Whitt v. Hutchison

• Decision Date: 02 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-812,74-812
• Citation: 43 Ohio St.2d 53,330 N.E.2d 678,72 O.O.2d 30
• Parties: , 72 O.O.2d 30 WHITT et al., Appellants, v. HUTCHISON et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 53

43 Ohio St.2d 53

330 N.E.2d 678, 72 O.O.2d 30

WHITT et al., Appellants, v. HUTCHISON et al., Appellees.

No. 74-812.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 2, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A written release in general and unqualified terms, on advice of counsel, made and executed upon legal consideration between a party wronged and one or more of the persons charged with the commission of the wrong, is presumed in law to be a release for the benefit of all the wrongdoers. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300, followed.)

2. If one has suffered personal injuries which thereafter were aggravated by the malpractice of an attending physician or surgeon, and then executes a valid, general and unconditional release to the original tort-feaseor, on advice of counsel, in full settlement for all present and future claims and causes of action, such release operates as a bar to an action against such physician or surgeon for such malpractice. (Paragraph two of the syllabus of Tanner v. Espey, 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229, followed.)

On March 1, 1969, James A. Whitt, Sr., was injured at Clear Fork Ski Resort in Richland County, Ohio. His injury was a compound fracture of his lower right leg. He was taken to Doctors Hospital, where he was treated by staff physicians.

On September 3, 1970, Whitt filed suit against Resorts, Incorporated, the operator of Clear Fork Ski Resort. That suit was settled, upon advice of counsel, and, on October 14, 1972, defendant and his wife signed an unconditional release of Resorts, Incorporated, for a consideration of $6,000. ^*

On March 22, 1973, Whitt filed suit against the hospital and the physicians who treated him alleging acts constituting malpractice on the part of the physicians and negligence on the part of the hospital; and alleging that this malpractice and negligence resulted in both an aggravation of the preexisting injury and the creation of new, separate and distinct injuries, namely, the infectious disease osteomyelitis and the removal of a portion of the right tibia without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff. Plaintiff's wife also joined in the suit to recover damages for loss of consortium.

The Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County sustained defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for defendants.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas as to the allegations concerning new separate and distinct injuries, and, following the rule of Tanner v. Espey (1934), 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229, affirmed the judgment concerning the aggravation of the original injury.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Ronald D. Keener, Dayton, for appellants.

Charles J. Chastang and John H. Burtch, Columbus, for appellees.

STERN, Justice.

In paragraphs one and two of the syllabus in Tanner v. Espey (1934), 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229, the court held:

'1. If one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of another's negligence exercises reasonable care in obtaining the services of a competent physician or surgeon, and such injuries are thereafter aggravated by the negligence, mistake or lack of skill of such physician or surgeon, such aggravation is a proximate result of the negligence of the original tort feasor, and he is liable therefor.

'2. If one has suffered personal injuries which thereafter were aggravated by the malpractice of an attending physician or surgeon, and then executes a valid, general and unconditional release to the original tort feasor, in full settlement for all present and future claims and causes of action, such release operates as a bar to an action against such physician or surgeon for such malpractice.'

In the recent case of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787, this court alluded to the holding in paragraph one of the syllabus of Tanner v. Espey, that negligence in causing bodily injury to a person is a proximate cause of the aggravation of that injury caused by the subsequent independent negligence of a physician in treating the injury. The court, at page 15, 321 N.E.2d[330 N.E.2d 681] at page 790, stated therein that '(t)he physician and the tortfeasor are not typical concurrent tortfeasors but, rather, are more in the nature of successive tortfeasors,' and held that their joint responsibility for the aggravation of the injury is equitably that of primary liability on the part of the doctor and secondary liability on the part of the original tortfeasor. No release was involved in the Trowbridge case, and therefore the second paragraph of the syllabus in Tanner was not at issue.

