Whitt v. Whitt
| Decision Date | 05 February 1973 |
| Citation | 490 S.W.2d 159 |
| Parties | Forrest Glenn WHITT, Appellee-Complainant, v. Juanita Butts WHITT, Appellant-Defendant. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Wilbur C. Ruleman, Jr., Memphis, for appellee-complainant.
W. J. Michael Cody, Joe M. Duncan, Memphis, Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, of counsel, for appellant-defendant.
This case presents the issue of the extent of the obligation of Forrest Glenn Whitt, appellee, for child support payments under a final decree of the Circuit Court of Shelby County, entered March 9, 1971, awarding Juanita Butts Whitt, appellant, an absolute divorce.
Prior to the final decree the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, at which time they had two daughters, ages eighteen and sixteen. The older daughter became eighteen in February, 1971. The property settlment pertinent to the issue here reads as follows:
7. As child support, the husband shall pay the monthly sum of $750.00 per month and upon the marriage or majority of one child, the payment will be reduced by fifty per cent and continue at that rate until the marriage or majority of the second child, at which time the child support payments shall cease.
Upon entry of the final decree the court specifically incorporated the above provision therein, making it a part of the decree of the court.
By Chapter 162, Public Acts of 1971, the General Assembly of Tennessee enacted the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971, effective May 11, 1971. After this date, pursuant to this Act, and the decree entered for monthly child support payments, appellee reduced his monthly payments fifty per cent.
On July 26, 1971, appellant filed a petition for writ of scire facias, alleging appellee had arbitrarily and without permission of the court reduced his monthly child support payments fifth per cent. The petition prayed appellee be ordered to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and further be ordered to promptly and timely pay all child support as heretofore ordered by the court.
In answer to the petition appellee alleged as a result of the enactment of the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971, which reduced the age of majority for persons in this state from twenty-one years to eighteen years, then under the terms of the decree for child support the amount of child support was reduced fifty per cent.
The facts were stipulated by the parties.
The trial judge dismissed the petition for writ of scire facias upon a finding the decree for child support entered March 9, 1971 was made in light of the statute empowering a court to provide for children during minority and the power of the state to change such period.
As to Chapter 162, Public Acts of 1971, suffice it to say this statute for all purposes reduces the age a person reaches his or her majority from twenty-one years to eighteen years.
Appellant's position in based upon the fact the parties did by contract agree the child support would be reduced by fifty per cent when one of the children reached his majority. That under a proper construction of the contract the parties intended this to mean when the child reached the age of twenty-one, this being when the child reached his majority at the time the contract was entered into. That this act of the Legislature reducing the age of majority to eighteen would be invalid as applied to this contract, since such would be impairing the obligations of a contract, prohibited by Article 1, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee.
We do not agree with this argument. This property settlement agreement, as a matter of public policy, was treated by the court as evidence to which it could look in fixing any property settlement, including the amount to be paid as child support. When the trial judge accepted this agreement of the parties as to the proper amount of support for the children and incorporated it in the decree, the agreement became merged into the decree and lost its contractual nature. Osborne v. Osborne, 29 Tenn.App. 463, 197 S.W.2d 234 (1946); Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn.App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411 (1952); Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn.App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583 (1959); Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944 (1964).
The authority of the court to order appellee to make payments in support of his children was by virtue of statutes, to-wit: T.C.A. § 36--820 and § 36--828. These statutes retain the matter within the jurisdiction of the court for any future changes as to child support and the rights of both appellant and ...
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