Whyte v. City of San Diego

• Decision Date: 26 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21cv1159-LAB-MDD
• Parties: MICHAEL WHYTE, an individual; DORION JACKETT, an individual; KANIUS HILL, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipality; SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER badge # unknown, an individual; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

MICHAEL WHYTE, an individual; DORION JACKETT, an individual; KANIUS HILL, an individual, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipality; SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER badge # unknown, an individual; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 21cv1159-LAB-MDD

United States District Court, S.D. California

May 26, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. 9]

Honorable Larry Alan Burns, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs Michael Whyte, Dorion Jackett, and Kanius Hill (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Defendants City of San Diego (the “City”) and San Diego Police Department Officer Trevor Sterling (“Officer Sterling”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged civil rights and state law violations related to a traffic stop on June 2, 2020. Plaintiffs allege that, despite having broken no laws, they were unlawfully pulled over by Officer Sterling and subjected to “illegal and gestapo tactics” simply on account of their race. The stop did not result in any arrests or citations.

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts nine causes of action for

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violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action, arguing that Plaintiffs have made conclusory allegations and provided insufficient facts to support their claims. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). (Dkt. 9).

I. BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2020, Jackett, Whyte, and Hill, “all three [of whom] are Black men, ” were driving along California State Route 94 (“SR-94”) in Jackett's Chevy Silverado when they were pulled over by Officer Sterling. (FAC ¶¶ 11-12). Jackett, who was driving, pulled over and stopped the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 13). Officer Sterling asked for Jackett's license and registration, and asked Jackett to exit the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 14). Jackett asked Officer Sterling why they were pulled over, and Officer Sterling informed him that he believed Plaintiffs were on their way to a protest in another part of town. (Id.). Officer Sterling also asked for Whyte's identification, but when Whyte informed him that his identification was in his wallet on the floor, Officer Sterling stated that he would shoot Whyte if he reached for it. (Id. ¶ 24). Officer Sterling then instructed Jackett to exit his vehicle, (id. ¶ 14), and asked Jackett if he could search the vehicle, (id. ¶ 15). Jackett declined but Officer Sterling proceeded to search both the vehicle and Jackett anyway. (Id.). As for Whyte, Officer Sterling removed him from the vehicle, placed him in handcuffs, rummaged through his pockets, and placed him in the back of his patrol car. (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiffs were ultimately allowed to leave. (Id. ¶ 26).

On June 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this suit against Defendants for civil rights and state law violations related to the alleged traffic stop on June 2, 2020. (Dkt. 1). Their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts nine causes of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs'

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Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth causes of action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations, ” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, which rise above the mere conceivability or possibility of unlawful conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While a pleading “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, '” Rule 8 nevertheless “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Excessive Force

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