Wiener v. Country Club at Woodfield, Inc., 4D17-2120

Decision Date05 September 2018
Docket NumberNo. 4D17-2120,4D17-2120
Citation254 So.3d 488
Parties Hilton M. WIENER, Appellant, v. THE COUNTRY CLUB AT WOODFIELD, INC., A Florida Corporation, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Daniel A. Hershman of Hershman Law, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

James N. Krivok of Dicker, Krivok & Stoloff, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Conner, J.

Hilton M. Wiener ("Wiener") appeals the final judgment against him in favor of The Country Club at Woodfield, Inc. ("Woodfield Club"). The issue we decide is whether the trial court erred in interpreting the pretrial stipulation in a manner that narrowed the factual issues to be tried pertaining to liability, resulting in the deprivation of a fair trial. From the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court failed to consider the intent of the parties as evidenced by the statements within the pretrial stipulation and incorrectly interpreted the stipulation in a manner that limited the evidence at trial, denying Wiener a fair trial. For those reasons, we reverse.

Background

Woodfield Club is a corporation which operates a country club in a residential community. Wiener was a homeowner in the residential community, which obligated him and his wife to purchase a club membership, pursuant to the master declaration of covenants for the residential community.

From approximately February 2004 through May 2011, Wiener used facilities as a club member and paid all dues in accordance with invoices issued by Woodfield Club. However, starting in June 2011, Wiener stopped paying dues because he moved out of the home in response to his wife filing for divorce.

Article X, Section 18(b) of the master declaration of covenants provides for the transfer of membership obligations in the event joint homeowners divorce:

b. In the event Members are legally separated or divorced, title to the Membership, including all rights and benefits given to the holder thereof, shall vest in the spouse awarded the Membership by judicial determination or settlement, provided such spouse fulfills the eligibility requirements for Membership in the Club. Both of the divorced or legally separated Members shall be required to give written notice to the Club designating the person who is entitled to the rights and privileges of the Membership within five (5) days after the divorce or legal separation is declared final. Until written notice has been provided to the Club, both spouses shall remain responsible for the payment of all dues, fees, charges and assessments associated with the Membership. Upon termination of co-habitation, only one Member may use the Membership. If both parties fail to designate one person, the Membership privileges shall be determined as follows:
(1) The person resident in the Property shall be deemed to be the Member entitled to use the Club Facilities.

Wiener's wife was granted exclusive use of the home in January 2013, while their divorce was pending. The divorce became final in December 2013, at which time Wiener's interest in the home was awarded to the ex-wife. In July 2014, Wiener executed a quit claim deed transferring his interest in the home to his ex-wife. The ex-wife sold the house to a third party in June 2015, and the club membership for the property was transferred to the third-party purchaser.

Woodfield Club sued Wiener in July 2014 for breach of contract. Wiener filed an answer alleging that the court order awarding his ex-wife exclusive use and possession of the home and subsequent divorce decree denied him access to Woodfield Club and its facilities, therefore absolving him from any obligations. Upon the case being scheduled for trial, the parties filed a joint pretrial stipulation.

Section I of the pretrial stipulation was entitled: "Stipulated Facts Which Require No Proof at Trial." Paragraph P of Section II stated:

Defendant's obligation to pay dues, assessments and other charges due Plaintiff terminated on June 23, 2015.

June 23, 2015 is the date ownership of the house was transferred to the third-party purchaser, triggering membership requirements for the new owner.

Section III of the pretrial stipulation was entitled: "Issues of Law and Fact to be Determined at Trial." Paragraphs F, G, H, and I of Section III stated:

F. Whether Defendant's financial obligation to the Club pursuant to the Membership Agreement was terminated or extinguished by a final judgment of dissolution of Defendant's marriage to his former wife.
G. Whether the Court Order in Defendant's dissolution of marriage proceeding, which awarded Defendant's ex-spouse exclusive use and possession of the Harrington Way property, extinguished or altered Defendant's right to used Plaintiff's facilities under the Membership Agreement.
H. Whether the Court Order in Defendant's dissolution of marriage proceeding, which awarded Defendant's ex-spouse exclusive use and possession of the Harrington Way property, extinguished or altered Defendant's obligation to Plaintiff under the Membership Agreement.
I. Whether Defendant was obligated to pay dues, assessments and all other club charges accruing on Defendant's membership until Defendant's full golf membership was reissued by the Club to a new member pursuant to Plaintiff's Bylaws.

The non-jury trial was conducted by a judge who had not handled the case prior to trial. After the parties made their opening statements and while Woodfield Club was presenting its first witness, the trial judge interrupted examination of the witness to question why the case was proceeding to trial, based on stipulated facts the trial judge read in the pretrial stipulation. The trial judge interpreted the statement in Subsection P of the pretrial stipulation to mean that the parties had agreed that "the defendant's [Wiener's] obligation to pay dues, assessments, and other charges to the plaintiff [Woodfield Club] terminated on June 23, 2015" (the date the membership was transferred to the third-party purchaser), prompting the trial judge to ask, "What are we doing here?"

Wiener argued that the stipulation meant that the June 23, 2015 date was the outside date for liability, and that Subsection P had to be read in context with the other issues framed in the stipulation. The trial judge flatly rejected the argument, contending, "That's not what you stipulated to." Additionally, the trial judge asserted it was his understanding that in the Fourth District, "the pretrial stip controls over the pleadings and anything else." After concluding that Wiener's liability for charges owed for the membership was "a mathematical calculation," the trial judge ended discussion on the timeframe of Wiener's liability for dues and instructed Woodfield Club to provide a proposed judgment. The remainder of the trial was spent calculating the amount due. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Woodfield Club. After his motions for rehearing and new trial were denied, Wiener gave notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

Wiener frames two primary issues on appeal, but we determine those can be consolidated into one issue: Whether the trial court correctly construed the pretrial stipulation when awarding a judgment in favor of Woodfield Club. Additionally, Wiener argues the trial court improperly denied his motions for rehearing and a new trial.

We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's interpretation of a written contract as a question of law "provided that the language is clear and unambiguous and free of conflicting inferences." Ciklin Lubitz Martens & O'Connell v. Casey , 199 So.3d 309, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Commercial Capital Res., LLC v. Giovannetti , 955 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ). Pretrial stipulations are interpreted using the same principles for interpreting written contracts. See McGoey v. State , 736 So.2d 31, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citing contract law and explaining that the essence of a pretrial stipulation is "an agreement between the parties" requiring mutual assent).

Orders denying rehearing are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Allard v. Al-Nayem Int'l, Inc. , 59 So.3d 198, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Appellate courts also "review orders on motions for new trial for an abuse of discretion." Cent. Square Tarragon LLC v. Great Divide Ins. Co. , 82 So.3d 911, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • State v. Harper
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 5 septembre 2018
    ...factual dispute between the State and the defendant prevents the resolution of subjective entrapment on a motion to dismiss. A jury may 254 So.3d 488very well find the defendant not guilty on the basis of subjective entrapment. That, however, is a decision for another day." Blanco , 896 So.......
  • Jones v. Blue Ridge Mfg.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 14 décembre 2022
    ...are interpreted using the same principles for interpreting written contracts." Wiener v. The Country Club at Woodfield, Inc., 254 So.3d 488, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). "[A] 'meeting of the minds' by the parties is essential to a stipulation." McGoey v. State, 736 So.2d 31, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 199......
  • Parker Waichman LLP v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 2 octobre 2019
    ...or failed to properly apply the correct legal standard, the standard of review is de novo . See Wiener v. The Country Club at Woodfield, Inc., 254 So.3d 488, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).Here, Parker Waichman argues the trial court failed to apply the correct standard for the fee award as provid......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT