October, 1972, the plaintiff Clarence Whitney, an architect licensed to practice in the State of Vermont, was approached by the defendant Brian Lea and asked to develop designs and drawings for a proposed tennis clubhouse which was to be part of a project known as 'Sundance' in the City of Rutland. The defendant specified no budgetary limitations for the structure but stated to the architect that the project was to be of 'super quality' and that it was to be given first priority by the architect, with overtime hours being expended if necessary. The architect undertook the assignment without discussing any fee arrangement with the defendant. After incorporating several changes into the design at the defendant's request, the architect furnished an initial design and drawings for a building which he estimated would cost $120,040 to construct. The defendant's contractor estimated that a building constructed according to this design would cost $120,288 to build. The defendant at this point informed the architect that because of previously undisclosed budgetary restrictions the project would have to be scaled down. The architect revised the drawings in accordance with the defendant's instructions and the clubhouse was eventually constructed on the basis of these revised plans at a cost of $79,659. The architect submitted a bill to the defendant for the architectural services rendered with respect to the design of the clubhouse; a separate charge was made for his services rendered relative to the electrical design for the tennis court building adjoining the clubhouse. The defendant paid only a portion of this bill, whereupon the architect and his employer, Crandall Associates, brought an action in the Rutland Superior Court on a quantum meruit basis seeking to recover the claimed balance due for the architectural services.
The lower court, in its findings of fact and conclusion of law, determined that the reasonable value of the services rendered by the architect with respect to the clubhouse was ten per cent of the actual cost of the completed structure, minus certain credits not in issue. It also awarded the plaintiffs compensation for additional services rendered by the architect, but this award did not include services provided by the architect for the electrical design of the tennis court building, a sum shown by the evidence to amount to $1,990. From the award of compensation, the plaintiffs appeal.
The principal issue raised on appeal is whether the lower court erred in awarding compensation on the basis of the actual cost of the clubhouse construction, not the estimated cost of construction of the facility as originally designed by the architect. We are also asked to review the lower court's failure to find with respect to the architect's compensation for the electrical lighting design for the tennis court building.
The parties to this appeal agree that the architect, in the absence of an express agreement concerning compensation, is entitled to recover the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered. Enos v. Owens Slate Co., 104 Vt. 329, 335-36, 160 A. 185 (1932). They disagree, however, as to the proper method to be used by the lower court in determining this amount. Before the lower court, the plaintiffs sought compensation based upon a percentage (9.8%) of the estimated cost of the building as originally designed. They introduced evidence showing that the architect's estimation of the construction cost of the building as originally designed was reasonable; his estimation closely coincided with that made by the defendant's contractor. The defendant in turn maintains that the architect is only entitled to recover a percentage of the actual cost of constructing the building.
Evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs showing that, if the architect had charged the defendant on an hourly basis, such figure would have exceeded the amount of the bill actually submitted. The lower court, apparently relying upon the testimony of an expert witness introduced by the defendant, based the award of compensation upon the actual cost of the building's construction. This expert testified that, where there was an express agreement as to compensation, the general practice...
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O'Bryan Const. Co., Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 369-79
...On a claim for quantum meruit, plaintiff is entitled to recover the fair and reasonable value of his services. Whitney v. Lea, 134 Vt. 591, 594, 367 A.2d 683, 685 (1976). Two witnesses attempted to give their opinion on this issue. First, O'Bryan, both as an expert in this area and as an ag......
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...of his services." O'Bryan Construction Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 139 Vt. 81, 89, 424 A.2d 244, 248 (1980) (citing Whitney v. Lea, 134 Vt. 591, 594, 367 A.2d 683, 685 (1976)). The trial court, in rendering judgment for the plaintiff in the present case, concluded the fair and reasonable va......
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...197, 435 N.E.2d 1169 (Ct.App.1982) (absent express contract term, architect entitled to reasonable value of services); Whitney v. Lea, 134 Vt. 591, 367 A.2d 683 (1976) (same); 98 C.J.S. Work and Labor § 66(2) (1957) ("fair and reasonable value"). There are several available measures for "re......
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