Wiegand v. State
Decision Date | 07 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 143,143 |
Citation | 363 Md. 186,768 A.2d 43 |
Parties | John C. WIEGAND, Bondsman v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Diem, Bel Air, for appellant.
Steven M. Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY,1 CHASANOW,2 RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ BELL, Chief Judge.
The issue this case presents is whether a bail bondsman, who posts a bail bond for a defendant whose pretrial release conditions prohibit the defendant from leaving the jurisdiction without court approval and who is not given prior notification of the court's intention to amend the terms of the defendant's pretrial release, is entitled to be discharged from the obligation of the bail bond when the court actually does amend the conditions of pretrial release. The Circuit Court for Harford County determined that, under the facts of this case, he was not. We shall affirm that judgment.
Ebony Jean Smith (the "defendant" or "Smith") was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. She was taken before a court commissioner for an initial appearance, including pretrial release determination. Noting the defendant's lack of family ties, unstable employment status and history, plus short length of State residence—the defendant indicated that she was leaving to return to California—on the date of arrest, the commissioner required, as conditions of pretrial release, among others, a bail bond in the penalty amount of $5000 and that the defendant not leave the State without the court's permission.
The appellant, John C. Wiegand, Bondsman,3 posted the bail bond on behalf of the defendant. By executing the bail bond, he accepted its conditions and terms:
After a criminal information was filed, the defendant was arraigned in the Circuit Court and given a trial date of February 12, 1997. Thereafter, she sought permission from the court to visit California. By order dated December 23, 1997, the court granted the defendant permission "to go to California for the period of December 23, 1997 to January 15, 1998."
When the defendant's case was called on the trial date, the defendant did not appear, prompting the trial court to issue a writ of body attachment for the defendant. It subsequently issued an order of forfeiture of the bail bond. The appellant filed a Petition To Strike Bond Forfeiture,4 in which he alleged that the court's authorization of the defendant to leave the State, without giving him prior notice "prohibited the bondsman from rescinding said bond and delivering up the Defendant ... before leaving the State, thus greatly increasing the risk to the bondsman." At the hearing, the appellant recognized that the court had the right to amend the conditions of pretrial release and that "a defendant can always skip and go to California or Timbuktu or wherever, and the bondsman would be put to the same obligation." Nevertheless, he maintained that this case presented a difference:
The court thus denied the appellant's petition to strike the forfeiture.
The appellant timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before consideration by the intermediate appellate court, we granted the writ of certiorari to address this important issue.
In this Court, the appellant argues that he was discharged of his obligation under the bail bond when, without his knowledge and without giving him notice or an opportunity to be heard, the court amended the terms of pretrial release applicable to the defendant. He points out that, before posting the bail bond for the defendant, he was aware of the conditions of pretrial release set by the court commissioner and, thus, could assess the risk he was undertaking. More particularly, he notes the condition prohibiting the defendant from leaving the State without the court's permission. Acknowledging also that the condition permitted, and so he knew that, the court could modify it, the appellant contends that could occur only after he had been given notice and an opportunity for a hearing. For that proposition, he relies on Md. Rule 4-216(i) which provides:
The appellant reads the requirement of the rule calling for "notice and an opportunity for a hearing" to include bondsmen. "To interpret the rule otherwise would not be consistent with the intent of the rule," he submits. Critical to the appellant's argument is the notion that the amendment, without notice to the bondsman, of the pretrial release conditions from "`can't leave' to `can leave'" is "a monumental change in the conditions of pretrial release," that a change in such conditions also changes the risk the bondsman undertook and, further, that the bondsman's knowledge of the changed conditions would allow him or her to determine on the basis of full information whether to continue the risk. Relevant to the first two propositions, he asserts:
As to the third, he states that, with notice, "any amendment or change in pretrial release conditions made by the court allows the Bondsman to reevaluate the risk, no matter how minor or how large and to rescind the bail bond."5
To the appellant, it is also relevant that, by writing a bail bond to assure the defendant's appearance for scheduled court proceedings, he entered into a contract with the State. Because parties to a contract are entitled to notice and, more to the point, the Maryland Rules require it, citing and relying on Maryland Rule 4-217(i), the appellant contends that, by failing to give him notice before changing the conditions of the defendant's pretrial release, the court discharged him of any obligation under the bond.6 This is so, he says, because "[t]he court, by approving the Defendant's departure from the State, without notice, terminated any control the Appellant might have had over her."
Thus, the State concludes that the court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to strike the bond forfeiture, a result that is also consistent with that reached by other courts under similar facts and circumstances.7
In Allegheny Mutual Cas. Co. v. State, 234 Md. 278, 282-83, 199 A.2d 201, 203 (1964), where the defendants, who having failed to appear at trial, within a day or so, voluntarily returned to Baltimore with the bondsman and...
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