Wickliffe v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 11-527 C,11-527 C
• Parties: LONNIE WICKLIFFE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

LONNIE WICKLIFFE, Plaintiff,

v.THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 11-527 C

United States Court of Federal Claims

Filed: December 20, 2011

Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Motion to Dismiss; Pro Se Complaint; Frivolous Allegations;

No Contract With the United States; Failure to Allege a Violation of any Money-Mandating Provision;

Emancipation Proclamation; Case or Controversy Requirement; Purported Treaty;

Negligence Claims; Punitive Damages; Transfer Not Appropriate

Lonnie Wickliffe, Ecorse, MI, pro se.

John J. Todor, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Judge

Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss. In this pro se case, plaintiff Lonnie Wickliffe alleges that the United States breached contractual obligations purportedly created between him and the government in President Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. He also asserts that the United States failed to perform its official obligations, contending that the government's negligence caused an economic downturn that damaged his emotional and psychological well-being. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). Although the court afforded plaintiff ample opportunity to file a response brief, he did not do so, and the court determines that, given plaintiff's silence, there is no reason to delay its ruling. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff, the United States, "on or about[] May 25, 2011," breached obligations to plaintiff set forth in the Emancipation Proclamation. Compl. ¶ V. Plaintiff also references a proposed treaty between the United States and the "Bantu of Nations-United," id. ¶ II; Pl.'s Ex. 4, though the nature of his allegations are unclear. It further appears that plaintiff alleges Tucker Act jurisdiction for the breach of a purported contract, claiming that the recent downgrade in the United States' credit rating by Standard & Poor's was the result of "negligence,. . . malfeasance, non-feasance [sic], negligence in performance of and/or failure to perform in a skillful, diligent, responsible, and/or reasonable manner . . . ." Compl. ¶ VI. Plaintiff theorizes that, had the government exercised "proper diligence and skill," the economy would have improved, the G.I. Bill "would had been [sic] still part of [his] health product," and the nation would have been the beneficiary of "[f]ruits of diligent and skillful work product." Id.. Plaintiff contends that he has incurred "emotional and psychological stresses" as a result of the government's purported breach, id., and he seeks $645,247.76 in general damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. He also requests that the court waive his filing fee.¹

Previously, plaintiff filed several pro se cases in various jurisdictions. In 1996, plaintiff, while incarcerated in an Indiana state correctional facility, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ("D.C. district court"), which was dismissed sua sponte. Wickliffe v. Reno, No. 1:96-cv-525-UNA (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1996) (order dismissing complaint), aff'd, No. 96-5098 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1997). In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sanctioned plaintiff for "a voluminous history of frivolous litigation" and "barred [him] from proceeding in forma pauperis in any future filings." Wickliffe v. Anderson, 23 F. App'x 538, 538 (7th Cir. 2001). In 2007, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction plaintiff's lawsuit seeking compensation for alleged posttraumatic stress disorder associated with his military service. See Wickliffe v. United States, No. 07-514C, 2007 WL 5173630 (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2007), recon. denied, 2007 WL 5173587 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 26, 2007). More recently, plaintiff unsuccessfully moved the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") to recall the mandate in his D.C. district court case. See Wickliffe, No. 96-5098, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 2011)(determining that plaintiff did not present extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant an appeal).

Plaintiff filed his complaint in these proceedings on August 22, 2011. On October 7, 2011, he filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Federal Claims to provide him "with a true, complete, and accurate copy and answers to the served[] request for Calls and Discovery" and an "alternative writ" to direct the D.C. Circuit to provide him with copies of the record in his D.C. district court case. The Federal Circuit denied plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed his "alternative writ" on November 14, 2011. See In re Wickliffe, No. 2012-M104 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2011). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and, as noted above, plaintiff never filed a response to defendant's motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pro Se Plaintiffs

The Court of Federal Claims holds pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to less stringent standards than those filed by litigants represented by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Courts have "strained [their] proper role in adversary proceedings to the limit, searching . . . to see if plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed." Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285, 1292 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency "with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007); see also Kelley v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[A] court may not similarly take a liberal view of that jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only."); Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (noting that pro se plaintiffs are not excused from satisfying jurisdictional requirements), aff'd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As the Court of Federal Claims stated in Demes v. United States, "[w]hile a court should be receptive to pro se plaintiffs and assist them, justice is ill-served when a jurist crosses the line from finder of fact to advocate." 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 369 (2002).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Whether the court possesses jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); see also Matthews, 72 Fed. Cl. at 278 (stating that subject matter jurisdiction is "an inflexible matter that must be considered before proceeding to evaluate the merits of a case"). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties or the court sua sponte may challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).

The ability of the Court of Federal Claims to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). A waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). Thus, unless Congress consents to a cause of action against the United States, "there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States." Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 587-88.

The Tucker Act confers upon the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Although the Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for claims for money damages, it "itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc portion). The separate source of substantive law must constitute a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); accord Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("The actions for which the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity are actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to money-mandating constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, or executive orders.").

C. Motions to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to RCFC 12(b). The court's "general power to adjudicate in specific areas of substantive law . . . is properly raised by a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion." Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999). When deciding an RCFC 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court assumes all factual allegations are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325,...