Wieczorek v. Harry

• Decision Date: 15 August 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 08-12334-BC
• Parties: JOHN LEE WIECZOREK, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEE A. HARRY, Respondent,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

JOHN LEE WIECZOREK, Petitioner,

v.SHIRLEE A. HARRY, Respondent,

Case No. 08-12334-BC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: August 15, 2011

Hon. Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO

APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner John Lee Wieczorek, presently confined at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 30, 2008. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Macomb County Circuit Court of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.520b(1)(f) and one count of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.84. He was sentenced as a fourth felony habitual offender, Mich. Comp Laws § 769.12, to between thirty and one hundred years in prison on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction, and a concurrent sentence of six to one hundred years in prison on the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction.

I.

The relevant facts surveyed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), are as follows.

On the evening of May 13, 2004, defendant picked up the victim on Eight Mile Road in Detroit. The victim testified that she agreed to have sex with defendant in exchange for money. Defendant drove his company truck to a dark area behind a factory off Eight Mile Road. The victim testified that as soon as defendant parked, he punched her in the face, and thereafter pulled her hair and repeatedly struck her in the face and head. Defendant then pulled down his pants, held the victim's head,and briefly "stuck his penis" in her mouth. Defendant then pulled down the victim's pants, directed her to kneel, and announced that he was going to have anal sex with her. Defendant placed his penis in the victim's anus briefly, as he continued to pull her hair and punch her. Eventually, the victim unlocked and opened the passenger side door, and rolled out of the truck onto the ground. Defendant "jumped out [of the truck] on top of [the victim] and started punching [her] again in the face." He then allegedly choked her and threatened to kill her. The victim managed to escape, and obtained a ride to a nearby gas station where Richard Radtke, her former husband, was waiting. The victim did not report the matter to the police.

On May 14, 2004, the police questioned defendant after his company's foreman reported that blood, vomit, and hair were in the truck that defendant had returned. Testimony from the foreman and police officers revealed that there was a "large amount" of "blood splatter throughout the passenger side," "smears on the window," "blood splatters" on the floor, roof, and seat, and hair "wrapped around" the window handle. Defendant gave four different explanations about what happened in the truck. Defendant first stated that he had cut his finger, but later claimed that he had assaulted a female prostitute on Eight Mile Road after she attempted to rob him at knifepoint. After learning about defendant's arrest, the victim contacted the police. DNA testing of the blood found in the truck matched a DNA sample taken from the victim. Testing of blood found on the shirt defendant was wearing on May 13, 2004, revealed a mixture of defendant's and the victim's DNA. But "[m]ost of the blood was from [the victim]."

Defendant testified on his own behalf, and claimed that he was acting in self-defense. Defendant admitted that he solicited the victim for oral sex. He claimed, however, that after he parked and pulled down his pants, the victim brandished a knife, demanded money, and indicated that her accomplice was nearby.¹ As the victim reached for defendant's money, he struck her and forced her out of the passenger side door. Defendant struck the victim again when she held onto the door, and they both fell out of the truck. Defendant got back in the truck and left. Defendant claimed that he repeatedly lied to the police to conceal his act of soliciting a prostitute.

People v. Wieczorek, No. 263592, 2006 WL 3613786, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.; see also People v. Wieczorek, 731 N.W.2d 697 (2007) (denying permission to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court).

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On August 13, 2008, theCourt granted Petitioner's motion to hold the petition in abeyance in order to permit him to complete post-conviction proceedings in the state courts. He attempted to obtain state court transcripts to support his speedy trial claim and affidavits to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The trial court denied Petitioner's request for the transcripts, because Petitioner had previously been provided all of the pre-trial and trial transcripts. People v. Wieczorek, No. 2004-3466-FC (Macomb County Circuit Court, June 2, 2008). The Michigan appellate courts denied Petitioner's appeal from the denial of his request for the transcripts, People v. Wieczorek, No. 287157 (Mich.Ct.App. January 21, 2009), as did the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Wieczorek, 771 N.W.2d 758 (2009).

On April 7, 2010, this Court reinstated the petition to the Court's active docket. Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds:

I. Whether venue was proper in Macomb County, Michigan.

II. Whether Petitioner was deprived of the right to a speedy trial.

III. Whether Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel.

II.

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. And "where factual findings are challenged, the habeas petitioner has the burden of rebutting, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the state court's factual findings are correct." Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 914 (6th Cir. 2010)).

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, _ , 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

III.

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Macomb County Circuit Court was not the proper venue to prosecute him, because the crimes that he was charged with took place in Wayne County,Michigan. In rejecting his claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that although a trial should take place in the county where the crime was committed, Mich. Comp Laws § 762.3(1) indicates that where an offense is committed on the boundary line of two counties or within one mile of the dividing line between the two counties, the criminal offense may be prosecuted and punished in either county. Because the offenses took place within one block of Eight Mile Road, which is the boundary line between Macomb County and Wayne County, venue for the prosecution was proper in Macomb County. Wieczorek, Slip. Op. at * 2.

The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that it was proper to try Petitioner in Macomb County under Michigan Law because the crimes took place within one mile of the boundary between Macomb County and Wayne County. The determination of whether a state court is vested with jurisdiction under state law over a criminal case is a function of the state courts, not the federal courts. Wills v. Egeler, 532 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976. The Sixth Circuit has noted that "[a] state court's interpretation of state jurisdictional issues conclusively establishes jurisdiction for purposes of federal habeas review." Strunk v. Martin, 27 F. App'x 473, 475 (6th Cir. 2001). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his first claim.

B.

Petitioner next contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated.

Petitioner was...