Widman v. Murray Corp. of Am.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1929
• Docket Number: No. 91.,91.
• Citation: 245 Mich. 332,222 N.W. 711
• Parties: WIDMAN v. MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

245 Mich. 332

222 N.W. 711

WIDMAN

v.MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA.

No. 91.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 7, 1929.

Certiorari to Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by George Widman, employé, opposed by the Murray Corporation of America, employer. An award of compensation was made by the Department of Labor and Industry, and defendant brings certiorari. Award affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Edward A. Smith, of Detroit, for appellant.

Frederick T. Witmire and Austin J. Spalding, both of Detroit, for appellee.

McDONALD, J.

The defendant seeks to review by certiorari an award of the Department of Labor and Industry.

The plaintiff claims that while in the employ of the defendant he received a compensable, accidental injury that resulted in the total loss of the sight of his right eye. At the time of the accident, he was traveling on a railroad train from Salt Lake City to Chicago. He had been sent by the defendant on a business trip, which took him to the West Coast and back to the home office of his employer in Detroit, Mich. His duties required that he go from Salt Lake City to Chicago, where he had business for the defendant with the Gimball Motor Company. He had no special hours within which to do his work and sometimes traveled at night to save time. He received a monthly salary. While sitting on the observation platform of the train, a cinder hit him in the eye. When he reached Chicago, he received treatment, and again in Detroit, but the eye continued to grow worse and finally had to be enucleated.

The defendant denies liability on the ground that the injury did not arise out of the employment. On the hearing, the Commission awarded the plaintiff compensation for 100 weeks at $18 a week for the loss of an eye and $720 for medical, surgical, and hospital services.

The following excerpts from defendant's brief state the issue involved:

‘This cause presents only one question for determination: Did the injury arise out of the employment? Defendant concedes that the injury occurred in the course of the employment and that the loss of the eye was the direct result of the injury.’

‘George Widman's presence on the train was of course justified by his employment. He was acting in the course of his employment but by his employment he was subjected to ‘no greater hazard or different risk than that sustained by every member of the general public,’ at least on that train.'

In the latter quotation is suggested the principal defense, which is a reliance on the general rule that an award is not authorized where the employment does not subject an employé to a greater risk than that to which the general public is exposed. But there are certain well-recognized fundamentals of responsibility which very often render this general rule inapplicable. There are present such fundamentals in the instant case. Chief of these is the nature of the duties which the plaintiff was required to perform. It was a condition of his employment that he should be on this train, which turned out to be a place of danger. The risks to which he was exposed from riding on trains from place to place as he was directed were incidental to his employment. He was required to ride on trains in the performance of his master's business. This condition of the employment was the proximate cause of his injury. These undisputed facts fix the responsibility of the defendant, regardless of the fact that others riding on the train were exposed to the same risks. In Cook v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, 243 Mass. 572, 137 N. E. 733, 29 A....