Whittington v. Estelle

• Decision Date: 20 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-2475,81-2475
• Citation: 704 F.2d 1418
• Parties: Fritz WHITTINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W.J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1418

704 F.2d 1418

Fritz WHITTINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W.J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 81-2475.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 20, 1983.

Curtis C. Mason, Staff Counsel for Inmates, Huntsville, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.

Charles A. Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before BROWN and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, and MAHON^*, District Judge.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge:

A prisoner in the Texas Department of Corrections appeals from a District Court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging constitutional error in the prosecutor's arguments to the jury and in the Court's having admitted evidence of extraneous offenses that may have been committed at the time the defendant was apprehended. Because we find that these occurrences, though disturbing, did not render Whittington's trial fundamentally unfair, we affirm.

The Overture: Con Brio

Officers Curran and Braun of the Houston Police Department were on routine patrol when they heard loud voices and cursing coming from Polly's Playhouse, a lounge. Upon investigation, the officers saw the appellant, Fritz Whittington, standing in the doorway of the lounge and arguing with a woman. Officer Braun followed Whittington and the woman inside the lounge and saw Whittington strike the woman. When Whittington, who was on parole at the time, saw the officer, he departed the scene through a side door.

Officers Braun and Curran pursued Whittington into the yard behind the lounge but there is some dispute as to what happened thereafter. Witnesses who were at the bar testified that the officer fired shots as soon as he (Officer Braun) stepped out the door. Braun and Curran testified that they did not discharge their weapons until later when Whittington, who had already been relieved of a knife by the officers and who they were trying to subdue, attacked Curran with a pair of handcuffs he had taken from the officer. Despite these efforts and the injuries sustained by the officers, Curran and Braun were unable to subdue Whittington, who escaped.

Soon thereafter Whittington was spotted by officers Guidry and Lott. Whittington had a blood-stained T-shirt wrapped around his waist, blood stains on his pants (the result of a gunshot wound sustained in the altercation with Curran and Braun), and the pair of handcuffs in his pocket which he had taken earlier. When Guidry and Lott made their attempt to arrest him, Whittington allegedly swung at them. When two additional officers joined in the fray, Whittington allegedly pulled a screwdriver from his pocket and began swinging it at the officers. Eventually, Whittington was subdued and arrested. ¹

The Trial: Sour Notes and All that Jazz

Whittington was charged with aggravated assault on Officer Curran. During the trial, Whittington's attorney objected to the admission of evidence of the screwdriver incident as being highly prejudicial and as trying the defendant for criminality in general. The objection was overruled.

At the close of the evidence on guilt, the prosecutor (Camp) made the following argument:

If you believe this story and if you believe that is what happened, then you ought to return a verdict of not guilty. But, I think you're better folks than that. I think you have a little bit more discerning character. The twelve of you were selected to represent the people in Harris County and the State of Texas. Your friends and your neighbors. After you leave this trial, your friends and neighbors are going to ask you what happened. The Judge will have instructed you to talk about it after the trial is over. They are going to ask you what happened and you are going to tell them, well, I sat on a trial where a man was accused of putting stiches in the back of an officer's head and five in the other officer and stabbing four other officers and your neighbor might ask what did you do--

Now, you--and as you think about that, think about it right now. Because I think you will want to give them an answer you can be proud of, that your friends and neighbors can be proud of.

Law enforcement begins at home. People talk about the weather. How awful it is. People talk about taxes and how awful that is. People talk about law enforcement in the community. Probably sometimes in the future we may be able to do something about the weather and goodness knows we will never be able to do anything about taxes, but you have an opportunity to do something about law enforcing the law. Well, right now, ladies and gentlemen, you are they. The big they.

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* * *

I'm going to ask, ladies and gentlemen, that based on the testimony I think you can see from 1965 on that Fritz Whittington has made a decision. He has made a very big decision and that decision is to live outside the law. He has been asking and I think by his attitude, his actions, and that story he presented to you yesterday. He's asking you to make it official and I ask you to ratify that decision that he had and label him a criminal. That's what he is. You are not changing a thing. Law enforcement is like a chain and it's only as strong as the weakest link.

Whittington's attorney objected, but this objection was also overruled.

The jury found Whittington guilty of aggravated assault. Having twice before been convicted of felonies, Whittington was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas Habitual Offender Statute.

Appellate Prelude

Whittington initially sought review of his conviction in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Whittington v. State, 580 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In affirming the conviction, Presiding Judge Onion, who wrote for the majority, concluded that the jury argument complained of was a permissible plea for law enforcement. Id. at 847. In concurring, Judge Clinton agreed that the argument was proper but only when viewed in the context of previous jury argument decisions by that court. He was quick to point out, however, that were it not for the doctrine of stare decisis, he would reverse. Judge Roberts completed the discordant trio in dissent, expressing the view that the prosecutor's statements constituted an improper plea for a finding of guilt because of community expectations. ²

The Texas courts having ruled against him, Whittington sought relief in the federal courts by petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. On June 23, 1981, Judge O'Conor entered an order dismissing Whittington's petition for failure to state a claim on which relief might be granted. A motion for Certificate of Probable Cause was filed with the District Court, which was denied. On December 7, 1981 a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted by this court.

Whittington's Petition

A. Variations on a Theme: The Prosecutor's Statements

Whittington's primary argument is that the prosecutor's statements to the jury constituted an impermissible plea for a finding of guilt based on community expectations. As such, he argues that they rendered his trial so fundamentally unfair that he is entitled to a Writ of Habeas Corpus. We disagree.

There can be little doubt that the jury argument complained of here is vexing in its proximity to impermissible conduct. The prosecutor here has danced a careful ballet, skillfully maintaining his balance on constitutional pointe. We marvel at his dexterity; yet criticize his technique.

Let there be no mistake. This Court, in denying habeas relief, does not approve the prosecutor's remarks in this case. They sound a familiar theme, a discordant elegy, diaphonic and inharmonious with traditional motives governing the conduct of public officials. Such melodies are best left unplayed.

Disturbing as the prosecutor's statements are, we nevertheless do not find that they deprived Whittington of a trial which was fundamentally fair. Improper jury argument by the prosecution does not present a claim of constitutional magnitude which is cognizable in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 unless such argument is so prejudicial that the appellant's state court trial was rendered fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372, 378 n. 8 (5th Cir.1978); Alvarez v. Estelle, 531 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044, 97 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed.2d 757; Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.1973); Mechling v. Slayton, 361 F.Supp. 770, 774 (E.D.Va.1973), citing Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 63 S.Ct. 1129, 87 L.Ed. 1492 (1943). See also Martin v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 918, 91 S.Ct. 179, 27 L.Ed.2d 157 (1970); Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 145, 27 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Moreover, a defect of constitutional proportions is not to be found in any but egregious cases. Houston, 569 F.2d at 382. Thus, in Houston, the court found a due process violation only in "repeated impropriety in the context of a trial already largely robbed of dignity due a rational process by the unbridled opportunism of the prosecutor." ³ But see Alvarez v. Estelle, 531 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.1976). Malley v. Manson, 547 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 30 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 1335, 51 L.Ed.2d 598 (1977).

In making our determination of the existence or lack of fundamental fairness here, this Court must look at the prosecutor's argument in the context of the entire trial, United States v. Sorzano, 602 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.1979), and determine whether the argument was a crucial, critical, highly significant factor in the jury's determination of guilt. Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir.1981); Pentecost v. Estelle, 582 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.1978); Blankenship v. Estelle, 545 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.1977); Alvarez, 531...