Whitney v. Lott

• Decision Date: 17 April 1944
• Docket Number: 149/685.
• Citation: 36 A.2d 888
• Parties: WHITNEY et al. v. LOTT et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

36 A.2d 888

WHITNEY et al.

v.LOTT et al.

149/685.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

April 17, 1944.

Suit by Ernest H. Whitney and others against Frank G. Lott, administrator with will annexed of the estate of Bessie Godown, deceased, and others, to establish right to property of the deceased.

Decree for complainants in accordance with opinion.

1. The common-law principle that no one should be allowed to profit by his own wrong has been accorded a very general application in equity.

2. The felonious homicide of the testatrix by a devisee or legatee does not prevent the legal title from passing to the criminal pursuant to the terms of the will. In such a case, however, equity will decree that the criminal or those who claim through him hold the property as constructive trustees.

Joseph C. Paul, of Newark, for complainants.

George K. Large, of Flemington (Sidney Kirschen, of Flemington, of counsel), for defendants.

Frank G. Lott, of Flemington, pro se.

JAYNE, Vice Chancellor.

A catastrophe, rather abhorrent and appalling, has occasioned the institution of this cause.

Frank Godown and his wife, Bessie, were married in 1910, and their alliance appears to have been blended with mutual devotion and affection. They resided in a modest home at Flemington, Hunterdon County, New Jersey, Each had achieved the prophetic span of life; he had attained the age of seventy-four and she was in her seventy-first year. In 1926 each executed a last will and testament by which the estate, real and personal, of the one was to be transmitted absolutely to the other. Mrs. Godown devised and bequeathed all of her property to her husband ‘to him, his heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple.’ These are words of limitation and not of substitution. King v. King, 125 N.J.Eq. 94, 4 A.2d 405. Neither will contains any provision for a gift over in the event of a failure of the devise or bequest to vest in the designated beneficiary.

An interruption of the customary observation of Mr. and Mrs. Godown in and about their home aroused anxiety and on March 2, 1943, peace officers were summoned. Normal entry into the house was not possible, and by means of a ladder ingress was accomplished through a window of the bathroom on the second floor. The lifeless bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Godown were promptly discovered. The police authorities seem to have been satisfied with the supposition that Mr. Godown killed his wife and then committed suicide. Both had suffered mortal wounds.

The complainants are the heirs and next of kin of the deceased lady and they lay claim to her property. The defendants, other than the administrator c.t.a., assert a similar relationship to Mr. Godown and resist the claims of the complainants. The administrator affects the situation of a neutral stakeholder. The present inquiry is directed to the factual questions: (a) Did Mr. Godown survive his wife; (b) did he feloniously slay her; and if so, then, to the legal or equitable point: (c) Can the heirs and next of kin of Mr. Godown in such circumstances acquire through him the property of his deceased spouse?

The evidence of the killings is, of course, circumstantial. Photographs realistically depict the conditions existing at the time of the discovery of the bodies. The body of Mrs. Godown was found on the floor immediately beside the bed in her bedroom. She was attired in a nightgown and her lower limbs and her feet were encircled by a bed quilt. Her death was caused by a traumatic comminuted fracture of the vertex of the skull producing severe hemorrhages from the ears, nose, and mouth. The evident force of the blow in reasonable probability created immediately upon its infliction a consequent concussion of the brain of a degree sufficient to physically incapacitate her. The injury was in character such as reasonably would be expected to result from the use of an iron bar. An iron bar twenty to twenty-two inches long and weighing twelve to fourteen pounds was observed on the floor under the right shoulder of Mr. Godown in the bedroom in which he succumbed. Foot tracks of blood appeared conspicuously on the floor between the bedrooms. The soles of the heavy socks worn by Mr. Godown were blood-stained. The feet of the wife were not discolored.

The corpse of Mr. Godown was met with in his bedroom. His death was caused by a laceration at the left groin which severed the left femoral artery. On his bed was a pen knife with the blood-stained blade opened at a ninety-degree angle. All articles of furniture in the bedrooms and throughout the house were in order and nothing indicated that a struggle had occurred. The circumstances are not productive of inferences of a mutual suicide pact or of the perpetration of the crimes by a third person. The sanity of Mr. Godown is presumed. 20 Am.Jur. (Ev.) 215. Although the evidence is not abundant, I am persuaded that a felonious uxoricide and a suicide in fact happened.

In like cases, the determination of the survivorship is often perplexing and enigmatic. Cf. In re Le Van's Will, 123 N.J.Eq. 463, 198 A. 278, affirmed 125 N.J.Eq. 92, 4 A.2d 280. Here, the bill charges (Par. 6) that Mr. Godown survived his wife. The defendants (other than Lott) admit in their answer (Par. 2) that ‘Frank Godown died within a short time after the death of Bessie W. Godown.’ Thus, this material fact is acknowledged by all parties professing to have a beneficial interest in the estate of Mrs. Godown. The admission being favorable to the interests of the infant defendants is therefore competent. Anderson v. Anderson, 133 N.J.Eq. 311, 32 A.2d 83. Methodically, this acquiescence would establish the acquisition by Mr. Godown of the property of his wife pursuant to the terms of her will and in consequence of his death, the property would gravitate to his heirs and next of kin.

The complainants avow that by reason of the homicidal act of Mr. Godown the normal succession of the beneficial ownership of the property of his victim is impeded and that such ownership veers to them. They invoke the policy of the common law that no one should be allowed to profit by his own wrong. The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, in one or another of its significations, has been accorded a very general application in equity and, indeed, also at law. Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 N.J.L. 414, 166 A. 335.

The doctrine itself, so essential to the observance of morality and justice, has been universally recognized in the laws of civilized communities for centuries and is as old as equity. Its sentiment is ageless. Domat, pt. 2, bk. 1; Code Nap. 727; Mackelday's Roman Law, 530; Coke's Littleton 148-B; Broom's Legal Maxims, 9th Ed., 197. The permissibility of its application in diversity of the provisions of a will or of statutes of descent or distribution, and the theorization of its legitimate application in such cases have been the subjects of decisions noticeably oppugnant and discordant. Such, also, have been the topics of numerous articles published in our law reviews: 3 Harvard Law Review 234; 4 Id. 394; 8 Id. 170; 24 Id. 227; 30 Id. 622; 44 Id. 125; 49 Id. 715; Am.Law Reg. 1897; 29 Mich.Law Rev. 745; 6 Univ. of Cincinnati Law Rev. 469; 47 Law Quarterly Rev. 320; Virginia Law Review (March 1933) p. 518; 8 N. Y. U. Law Quarterly Review, No. 3, p. 492; lecture of Mr. Justice...