Widdison v. State

• Decision Date: 29 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20161043,20161043
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: Bobbie D. WIDDISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Utah and the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, Appellee.

489 P.3d 158

Bobbie D. WIDDISON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Utah and the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, Appellee.

No. 20161043

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard September 20, 2019

Filed April 29, 2021

Attorneys:¹ Lorenzo K. Miller, Draper, for appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Brent Burnett, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee

Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Himonas, and Justice Petersen joined.

Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 In 2011, the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) notified Bobbie Widdison that she would be paroled in 2018. In 2013, the Board rescinded Widdison's parole date and ordered her to serve her entire life sentence. The Board rescinded Widdison's parole date based on unadjudicated allegations that Widdison had abused a child and supplied a minor with drugs and alcohol.

¶2 Widdison filed a petition for extraordinary relief arguing that the Board's decision to rescind her parole date violated her state and federal constitutional rights. And she asked the district court to reinstate her original parole date. The district court rejected those arguments and granted the State's motion for summary judgment.

¶3 After Widdison filed this appeal, the Board paroled her. Widdison concedes that the Board's decision moots this matter because she has received the relief she sought before the district court. Widdison nevertheless emphasizes the importance of the issues she raises and invites this court to hear her arguments under our public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We acknowledge the importance of the concerns Widdison advances, but Widdison has not convinced us that if we do not decide her case, we will likely deprive ourselves of any opportunity to review the types of issues she raises. We therefore decline Widdison's invitation and dismiss this case as moot.

BACKGROUND

¶4 The State of Utah charged Bobbie Widdison with the murder of her child, as well as three counts of felony child abuse and three counts of misdemeanor child abuse based on injuries the child sustained before death. At trial, the State offered evidence that Widdison had mistreated two other children, but those allegations were never adjudicated.

¶5 A jury convicted Widdison of first degree felony murder. The jury also convicted Widdison on the remaining charges, although it reduced one felony charge to a misdemeanor. The district court sentenced Widdison to five years to life in prison for the murder. It also sentenced Widdison to one to fifteen years for each felony and one year for each misdemeanor. The court ordered the child abuse counts to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the murder sentence.

¶6 In 2011, the Board held a parole hearing for Widdison and granted her a parole date of May 8, 2018, subject to future review and modification.

¶7 Two years later, a witness (Witness) from Widdison's original trial testified at a Board hearing on an unrelated matter and mentioned that Widdison had supplied her with drugs and alcohol when she was a minor. Based on this information, the Board scheduled a hearing to consider whether it should rescind Widdison's parole date.

¶8 The Board did not originally tell Widdison why it had scheduled a rescission hearing. After Widdison inquired, the Board disclosed the allegation that had been made and explained that she would have an opportunity to respond.

¶9 At the rescission hearing, the Witness testified about the drugs and alcohol she claimed Widdison had given her when she was underage. The Witness also testified that Widdison had abused her other children. The Board member overseeing the hearing questioned Widdison about the drugs and alcohol. The Board member also questioned Widdison about her child's death.

¶10 After the hearing, the Board collected more documents from the State's original investigation, provided a packet of these documents to Widdison, and scheduled a second hearing. At this hearing, the Board member questioned Widdison about, among other things, the alleged abuse of her other children. At the hearing and in a letter sent to the Board afterward, Widdison denied the new allegations. Despite her denials, the Board rescinded Widdison's parole and "expired" her life sentence.²

¶11 Widdison filed a petition for extraordinary relief alleging various violations of her federal and Utah constitutional rights. Widdison requested that the district court order her original parole date reinstated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. Widdison appealed and, while this appeal was pending, the Board paroled Widdison and filed a suggestion of mootness.

ANALYSIS

I. This Case Is Moot

¶12 Widdison concedes her case is moot. As a general rule, if our decision cannot affect the rights of the parties before us, the matter is moot and, absent an exception to our mootness doctrine, we will not hear the matter. See State v. Steed , 2015 UT 76, ¶ 1, 357 P.3d 547. In her petition, Widdison requested an evidentiary hearing, an order declaring that the Board's actions violated her constitutional rights, the reinstatement of her parole date, and an order prohibiting the Board from retaliating against her. The Board has paroled Widdison; any relief relating to prerelease proceedings or retaliation would have no legal effect on Widdison or her rights.

