Whitt v. Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc., No. C2-99-1065.

Decision Date15 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. C2-99-1065.
Citation209 F.Supp.2d 787
PartiesJames WHITT, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN UTILITY SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Tony C. Merry, Palmer, Volkema & Thomas, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Ronald Gordon Linville, William R. Post, Baker & Hostetler, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HOLSCHUH, District Judge.

Plaintiff James Whitt brought suit against his former employer, Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc., alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, and wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio's public policy. This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Record at 22).

I. Background

Lockheed Martin Utility Services Inc. ("Lockheed") employed Plaintiff James Whitt at its Piketon, Ohio facility from November 27, 1967 through July 31, 1997. (Ex. A to Pl.Dep., Ex. 1 to Def.'s Mot. Summ.J.). In his thirty years at Lockheed, Plaintiff held a variety of positions, including Draftsman, Material Control Analyst, and Drafting Technician III. (Id.). In September of 1995, Lockheed transferred Plaintiff to a Parts Specialist position in the Work Control Department, where he worked until his retirement in July 1997. (Pl.Dep. at 55). His supervisor was Dawn Hutchison.

The Work Control Department consisted of three groups — Maintenance Planners, Maintenance Schedulers, and Parts Specialists. The Planners scheduled maintenance work, developed estimates, and coordinated materials required to complete the projects. The Schedulers identified which individuals were needed to complete those projects, determined the sequence in which the tasks should be performed, and made arrangements for those tasks to be accomplished. Plaintiff and the other Parts Specialists ordered the necessary parts and supplies so that the Planners could focus on their planning responsibilities. (Hutchison Dep. at 21-22). However, the general consensus among the Maintenance Planners was that the Parts Specialists were more of a hindrance than a help. (Rogers Dep. at 21, Ex. 3 to Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.).

As time went on, Lockheed implemented a new computer program that allowed the Maintenance Planners to more easily order their own parts. (Ex. N to Pl.Dep., Ex. 1 to Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.). Because the Parts Specialists were no longer being fully utilized, the Work Control Department agreed to temporarily loan its four Parts Specialists to the Maintenance Department while the Maintenance Department's clerks were busy undergoing intensive computer training. In this capacity, the Parts Specialists, now referred to as "materials expediters," were responsible for ordering inventory and shop stock, like nuts and bolts, for the Maintenance Department's Front Line Managers. (Hutchison Dep. at 18, 22-23; Ex. N to Pl.Dep.).

In Spring of 1997, Lockheed determined that, because of declining work, it needed to implement a reduction-in-force. (Ex. 4 to Mem. Opp'n Mot.Summ.J.). To ensure that the impending layoffs would not have a disparate impact on any particular group of employees, Lockheed formed a disparate impact team and established a set of guidelines for managers to use in making their layoff decisions. (McGinnis Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 2 to Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.; Ex. A to McGinnis Aff.).

In connection with this reduction-in-force, Jim Morgan, the Enrichment Plant Manager, advised Steve Casto, head of the Work Control Department, that Casto would have to eliminate six positions in the Work Control Department. (Casto Aff ¶ 4, Ex. 6 to Def.'s Mot.Summ.J.). In response to this order, Mr. Casto conducted an evaluation of the entire Work Control organization to determine which positions were dispensable. (Id.). He considered multiple factors, including, but not limited to, each position's value to the organization, and whether a particular function's purposes were being fulfilled. (Id. at ¶ 5). He did not consider performance, age, gender, or retirement status in determining which positions to eliminate. (Id. at ¶ 7). Mr. Casto concluded that, because the Parts Specialists were no longer of significant value to the Work Control organization, all Parts Specialist positions could be eliminated. (Id. at ¶ 6).

Once preliminary lists of the employees selected for layoff were compiled, the disparate impact team reviewed the choices to ensure that the layoff decisions did not disparately impact minorities, women, or employees over forty. (McGinnis Aff. at ¶ 7). The disparate impact team applied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC's") selection criteria and determined that Lockheed's percentages fell well within the guidelines with respect to the protected classifications of age, gender, and race. (Id. at ¶ 8). On May 16, 1997, Lockheed advised Plaintiff and the other Parts Specialists that, as a result of the reduction-in-force, their positions were being eliminated and they would be laid off on July 31, 1997. (Ex. S to Pl.Dep., Ex. 1 to Def's Mot.Summ.J.). At that time, Plaintiff was 51 years old. (Pl.Dep. at 8).

Lockheed laid off one-hundred and forty-four employees between June 30, 1997 and August 31, 1997. (McGinnis Aff. ¶ 10). Prior to this reduction in force, 77.15% of Lockheed's workforce was male and 60.60% was over forty years of age. (Id.). One month following the reduction in force, 77.44% of Lockheed's employees were male and 60.80% were over forty years of age. (Id.). As of July 22, 1997, twenty-four salaried employees scheduled for layoff, including Plaintiff, had not found replacement positions at Lockheed. (Id. at ¶ 9). Of those twenty-four, fifteen were younger than Plaintiff, six were under forty years old, and eleven were female. (Id.).

At the time that the Work Control organization was forced to eliminate the Parts Specialist positions, the Maintenance Unit clerks had not yet completed their computer training on the new parts ordering system. (Hutchison Dep. at 41). Accordingly, when the Parts Specialists left, the Maintenance Department determined that it still needed someone to temporarily handle stock inventory and supply ordering for its Front Line Managers. To fill this temporary need, the Maintenance Department borrowed Phyllis Ragland, who was forty-four years old, from the Purchasing Department. (Ragland Dep. at 15-16). Ms. Ragland moved to the shop floor of the 720 Building where Plaintiff had previously worked. (Hutchison Dep. at 35-36). For approximately four months, from August until December of 1997, Ms. Ragland ordered shop stock for the Front Line Managers, as Plaintiff and the other Parts Specialists had done prior to the layoff. (Ex. CC to Pl.Dep.). Once the Maintenance Unit clerks completed their training and resumed their shop stock ordering function in December of 1997, Ms. Ragland returned to work in the Purchasing Department. At that point, Julie Needham, who was younger than Phyllis Ragland, took over the work Ms. Ragland had been doing in the Maintenance Department. (Ragland Dep. at 18). Ms. Needham took on this responsibility in addition to the time entry work which she had previously been performing. (Id. at 20; Hutchison Dep. at 42).

Lockheed bases its retirement plan on accumulated years of service. (McGinnis Aff. ¶ 11). In order to get full retirement benefits, an employee must earn a total of eighty-five points. Lockheed awards employees one point for each year of service and one point on their birthdays. (Id.). It also awarded employees who were laid-off as a result of the reduction-in-force two additional points toward retirement. (Id.). Prior to the layoff, Plaintiff had accumulated eighty points toward retirement. (Pl. Dep. at 119). After receiving the two additional layoff points, he still lacked three points to be eligible for full retirement. Plaintiff contacted Bill Reep, Lockheed's Employees Concern Manager, to see if Lockheed would award him the three extra points. (Id. at 120). Lockheed denied Plaintiff's request; it had already determined that employees would not be permitted to avoid or delay layoff solely to accumulate seniority points. (McLaughlin Dep. at 45-46). To make an exception, a department manager had to present a business justification and, in Plaintiff's case, none existed. (Id. at 46-47). Upon receiving his notice of layoff, Plaintiff applied for a few positions but then decided to take early retirement and stay at home to babysit his grandchildren. (Pl.Dep. at 177-178).

On January 13, 1998, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that, in selecting him for layoff, Lockheed had discriminated against him because of his age and gender. Plaintiff obtained a Right to Sue letter on July 19, 1999 and filed suit against Lockheed on October 14, 1999. In Count I of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Lockheed discriminated against him on the basis of his gender in violation of Title VII. In Count II of the complaint, he alleges that Lockheed discriminated against him on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In Count III, Plaintiff asserts parallel state law claims, alleging age and sex discrimination in violation of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a common law wrongful discharge action. Defendant has now moved for summary judgment on all of these claims.

II. Standard for Granting Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides:

[Summary judgment] ... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

"[T]his standard...

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