Whitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1987
• Docket Number: 87-AR-1644-M and 87-AR-5394-NW.,Civ. A. No. 87-AR-1442-M
• Citation: 676 F. Supp. 1119
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Parties: William B. WHITT, as administrator, Plaintiff, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, et al., Defendants. Harley AMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants. Ray E. EITEL, Plaintiff, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY EMPLOYEE'S TRUST, Defendant.

676 F. Supp. 1119

William B. WHITT, as administrator, Plaintiff, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Harley AMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

Ray E. EITEL, Plaintiff, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY EMPLOYEE'S TRUST, Defendant.

Civ. A. Nos. 87-AR-1442-M, 87-AR-1644-M and 87-AR-5394-NW.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle and Northwestern Divisions.

December 4, 1987.

Supplementary Memorandum Opinion December 22, 1987.

Rick DiGiorgio, Jaffe, Burton & DiGiorgio, Rogers-Taylor Manor, Birmingham, Ala., for Whitt.

John O. Morrow, Jr., Florence, Ala., for Amos.

Daniel B. King and Robert H. King, King & King, Gadsden, Ala., for Eitel.

James D. Pruett, Pruett, Turnbach & Warren, P.C., Gadsden, Ala., for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

Charles D. Stewart and Ann M. Watson, Spain, Gillon, Tate, Grooms & Blan, Birmingham, Ala., for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama.

Lawrence B. Clark, Sally S. Reilly, Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, Ala., for Halliburton Co. Employee's Trust.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ACKER, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in the above-entitled causes apparently so strongly believe in their right to the jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment that they are not willing to roll over and play dead and to accept the growing assumption, as yet without Supreme Court sanction, that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (ERISA), both precludes all state law remedies in cases which fall under ERISA and simultaneously denies the complaining party any right to trial by jury, no matter whether the remedies he seeks are considered traditionally "legal" or traditionally "equitable."

Each of the three above-entitled cases presents the same question. This court has not consolidated the cases, but because this opinion will reveal the court's rationale for its ruling in all three cases, the cases will be treated together for the purposes of this opinion.

In Whitt v. Goodyear, Whitt filed his complaint in the state court. He never invoked nor mentioned ERISA. He stated Alabama causes of action for breach of contract, negligence and fraud. He demanded a jury trial. Absent some constitutional legislative intervention, his claims would clearly entitle him to a jury trial. Goodyear, correctly characterizing the relationship between the parties to implicate ERISA, removed the case to this court and seeks not only to preempt all of Whitt's state claims and to limit Whitt to any remedies provided by ERISA, but also to strike Whitt's jury demand.

In Amos v. Blue Cross, Amos filed his complaint in the state court. He never invoked nor mentioned ERISA. He stated Alabama causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay a clearly due claim. He demanded a jury trial. Absent some constitutional legislative intervention, each of his claims would clearly entitle him to a jury trial. Blue Cross, correctly characterizing the relationship between the parties to implicate ERISA, removed the case to this court and seeks not only to preempt all state claims and to limit Amos to the remedies provided by ERISA, but also seeks to strike Amos' jury demand.

In Eitel v. Halliburton, Eitel filed his complaint in the state court. He never invoked nor mentioned ERISA. He stated an Alabama cause of action for breach of contract. He demanded a jury trial. Absent some constitutional legislative intervention, his claim would clearly entitle him to a jury trial. Halliburton, correctly characterizing the relationship between the parties to implicate ERISA, removed the case to this court and seeks not only to preempt the state claim and to limit Eitel to the remedies provided by ERISA, but also to strike Eitel's jury demand.

The reader should by now have detected such striking similarities between the procedural and substantive postures of these three cases as to make them virtually identical.

It is now beyond argument that ERISA is "the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits." Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); Seafarer's Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So.2d 53 (Ala. 1987). The idea of congressional ERISA preemption under the aegis of the "commerce clause" was anticipated by the Eleventh Circuit even prior to Pilot Life in Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.1987). While Howard v. Parisian, Inc. recognizes that state remedies are preempted, the exact extent and variety of the ERISA remedies themselves have not as yet been determined. In Howard v. Parisian, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit said as to the scope of the available remedies:

Howard also argues that this Court should hold that extra-contractual relief is available under ERISA for the fraudulent and malicious denial of medical benefits under an employee welfare benefit plan and should fashion that relief to parallel the relief available under state law. See Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir.1984) (ERISA intends courts to develop federal common law concerning rights and obligations under employee benefit plans). In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 3089-94, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985), the Supreme Court held that Section 409(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a), does not create a private right of action in favor of a plan beneficiary against a plan fiduciary for extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages on account of the improper refusal to pay benefits. However, the Court did not address whether such relief was available under any other provision, Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 3089 n. 5, and Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in which three other Justices joined, strongly indicated that Section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3), which allows a beneficiary to "obtain other appropriate equitable relief," permits a beneficiary to recover such extra-contractual damages. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148-58, 105 S.Ct. at 3094-99 (Brennan, J., concurring). Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that such extra-contractual relief is available under ERISA, the assertion of claims arising under state law is still preempted.

807 F.2d at 1565.

The scope of the relief to which these three plaintiffs may be entitled under ERISA is not placed in question by defendants' motions to strike plaintiffs' jury demands, except perhaps by implication if it makes a difference whether the types of relief being sought are categorized as "legal" or "equitable," with the right to a jury trial depending upon which category it fits in. This very judge denied Howard's right to a jury trial in Howard v. Parisian, Inc. This embarrassing fact not only presents this court with a sense of deja vu but this court is now being asked by plaintiffs to swim upstream against a current to which this court contributed some volume of downhill water, however slight.

In Howard v. Parisian, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit quite properly avoided the issue of entitlement to a jury trial, as to which this court had spoken, by saying:

This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court's order striking Howard's demand for a jury trial....

807 F.2d at 1566.

Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit went on to say in dictum:

The former Fifth Circuit squarely held that such actions are not entitled to trial by jury. Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1236-37 (5th Cir.1980). Every other circuit addressing the issue has reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S.Ct. 565, 83 L.Ed.2d 506 (1984); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 800, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir.1985); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 828-30 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 319-22 (8th Cir.1982).

807 F.2d at 1567.

This court is now confronted with the somewhat awesome task of evaluating the significance of Howard v. Parisian, Inc., as that case may elucidate the question of the right to a jury trial in all ERISA cases. As noted, it was this very judge who struck Howard's demand for a jury. It was also this very judge who was not asked to consider and who did not consider the Seventh Amendment implications in Howard v. Parisian, Inc. As further noted, the Eleventh Circuit's statement is clearly dictum, because Howard's attempted appeal concerning the jury trial issue was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, a fact which made the Eleventh Circuit's comments unnecessary to its decision. Nevertheless, because the expressions do come from the Eleventh Circuit, this court should and will give them careful consideration.

The first case cited in the above quotation in Howard v. Parisian, Inc., from the Eleventh Circuit bearing on the jury trial issue is Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.1980), a case which is admittedly binding on the Eleventh Circuit and on this court. In Calamia, the Fifth Circuit was dealing with a complaint which only "asked the court to declare his rights under the pension." (emphasis supplied). 632 F.2d at 1236. In Calamia, the plaintiff was seeking classical equitable relief in the form of a declaration as to his future entitlements. Calamia's case is therefore clearly distinguishable from the cases of Whitt, Amos, and Eitel, each of whom seeks to recover a sum of money allegedly presently due and owing. None of the instant plaintiffs seeks any relief that can legitimately be called "equitable." Furthermore, in Calamia, an exercise of discretion by pension trustees was being examined. In agreeing with Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &...