Widoe v. District No. 111 Otoe County School

• Decision Date: 23 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1518,97-1518
• Citation: Widoe v. District No. 111 Otoe County School, 147 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 1998)
• Parties: 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 407, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,541, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 576 Betty J. WIDOE, Appellant, v. DISTRICT # 111 OTOE COUNTY SCHOOL, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 726

147 F.3d 726

77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 407,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,541, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 576

Betty J. WIDOE, Appellant, v.DISTRICT # 111 OTOE COUNTY SCHOOL, Appellee.

No. 97-1518.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 24, 1997.

Decided June 23, 1998.

Scott A. Calkins, Omaha, NE, argued (Thomas F. Hoarty, Jr., on the brief), for Appellant.

Richard H. Hoch, Nebraska City, NE, argued, for Appellee.

Before McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and WEBB, ¹District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Betty J. Widoe(plaintiff) appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granting summary judgment in favor of Otoe County School DistrictNo. 111(defendant) on plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to hire her because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.Widoe v. Otoe CountySch. Dist. No. 111, No. 8:CV96-291 (D.Neb. Jan. 23, 1997)(order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment)(hereinafter "slip op.").For reversal, plaintiff argues, among other things, that the district court erred in holding that there is no genuine issue of material fact and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's disparate treatment claim when analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973)(McDonnell Douglas), or under a mixed motives theory as in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268(1989)(Price Waterhouse).For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's disparate treatment claim and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331,29 U.S.C. § 626.Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 4(a).

Background

The following summary of the factual background is largely based upon the district court's order.Slip op.at 2-7.Plaintiff was a substitute teacher for defendant from 1979 through 1995.During the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 academic years, plaintiff served as a full-time substitute third-grade teacher at Hayward Elementary School, which is within defendant's school district.Around the spring of 1995, Beverley Dodds, the principal at Hayward Elementary School, decided to hire a permanent teacher for the third-grade position which plaintiff had been filling.The position was advertised, and approximately 178 individuals, including plaintiff, applied.Dodds appointed five individuals to a selection committee that was to interview applicants and make a recommendation to the superintendent.The committee that Dodds appointed included one fifth-grade teacher, Susan Yohe, three third-grade teachers, Patsy Harper, Haeven Pedersen, and Beverly Jordon, and Dodds, herself.

The committee selected five or six applicants, including plaintiff, as finalists to be interviewed.Following the interviews, the committee recommended to the superintendent that the job be offered to Melissa Keeney, a recent college graduate in her early twenties.The superintendent recommended Keeney to the school board, which in turn voted to hire Keeney.

After exhausting her administrative remedies, plaintiff filed the present action in federal district court on May 10, 1996.She asserted disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.²In alleging disparate treatment, plaintiff maintained, in the alternative, that she was entitled to relief under a McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or a Price Waterhouse mixed motives analysis.Defendant moved for summary judgment.Upon review, the district court first considered whether plaintiff could survive defendant's motion under the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework.The district court noted that defendant conceded that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination.Slip op.at 9.The district court next held, as a matter of law, that defendant's articulated reason for not hiring plaintiff--"i.e., that Ms. Keeney was the best candidate for the job"--was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.Id. at 5-6, 9-10.³Finally, the district court concluded that plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's proffered reason was pretextual and, ultimately, whether defendant's failure to hire plaintiff was motivated by intentional age discrimination.Id. at 10-11(citingRothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37(8th Cir.1996)(Rothmeier)).

The district court also considered whether plaintiff could survive defendant's motion under a Price Waterhouse mixed motives analysis.The district court held that, because no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's age was a motivating factor in defendant's decision not to hire her, plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law under a mixed motives theory.Id. at 11-13(citingPhilipp v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673(8th Cir.1995)).

Upon further concluding that plaintiff failed as a matter of law on her disparate impact claim, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment of dismissal with prejudice.This appeal followed.

Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986);Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666(8th Cir.1992);St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699(8th Cir.1992).The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record.Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077(8th Cir.1980)(citingAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142(1970)).McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis

Given the absence of direct evidence of age discrimination in the present case, plaintiff's disparate treatment claim is best analyzed at the present stage of the litigation as a McDonnell Douglas pretext case.SeeRyther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 & n. 1(8th Cir.1997)(en banc)(holding that the facts of the case fall under the McDonnell Douglas standard, which does not require direct proof of discrimination for the plaintiff to make a submissible case), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013(1997).It is well-established that the now familiar three-stage analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas, and refined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207(1981), applies to disparate treatment claims under the ADEA.See, e.g., Ryther, 108 F.3d at 836;Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776(8th Cir.1995).Thus, we consider at this summary judgment stage: (1) whether plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie case of age discrimination, (2) whether defendant has sufficiently met its burden of producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case, and (3) whether plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that the proffered reasons were not the true reasons for the employment decision and that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the ultimate question of age discrimination.See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407(1993).

As the district court noted, there is no dispute that plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Regarding defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring plaintiff, defendant contends:

The decision making process was described in detail by the selection committee members in their respective depositions.The committee's reasons for the Keeney rather than Widoe selection included:

1.[Keeney] gave a very impressive interview (she was a bundle of energy).

2.[Keeney's] answers to their questions were good.

3.[Keeney] had excellent questions.

4.[Keeney] had some impressive experiences.

5.[Keeney] had a strong background in the reading program.

6.[Keeney] had good grades.

7.[The selection committee] couldn't locate some of [plaintiff's] references to check; they were not up-to-date.

8.[Plaintiff's] interview was not satisfactory.She didn't explain things well.She didn't answer the questions fully.

Brief for Appelleeat 4-5; see also slip op. at 3-6(summarizing and quoting excerpts from the deposition testimony of individual members of the selection committee).

Thus, the primary issue on appeal is whether plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated genuine controversy concerning intentional age discrimination to survive defendant's motion for summary judgment.The law applicable at this stage of the analysis was clarified by this court in Rothmeier:

[T]he rule in this Circuit is that an age-discrimination plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if the evidence considered in its entirety (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision.The second part of this test sometimes may be satisfied without additional evidence where the overall strength of the prima facie case and the evidence of pretext "suffice[s]...