Whitson v. Staff Acquisition, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 98-T-862-N.,CIV.A. 98-T-862-N.
• Citation: 41 F.Supp.2d 1294
• Parties: Rhonda WHITSON, Plaintiff, v. STAFF ACQUISITION, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Page 1294

41 F.Supp.2d 1294

Rhonda WHITSON, Plaintiff, v. STAFF ACQUISITION, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 98-T-862-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

January 27, 1999.

Julian L. McPhillips, Jr., Karen Sampson Rodgers, McPhillips, Shinbaum & Gill, Montgomery, Al, for plaintiff.

Judy B. Van Heest, Beers, Anderson, Jackson, Hughes & Patty, PC, Montgomery, AL, John F. Wymer, III, Eric P. Berezin, Derek W. Bottoms, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Rhonda Whitson, an African-American woman, has brought this lawsuit claiming that defendants Staff Acquisition, Inc., Staff Leasing, L.P., and Red Lion Apartments unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her race and terminated her employment in retaliation for filing a charge of race discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Whitson bases her lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. She has invoked the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal-question) and 1343(a)(4) (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII).

Currently, this cause is before the court on a motion, filed by the Staff defendants, seeking to have Whitson's complaint dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss should be denied.

I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD

Lack of subject matter-jurisdiction may be asserted by either party or by the court, on its own motion, at any time during the pendency of an action. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).¹ The burden of establishing a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction once challenged, rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 445, 62 S.Ct. 673, 675, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980).²

As a general rule, a district court's first duty is to determine whether it enjoys subject-matter jurisdiction, because that implicates the court's "very power to hear the case." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Accordingly, the court is permitted to undertake a wide-ranging investigation and, in order to ascertain whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, may look beyond the pleadings and may review or accept any evidence submitted by the parties. See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam).

Rule 12(b)(1) permits lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to be asserted in two ways: by facial and factual attacks on the pleading. Id. A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the pleading and the plaintiff enjoys similar safeguards to those provided when opposing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).³ Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir.1994); see also Dunbar, 919 F.2d at 1529. The court accepts the plaintiffs allegations as true, construes them most favorably to the plaintiff, and will not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine jurisdiction. Id. See also Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511; Dunbar, 919 F.2d at 1529.

A factual attack, on the other hand, permits "the trial court [to] proceed as it never could under [Rule] 12(b)(6)." Dunbar, 919 F.2d at 1529. The court, in an effort to determine whether it has the power to hear the case, may weigh the evidence to confirm its jurisdiction. Id. "No presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts does not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Id.

However, there is an important, if not always clear, distinction between the court's power to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction and its ability to reach the substantive federal-law claims which form the basis of the case. The wide-ranging power afforded the court is strictly limited to a consideration of subject-matter jurisdiction: when the inquiry encroaches upon the merits of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to protection from the court's power to weigh the facts under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 733 (11th Cir.1982). ("The argument against premature dismissal on 12(b)(1) grounds is particularly strong when the basis of jurisdiction is also an element of plaintiff's cause of action on the merits").

Thus, where subject-matter jurisdiction is "inextricably intertwined" with the merits of the case, Dunbar, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Eaton, 692 F.2d at 733), "the defendant's challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. May 20, 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981).⁴ Here the court's power is more limited than under a straightforward Rule 12(b)(1) motion, because a defendant may not challenge the underlying cause of action by means of an attack on subject-matter jurisdiction which enables the trier of law, rather than the trier of fact, to weigh the merits of the case. See Eaton, 692 F.2d at 733. Instead, the court should convert the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to provide the plaintiff with the appropriate protections. Id.

In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Andreu v. Sapp, 919 F.2d 637, 639 (11th Cir.1990), and construes the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). The lawsuit may not be dismissed unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts supporting the relief requested. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 1686; Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir.1993).

II. FACTUAL SUMMARY

Whitson worked as the assistant manager of Red Lion Apartments. Her complaint alleges that three different entities, Red Lion, Staff Acquisition, and Staff Leasing, racially discriminated against her and then terminated her in retaliation for filing a claim with the EEOC.

Whitson filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC asserting that she was denied promotion to the position of apartment manager in favor of a less-qualified white woman.⁵ However, she named only Red Lion on her charge-of-discrimination form and on the accompanying affidavit.⁶ Neither of the Staff defendants were mentioned. After Red Lion terminated Whitson,⁷ she amended her EEOC discrimination charge to allege retaliation.⁸ Once again, she named only Red Lion, and not the Staff defendants, on her charge-of-discrimination form and accompanying affidavit.⁹

Whitson alleges that her failure to name the Staff defendants in the EEOC charge is justified because they are "closely related" to Red Lion: that they share operations, management, control, and legal counsel; that they provided Whitson with her benefits and health forms; and that they were labeled as employers during her unemployment hearing against Red Lion.¹⁰

The Staff defendants claim they are not closely related to Red Lion.¹¹ Judith Smith, Corporate Counsel for Staff Leasing, filed an affidavit stating that Staff Leasing has not done business in Alabama, or anywhere else, as Red Lion; that Staff Leasing has no ownership interest in Red Lion; and that Red Lion is not its agent.¹² Michael D. Craig, Vice President and General Counsel of Staff Leasing, filed an affidavit stating that he did not retain Hon. Judy van Heest, who also represents Red Lion, until after the EEOC had concluded its investigation.¹³

III. DISCUSSION

The Staff defendants contend that Whitson is precluded from suing them for racial discrimination because she failed to name them as parties in her EEOC charge. Usually, the identification of a defendant in the EEOC charge is a prerequisite to bringing a claim under Title VII. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir.1994); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c). "The starting point for determining the permissible scope of a judicial complaint is the administrative charge and investigation. The judicial complaint is limited to the scope of the administrative investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (citing Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1983); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 714 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S.Ct. 1415, 79 L.Ed.2d 741 (1984)). A plaintiff may include in her complaint a claim for injury resulting from any practice which "was or should have been included in a reasonable investigation of the administrative complaint." Id.

However, courts liberally construe this requirement, see DiGiro v. Pall Corp., 993 F.Supp. 1471, 1473 (M.D.Fla.1998), and, where the purposes of the act are fulfilled, will carve out an exception to the general rule that parties to the lawsuit must be named in the EEOC charge. See Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1359. Thus, to prove jurisdiction for the purposes of Title VII, Whitson must demonstrate either that the Staff defendants are covered by the "grows out of" prong of the rule or that they are included in the "purposes of the act" exception to the rule.

A. "Growing out of" Prong

Whitson contends that the Staff defendants were in a sufficiently-close relationship with Red Lion to receive notice of the EEOC investigation. "It is well-established that `an administrative charge against one defenda...