Tanner is on all fours with the facts of the instant case, and, if followed, requires the affirmance of the Court of Appeals. Appellants argue that the trend in the law of other states is away from the Tanner rule and that it should be overruled. We disagree. The difficulties and injustices of common-law rules regarding the effect of releases have been replaced in this state by principles of law which permit an injured party to settle that injury and action as he may intend. The effect of such a settlement upon the rights and obligations of others who might also be jointly liable for the injury is established, and is in accord with the holding in Tanner, and with the trend in the law allowing the expressed intention of the parties in releases and covenants not to sue to determine the liability of others jointly liable for the same injury. Therefore, no reason appears to modify the holding in Tanner.

At common law, the traditional rule was that a general release executed in favor of one charged with a wrong extinguished the right of action against all those jointly liable for the same wrong. The somewhat metaphysical theory of this rule is that for a single injury there is a single, indivisible cause of action, and that a general release for valuable consideration (or even, in some cases, for none), is a satisfaction of the injury and a release of the cause of action. Cocke v. Jennor (K. B. 1614), 80 Eng.Rep. 214; Price v. Baker (1959), 143 Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90 (overruled in part by Cox v. Pearl Investment Co. (1969), 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60); Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties (1939), 13 Cal.2d 174, 88 P.2d 690; Muggenburg v Leighton (1953), 240 Minn. 21, 60 N.W.2d 9 (but, see, Gronquist v. Olson (1954), 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159); Salmond on Torts (14 Ed.) 635.

In some cases, it was even held that a release of one jointly liable acted as a release of all, even though the release contained an express provision to the contrary. Ellis v. Bitzer (1925), 2 Ohio 89. See, e. g., Atlantic Coast Line R. C. Co. v. Boone (Fla.1956), 85 So.2d 834; Getzendaner v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1958), 52 Wash.2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089.

The injustice of the traditional rule was that it frequently acted to extinguish a cause of action which was only partly compensated, even though the parties themselves had no such intention. The rule also made it very difficult for a claimant to settle a claim by partial settlements with several persons who were jointly liable for his injury. A major cause of these difficulties was the doctrine of joint liability itself, a doctrine largely grounded in a policy of assuring compensation for injured plaintiffs, but which the traditional rule paradoxically converted into a burden and a trap for unwary plaintiffs. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413.

In recent years, the strict limitations of the traditional rule have been largely abandoned. The parties in the instant case have exhaustively canvassed the law on this point, and their efforts have been most helpful. See Annotation, 39 A.L.R.3d 260. Only four states appear to have retained the traditional common-law rule. All the others have held that the intention of the parties governs whether a release of one tortfeasor releases others, although the means of determining intent differs.

Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a release of one joint tortfeasor 'does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides.' That Act, or a form of it, has been adopted in 18 states. Courts in these states have differed, however, as to whether a general release of all claims or causes of action arising out of an accident is a discharge of other tortfeasors who are jointly liable but not specifically named. See, e. g., Morison v. General Motors Corp. (C.A.5, 1970), 428 F.2d 952; Peters v. Butler (1969), 253 Md. 7, 251 A.2d 600; Dorenzo v. General Motors Corp. (E.D.Pa.1971), 334 F.Supp. 1155, holding that a person need not be specifically named in order to be discharged by a release. Contra, Young v. State (Alaska 1969), 455 P.2d 889; Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co. (1952), 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 245.

Four states have other statutes which are similar in effect to the Uniform Act.

Five states, including Ohio, presume that a general, unconditional release is a satisfaction of the claim, absent express language or other proof to the contrary. In at least five other states, this rule or some form of the traditional rule are generally followed, but an exception is made for medical malpractice cases. Those courts have held that the original injury and its aggravation are considered to be independent injuries, and that the doctor is released if that was the intent of the parties or if the consideration paid was in fact a full satisfaction. The effect of these cases is perhaps best expressed by the Wisconsin rule that the general release of an original tortfeasor is rebuttably presumed not to release a malpractice cause of action for aggravated injuries, unless the intention to do so is clearly and expressly stated in the release. Krenz v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne (1973), 57 Wis.2d 387, 204 N.W.2d 663. The court in...