Wickey v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission

Citation120 N.W.2d 181,369 Mich. 487
Decision Date07 March 1963
Docket NumberNo. 1,1
PartiesRobert WICKEY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. APPEAL BOARD OF MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, and the Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants and Appellees, and Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Company, an Indiana Corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Lucking, Van Auken & Miller, Detroit, for defendant and Appellant.

John J. Namenye, Muskegon, for plaintiff and appellee.

Arthur W. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, for defendants and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice (for affirmance).

The proper scope of judicial review of the decisions of administrative tribunals has been a subject of much dispute on this Court in recent years. This dispute involves our interpretation of statutory limitations upon judicial review of agency decisions and limitations developed at the common law upon our review of such decisions by certiorari. Unfortunately, on this subject we have spoken with two and sometimes with three tongues, each with considerably less precision than the bench and bar of this State are entitled to expect from us. Our principal fault lies, if fault is to be assessed, as was said by Mr. Justice Talbot Smith about one aspect of this controversy, 'from our effort to make one suit of clothes fit all mankind.' Peaden v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich. 613, at p. 643, 96 N.W.2d 281, at p. 296.

Section 38 of the Michigan employment security act, C.L.S.1956, § 421.38 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.540), provides that:

'The findings of fact made by the appeal board acting within its powers if supported by the great weight of the evidence, shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the circuit court * * * shall have power to review questions of fact and law on the record made before the referee and the appeal board involved in any such final decision, but said court may reverse such decision of said appeal board upon a question of fact only if it finds that said decision of the appeal board is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. * * *'

Nothing in the foregoing statutory language limits the judiciary's power to review administrative determinations of issues of law as distinguished from issues of fact. However, with reference only to 'findings of fact made by the appeal board,' we are required by the statute to consider such findings conclusive unless they are 'contrary to the great weight of the evidence.' Therein lies part of our difficulty, for only rarely have we made the sometimes difficult effort to distinguish between issues of fact, issues of law, and compound issues of fact and law. Too frequently we have applied to all such issues the statutory limitation upon our review of factual determinations set forth above from section 38 of the act.

But that is only a part of our difficulty. Another part of our difficulty arises from a perceptible inclination to extend that statutory limitation to preclude judicial review of fact or of law determinations if the administrative decision is supported in the record by 'some evidence.' See, for example, Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Lyons v. Employment Security Commission, 363 Mich. 201, at 230, 108 N.W.2d 849, at 864. Thus, not only is the statutory 'great weight of the evidence' limitation applied now to review of questions of law as well as to review of questions of fact, but that limitation soon may be supplanted judicially by the more restrictive 'some evidence' limitation. We have traveled such great distances down the path of abnegation of judicial duty in this area of the law that traditional judicial safeguards against administrative error may be beyond the point of no return.

Contributing to the confusion resulting 1) from our failure to make the sometime difficult distinctions between fact and law in applying the statutory limitation upon our review of agency determinations of fact and 2) from the inclination to devise judicially a more restrictive 'some evidence' rule, is 3) an occasional reference, again without distinction between issues of fact and issues of law, to the permissive doctrine of statutory construction that an agency's interpretation of a statute, if reasonable and if it has warrant in the record, may be sustained upon judicial review even if we would have reached a contrary result had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. 1 Here, again, confusion has been compounded, not only by misapplication of this doctrine to administrative findings of fact as well as to administrative interpretations of statute, but also by application of the doctrine as an immutable rule of law. See Peaden v. Employment Security Commission, supra.

The entire range of this controversy and its consequences are illumined in the opinions found in Knight-Morley Corporation v. Employment Security Commission, 350 Mich 397, 86 N.W.2d 549 (Justice Talbot Smith's opinion, beginning at p. 411, 86, N.W.2d p. 557); Peaden v. Employment Security Commission, supra (Justice Black's opinion, beginning at p. 614 of 355 Mich. at p. 282 of 96 N.W.2d and Justice Talbot Smith's opinion, beginning at p. 635 at p. 292 of 96 N.W.2d); and Miller v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 359 Mich. 342, 102 N.W.2d 728 (Justice Talbot Smith's opinion, beginning at p. 358, 102 N.W.2d p. 732). From all that has been written it should be clear that not every appeal from the employment security commission's appeal board, or from any administrative agency for that matter, can be affirmed summarily by the indiscriminate application of a single simple or compound rule of judicial review to a multitude of complex agency decisions of fact or law or of fact and law.

On those rare occasions when appellate dispute rages solely upon an administrative finding of simple fact, as was involved in Knight-Morley, supra, our hand is stayed from reversal unless the administrative tribunal's finding of fact is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. In those cases like Peaden, supra, where the dispute rages over the administrative tribunal's interpretation or application of a statute, our function is not restricted by the 'great weight' test in determining whether or not the agency's application of the statute to the facts found conforms with the law, and in the performance of this function we can, but we need not, affirm the tribunal's statutory interpretation if it is reasonable and if it finds warrant in the record. Each such case requires our preliminary determination of the nature of the dispute over the appeal board's decision. This task in itself may sometimes be difficult, as it has been in the past, but the proper performance of our judicial function demands that it be undertaken because only when this is done can we determine the principles in accordance with which our appellate function properly may be performed.

This brings us to the case at bar, a case in which this Court's imprecision is duplicated in the briefs and arguments on appeal. It is said that the appeal board's decision was supported by the great weight of the evidence and, therefore, should have been, but was not, affirmed by the circuit judge on review by certiorari. No effort is made by the appellant to draw the fine line of distinction between the appeal board's findings of fact and its rulings of law. Consequently, on the principal issue in the case, did plaintiff voluntarily quit his employment, the whole argument of the appellant is devoted to a discussion of the great weight of the evidence, although the plaintiff does not dispute the board's findings of material fact, and without apparent concern that the board's application of its findings of fact to the law may have been erroneous as a matter of law. Yet, the real thrust of the appellant's argument in this case is that the appeal board's unchallenged findings of fact do support its conclusion of law that the plaintiff claimant voluntarily left his work without good cause attributable to his employer within the meaning of section 29(1)(a)(1) of the employment security act. C.L.S.1956, § 421.29 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.531). The circuit court on review by certiorari 2 reversed the decision of the appeal board. As we view our appellate function, and that of the circuit court, we must determine first whether or not the appeal board's conclusion of law, accepting for this purpose all of the findings of fact of the appeal board, was a legally valid conclusion. Only if we conclude that it was, need we determine whether or not the appeal board's findings of fact were supported by the great weight of the evidence. It is our conclusion that accepting all of the findings of fact made by the appeal board, such findings of fact did not justify the appeal board's conclusion of law that plaintiff claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer. In short, we conclude that as a matter of law claimant's conduct did not constitute a 'voluntary quit.'

Plaintiff was a seaman aboard the S. S. South American, serving as a night patrolman when the ship docked at the Eisenhower lock at the port of Messina in New York State on June 4, 1959. At about 2:00 in the afternoon, being off duty, plaintiff went ashore. The first mate testified the ship's 8:00 p. m. scheduled departure time was posted on the bulletin board in the ship's lobby. Plaintiff denied there was any such notice posted and testified that the ship's gangway watch told him she was departing at 9:00. (Plaintiff's knowledge of the ship's departure time was the only material fact in dispute at the hearing before the referee, and for our purposes we shall accept the first mate's testimony to the effect that plaintiff either knew or should hav known that the ship was scheduled to depart at 8:00 p. m.) Because of a hard wind and the late arrival of two passengers, the ship did not clear the dock until 9:15. Plainti...

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  • Department of Economic and Employment Development v. Taylor, 794
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    ...it could be found from those facts that the claimant voluntarily abandoned his employment. Compare Wickey v. Employment Security Commission, 369 Mich. 487, 120 N.W.2d 181 (1963) (sailor discharged after he missed a ship's sailing because he was watching a movie; held, sailor had not volunta......
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