II. Mootness Exceptions

¶13 Because this matter is moot, Widdison asks us to apply the "public interest" exception and address the legal issues she presents.

A. The Elements of the "Public Interest" Exception

¶14 The "public interest" exception carries a slightly deceptive name, and, in an effort to resolve this confusion, we have previously suggested that this exception should simply be referred to as an exception to the mootness doctrine. See Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union , 2012 UT 75, ¶ 33, 289 P.3d 582. Under this exception, it is not enough that an appellant convince us that the appeal presents an issue of public concern. Rather, we will decide a moot issue when a litigant can demonstrate that the issue will "(1) affect the public interest, (2) be likely to recur, and (3) because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, be likely to evade review." State v. Steed , 2015 UT 76, ¶ 7, 357 P.3d 547.³ Widdison argues that all three considerations are present here. Although we agree with Widdison that her appeal raises issues that affect the public interest and are likely to recur, we are not convinced the issues she raises are likely to evade review.

¶15 The first thing someone asking us to address a moot issue under this exception must show is that the matter affects the public interest. In McRae v. Jackson , we noted that "class actions, questions of constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of a statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings" frequently raise issues of public concern.

526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974), overruled on other grounds by Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union , 2012 UT 75, 289 P.3d 582 ; see also State, in Interest of F.S.B. , 2014 UT App 235, ¶ 3, 336 P.3d 1073 (holding that a question of sufficiency of the evidence did not affect the public interest).

¶16 Widdison contends that whether the Board can rescind a parole date based on unadjudicated conduct presents an issue of first impression, implicates important constitutional rights, and has the potential to affect all inmates subject to Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. We agree.

¶17 The second factor requires a party to demonstrate that the issue is likely to recur. "Under settled case law, ‘a mere physical or theoretical possibility’ of recurrence is insufficient." Utah Transit Auth ., 2012 UT 75, ¶ 36, 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) ).⁴ A party must convince us that the issue will arise again.

¶18 Widdison notes that the Board makes rescission and parole decisions regularly, including in circumstances involving unadjudicated allegations against the inmate. And Widdison's argument comports with our experience. See, e.g. , Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89, ¶ 27, 416 P.3d 663 ; Blanke v. Board of Pardons & Parole , 2020 UT 39, ¶¶ 8–9, 467 P.3d 850. We agree with Widdison that the issue will likely recur.

¶19 Third, it is not enough that the issue be likely to recur, it must also be likely to evade review. Steed , 2015 UT 76, ¶ 8, 357 P.3d 547. We have often restated this requirement as mandating that the issue should be "inherently short in duration." See, e.g. , id. ¶ 9 ; Utah Transit Auth. , 2012 UT 75, ¶ 37, 289 P.3d 582 ("The types of issues likely to evade review are those that are inherently short in duration. ..." (quoting In re Adoption of L.O. , 2012 UT 23, ¶ 10, 282 P.3d 977 )); Guardian ad Litem v. State ex rel. C.D. , 2010 UT 66, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d 724 (same). Examples of these short matters include election challenges, Ellis v. Swensen , 2000 UT 101, ¶ 27, 16 P.3d 1233 ("[B]allots do not have to be produced until seven days before the election."), and pregnancy, see Utah Transit Auth ., 2012 UT 75, ¶ 37 n.23, 289 P.3d 582 (noting that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) was heard because the issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review").

¶20 We have also held that issues can evade review because of the likely actions of a party. See, e.g. , State ex rel. C.D. , 2010 UT 66, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d 724 (citing Anderson v. Taylor , 2006 UT 79, 149 P.3d 352 and Kearns-Tribune v. Salt Lake Cnty. Comm'n , 2001 UT 55, 28 P.3d 686 as examples of inherently short issues); Utah Transit Auth. , 2012 UT 75, ¶ 37 & nn.21–22, 289 P.3d 582 (citing McBride v. Utah State Bar , 2010 UT 60, 242 P.3d 769 and Kearns-Tribune as examples of inherently short issues); State v. Steed , 2015 UT 76, ¶ 11 n.9, 357 P.3d 547 (recognizing an ...