Whitty v. Astrue, CASE No. 8:10-CV-2723-T-TGW
| Decision Date | 20 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE No. 8:10-CV-2723-T-TGW |
| Parties | TRACY C. WHITTY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
The plaintiff in this case seeks judicial review of the denial of her claims for Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income payments.1 Because the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is supported by substantial evidence and does not contain any reversible error, the decision will be affirmed.
The plaintiff, who was forty-four years old at the time of the administrative hearing and who has an eighth grade education, has worked atvarious jobs, including as a cashier (Tr. 30-32, 35). She filed claims for Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income payments, alleging that she became disabled due to rheumatoid and osteoarthritis (Tr. 342). The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration.
The plaintiff, at her request, then received a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. The law judge found that the plaintiff has severe impairments of degenerative joint disease and obesity (Tr. 92). The law judge concluded that these impairments imposed the following restrictions (Tr. 94):
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. Specifically, she could lift/carry 10 pounds occasionally, less than 10 pounds frequently, she could sit 6 hours out of an 8 hour workday and stand/walk a total of 2 hours out of an 8 hour workday with a sit/stand option at will. Likewise, she would have limitations in her ability to push/pull when she is symptomatic. She would be limited to no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only be able to occasionally climb ramps and stairs. Additionally, she would have limitations in her ability to kneel, crouch, stoop or crawl because of her obesity. Due to pain in her shoulders she would have limitations (could not do often) in her ability to reach overhead. Furthermore, she wouldneed to avoid all exposure to extreme heat, cold and hazards (i.e. moving machinery, unprotected heights). Lastly, she would have some limitations in fine manipulation and occasional limitation in gross manipulation.
The law judge found that, with these limitations, the plaintiff could not return to any past relevant work (Tr. 98). However, based upon the testimony of a vocational expert, the law judge found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, such as cashier, assembler, and information clerk/surveillance monitor (Tr. 99). Consequently, the plaintiff was found to be not disabled (id.). The Appeals Council let the decision of the law judge stand as the final decision of the Commissioner.
A. In order to be entitled to Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income, a claimant must be unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(l)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A "physical or mental impairment," under theterms of the Act, is one "that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). The plaintiff must also show that she became disabled before her insured status expired on December 31, 2007, in order to receive disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. 423(c)(1); Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088. 1090 (5th Cir. 1979). cert, denied, 444 U.S. 952. There is not a similar requirement with respect to the plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income payments.
A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197. 229 (1938). Under the substantial evidence test, "findings of fact made by administrative agencies ... may be reversed ... only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings."Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1035 (2005).
It is, moreover, the function of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1971). Similarly, it is the responsibility of the Commissioner to draw inferences from the evidence, and those inferences are not to be overturned if they are supported by substantial evidence. Celebrezze v. O'Brient, 323 F.2d 989, 990 (5th Cir. 1963).
Therefore, in determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court is not to reweigh the evidence, but is limited to determining whether the record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable mind to conclude that the claimant is not disabled. However, the court, in its review, must satisfy itself that the proper legal standards were applied and legal requirements were met. Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).
B. The Commissioner's regulations set out what is termed a "sequential" analysis for deciding disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520, 416.920. The initial question is whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity because, if so, the plaintiff will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, the next inquiry (step two) is whether a claimant has a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit a claimant's physical or mental abilities to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. 404.1521(a), 416.921(a). If there is not a severe impairment, then a claimant is deemed to be not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
When an impairment is severe, but does not meet, or equal, a listing in Appendix 1 (step three), a further inquiry (step four) is made as to whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If a claimant cannot do such work, an additional determination (step five) is made concerning whether the claimant can perform other work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). In such cases, the regulations direct that an individual's residual functional capacity, age, education, andwork experience be considered in determining whether the claimant is disabled. These factors are codified in tables of rules, known as "guidelines" or "grids," that are appended to the regulations. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. Appendix 2.
The law judge found that the plaintiff has a substantially restricted functional capacity, as he limited her to only a reduced range of sedentary work. Based upon the testimony of a vocational expert, who stated that there are jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff could perform notwithstanding her limitations, the law judge found the plaintiff was not disabled. The plaintiff challenges the law judge's decision on three grounds. None of the arguments warrants a reversal.
A. The plaintiff argues that the law judge should have found that her fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and carpal tunnel syndrome are severe impairments (Doc. 15, pp. 14-18). The contention presupposes that the plaintiff suffers from these impairments, and that the law judge concluded that she did not have significant limitations from these conditions (see id., pp. 14-15,17; 20 C.F.R. 404.1521 (a), 416.921 (a) (a nonsevere impairment is one that "does not significantly limit [the claimant's] physical or mental ability todo basic work activities")). However, as the record and the law judge's decision reflects, the evidence is conflicting or indefinite as to the ailments underlying the plaintiff's physical problems. Consequently, the law judge more generally identified the plaintiff as having the severe impairment of degenerative joint disease, and considered the plaintiff's symptoms accordingly.
As the law judge discusses in his decision. Dr. Eugene Bloom, who testified at the hearing and whose opinions the law judge gave significant weight, stated that there is conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff has rheumatoid arthritis, and he merely said she "probably" has fibromyalgia (Tr. 44, 93, 94). Further, the record does not even contain a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome (Tr. 566)(symptoms "consistent with" carpal tunnel syndrome). Therefore, this is not a circumstance where the law judge found that the plaintiff had these impairments, but found them non-severe because they did not impact her ability to work. Further, the plaintiff s citations to evidence which "point[s] to," or is "consistent with" these ailments (Doc. 15, pp. 16-18), does not compel the law judge to conclude that she has these impairments. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, supra.
Regardless, the plaintiff cannot prevail on this issue simply by showing that the law judge should have characterized fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and carpal tunnel syndrome as severe impairments. The Eleventh Circuit has held that "step [two] acts as a filter; ... the finding of any severe impairment ... is enough to satisfy the requirement of step two." Jamison v. Bowen. 814 F.2d 585,588 (11th Cir. 1987). Because the law judge found that the plaintiff has severe impairments of degenerative joint disease and obesity, he did not stop...
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