Whitridge v. Whitridge
| Decision Date | 07 June 1892 |
| Citation | 24 A. 645,76 Md. 54 |
| Parties | WHITRIDGE v. WHITRIDGE ET AL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore.
Suit by Elizabeth Whitridge by her next friend, James H. B Whitridge, against William H. Whitridge and others, trustees of a voluntary deed executed by plaintiff, to vacate same and set it aside. Judgment sustaining the deed reversed.
In an action to vacate a voluntary deed conveying in trust for the grantor and others property received absolutely under her grandfather's will, the grantor testified that she was told by her grandfather's legal adviser, who drew his will, and was one of its trustees, that it was obligatory on her to put her property in trust, as it was her grandfather's wish; that she was led to believe from what her father and other relatives insisted that her father had the right to "elect" that she should put her property in trust, which, not having seen her grandfather's will, she never doubted; that eventually she became engaged to be married, and that, after much further pressure, and for fear of losing her father's approval of her marriage, she signed the deed, skimming it through without understanding its meaning, and with no person to explain it or its results to her. Held, that this evidence, corroborated by the intrinsic improvidence of the deed itself in containing no power of revocation, and relinquishing all free testamentary power over the bulk of the property, shows a want of understanding of its dispositions, and that the deed was not the free, voluntary and unbiased act of the grantor.
The opinion of Judge PHELPS dismissing the bill in the circuit court is as follows:
"The object of this suit is the cancellation of a deed of trust executed by the plaintiff 9th November, 1876. The case has been twice argued; the first time before Judge DENNIS, who declined to entertain it as then presented, for reasons which will appear further on. The plaintiff is the daughter of the late William H. Graham, and the granddaughter of the late George Brown. Upon her coming of age in March, 1876, she became entitled in her own right to the possession of one fourteenth of her grandfather's estate under his will, her share, with its accumulations, then amounting to $357,920.94. She had also expectations from her grandmother, Mrs. Isabella Brown, her father, and other relations, which have been since realized. The case made by the bill, filed 18th June, 1890, is that her intended marriage to her present husband, William H. Whitridge, being opposed by her father, her grandmother, and the family generally, every effort was made by them to break off the match, and to that end they all combined to compel her to execute a deed of trust of her property, which, should she die without issue, would secure it all to the Brown family, and exclude her husband from its administration, and the execution whereof by her they believed would cause the defendant William H. Whitridge to break off said marriage. The deed, she charges, was obtained from her by the influence of her father and grandmother, at a time and under circumstances when her mind was incapable of exercising any free agency, and was too feeble to resist their influence.
The grantees and trustees named in the deed are the plaintiff's father, the late Wm. H. Graham, and Wm. G. Bowdoin. The general scheme of the deed (leaving out of view the powers to devise) is a voluntary settlement of that portion of the grantor's fortune coming to her under her grandfather's will, in trust for the separate use of the grantor for life, remainder to her issue living at her death, remainder in equal moieties (but unequal estates) to her father and brother, with cross remainders, ultimate remainder to the heirs at law and next of kin of her said grandfather. The powers to devise are: (1) As to $150,000 absolutely; (2) to prefer and apportion at her pleasure as amongst her 'issue;' (3) to prefer and apportion at her pleasure as amongst the 'descendants' of her grandfather. This last power can only be made available in remote contingencies. Upon the termination of her life estate two main contingencies are provided for,--the contingency of her death leaving issue then living, and the contingency of her death without issue then living. The first of these contingencies is subdivided into two,--the first supposing the powers to devise have been exercised in whole or in part; the second providing for so much as may not have been so devised. In this way three principal contingencies are developed, and provision is then made for eight subcontingencies or 'cases,' under each of these three heads; four of these 'cases' being applicable to her father, and four of them to the moiety of her brother. These twenty-four subcontingencies or 'cases' are, of course, postulated upon the various contingencies of life and death of her successors, and of death with and death without issue, and whether before or after the several events upon which the contingent remainders and cross remainders are limited.
The deed is very elaborate, and on the surface presents an artificial and intricate appearance. So far as concerns her own personal interest, and perhaps as to the interests of her immediate successors, the plaintiff might have been able to understand it without assistance. But it would have been manifestly impossible for her or any one but an expert to follow the ulterior limitations of the deed. This fact is noted in passing, but its importance will be found considerably reduced by circumstances hereafter mentioned. The deed was drawn out into great prolixity, partly from an evident anxiety to avoid collision with the rule against perpetuities. Notwithstanding this, the acute criticism of learned counsel has fastened upon a supposed error, several times repeated.
1. I agree with them that the deed is to be construed as if the rule did not exist, to this extent: that the true construction cannot be varied to avoid the effect of the rule. I also agree with the proposition on the other side,--that, where an expression is fairly doubtful, equally susceptible of two constructions, that construction is to be preferred which would create a legal rather than an illegal interest. This principle is especially applicable in cases where the whole context manifestly shows, as in this instrument, that the rule against perpetuities was held in contemplation. Gray, Perp. § 633. Extracted from its context, (with which, however, it must be carefully compared,) the expression in question reads as follows: 'And if any such issue [[issue of the grantor living at her death] shall die under the age of twenty-one years, without leaving issue living at the time of his or her death, then, as to the entire property, as well original as accruing under this deed of such issue so dying, in trust for or [as] the case may be, to be conveyed to the issue then surviving of the said Elizabeth,' etc. The words 'in trust for or as the case may be,' are elliptical, and, in order to complete the meaning, something will have to be read into them. That is clear enough, but it is not so clear what the words are that must be supplied. As claimed by counsel for plaintiff, the expression must be understood to read as follows: 'In trust for (if under age) or as the case may be (if over age) to be conveyed to,' etc. They have shown that by this construction there is a possibility that the trust might not end for forty or fifty years after the death of Mrs. Whitridge as to some of her possible remote issue, and there are plausible arguments for this construction, and they have been very ably and forcibly urged. On the other hand, the ellipsis is sought to be filled by reference to the immediately preceding context, so as to make the expression read something like this: 'In trust for (if as last aforesaid) or as the case may be (if otherwise.)' The immediately preceding context, to which this reference is made, is as follows: 'Shall be held in trust by said trustees for the benefit of such issue [issue of the grantor living at her death] until he or she shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and then to be conveyed to him or her.' By thus referring the trust immediately in question to a trust for those only for whose use a trust had just before been declared, the trust is obviously limited to issue living at the grantor's death, and as to all other issue (not living at her death) included within the expression, 'or as the case may be,' no trust had been previously declared, and none is intended to be created by the clause in question. The elliptical expression thus draws upon its immediate antecedent for its filling, and the deed naturally becomes its own interpreter. By it no estate is attempted to be created beyond a life in being and twenty-one years thereafter. The same expression is repeated in subsequent paragraphs, and each time is suceptible of a similar construction. The clause criticised does not, in my opinion, violate the rule against remoteness; and, even if it did, the striking down of this clause for the benefit of the issue would not invalidate the previous trust for the benefit of the grantor. 'When successive estates are created and the first in order of succession is not void for remoteness, it is good, although the subsequent estates should be void for that reason.' Goldsborough v. Martin, 41 Md. 502.
2. The deed reserves to the grantor no power of revocation, and this omission is relied on by the plaintiff, if not to condemn the deed absolutely, at least to raise a presumption against it. There is a class of voluntary settlements to which powers of revocation are appropriate, and another class to which they are not. It is not deemed necessary to discuss the numerous cases cited on...
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