Wiese v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service, 85-93

• Decision Date: 18 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-93,85-93
• Citation: 389 N.W.2d 676
• Parties: Randy L. WIESE, Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 676

389 N.W.2d 676

Randy L. WIESE, Appellant, v.IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, Appellee.

No. 85-93.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 18, 1986.

Donna J. Henderson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Walter F. Maley, Blair H. Dewey, and Joseph L. Bervid, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS, SCHULTZ, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The issue in this appeal is whether an employee's refusal to temporarily work out of state disqualifies him from receiving unemployment benefits.The agency, Iowa Department of Job Service, determined that the employee voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his employer because the employee knew near the time of hire that out-of-state employment was a customary practice of the employer.On judicial review, the district court affirmed the agency decision; however, on appeal the court of appeals reversed.In a plurality opinion that court held the agency erred as a matter of law because the rule supporting the agency's decision requires that the terms of the contract of hire be known to the employee at the time of hire, rather than near the time of hire.We agree the agency incorrectly interpreted its rule; however, we believe the case should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings.

Certain basic facts are undisputed.Employee Randy L. Wiese commenced work at Johnson Development Company in November 1981 as a full-time rough carpenter.The employer is a construction company that has its office in Altoona, Iowa, which is also the place of the employee's residence.The employee worked for his employer at jobs in Iowa until October 1983.At that time the employer had no construction work available in Iowa, but did have a job in Texas which was to last approximately two months.Employees flew to the Texas job site to work for nine days and then return to Iowa for a five-day period.While at the job site the employees worked for four days, had one day off, and then worked for another four-day period.The employer paid for the employees' flight expenses, and other expenses incurred while in Texas including food, lodging, maid and laundry service.Employees were paid an additional $2.00 per hour while working in Texas.The employee made an initial trip to Texas for one nine-day work period, but upon returning home he informed his employer that he was quitting his job because "he couldn't be away from his family that much."The employee revealed he would continue his employment if the employer could provide him work in Iowa; however, the employer had no in-state work available.The employee quit his job rather than return to work in Texas.Thereafter, he applied for unemployment benefits.

The fighting issue in this appeal concerns the interpretation of agency rules defining when an employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for voluntarily terminating employment.The rules implement Iowa Code section 96.5(1983) which provides in part:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1.Voluntary quitting.If he or she has left his or her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his or her employer, if so found by the department.

Agency rules specifically define when a quit is for a cause that may or may not be attributable to the employer.See370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.25, .26.

Our initial inquiry concerns rule 4.25.Rule 4.25 defines "voluntary quit" and notes the burden of proof is upon the employer to establish that the separation was "a voluntary leaving of employment without good cause attributable to the employer."370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.25.Additionally, it sets forth some 38 reasons when a voluntary quit will be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer.See370 Iowa Admin.Code 4.25(1)-(40).The majority of the agency appeal board adopted the hearing officer's conclusion that under rule 4.25(32) the employee's quit was voluntary and not attributable to the employer.Subsection 32 specifically provides as follows: "The claimant left by refusing a transfer to another location when it was known at the time of hire that it was customary for employees to transfer as required by the job."On judicial review, the district court affirmed the agency decision.The court of appeals reversed concluding that the subsection 32 language "at the time of hire" was inapplicable because under the agency's findings of fact the employee merely knew of out-of-state work "near the time of hire."Without remanding for further proceedings, that court concluded there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the employee knew of the possibility of transfer "at the time of hire."

The agency urges that deference should be given to its interpretation of its own rules.We note that courts are not bound by the agency's interpretations of the law.Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10(Iowa1982).We give weight to administrative interpretations of statutes, but the meaning of a statute is always a matter of law that cannot be changed by administrative rule.Schmitt v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 263 N.W.2d 739, 745(Iowa1978).We have indicated that we accord agencies "a reasonable range of informed discretion in the interpretation and application of their own administrative rules."Dameron v. Neumann Brothers, Inc., 339 N.W.2d 160, 162(Iowa1983).On appeal, the meaning of a rule that interprets a statute is an issue of law which is a matter finally reserved to the courts.Consequently, the court of appeals followed the correct approach when it applied its own interpretation to the agency's rules interpreting section 96.5.

The employee concedes that he did not work at a permanent job site but asserts he only objected to working out of state.A careful reading of the agency's findings of fact reveals the "employer had a temporary job in the state of Texas."We believe rule 4.25(32) is inapplicable under these facts.In this case, the nature of the employment is such that the location of the work site often changes.We do not believe that a temporary location change, even to an out-of-state job site, is a "transfer to another location" under rule 4.25(32).Subsection 32 is either inapplicable to this type of employment or applies to a change of employment site that requires the employee to change his or her residence.The agency erred as a matter of law in relying upon rule 4.25(32).

In its decision, the agency also rejected the employee's claim that he quit because of personal hardship in being away from his family.To support its decision, the agency noted the temporary nature of the job and the fact that the employer payed all the employee's expenses while he was away from home.Although the employee has not directly challenged this determination, he has preserved error on an additional claim that his quit was with good cause attributable to the employer because of a change in the contract of hire.We now turn to this contention.

An employee leaving his or her employment may quit with "cause attributable to his or her employer," as that term is mentioned in section 96.5(1), if the employer makes a substantial change in the terms or conditions of the contract of hire.We have affirmed an agency's finding that an employee did not quit work, but that the work was terminated by the employer when the employee refused to accept a change in a work assignment which was contrary to the contract of hire.Forrest Park Sanitarium v. Miller, 233 Iowa 1341, 1343, 11 N.W.2d 582, 583(1943).In Miller a 108-pound practical nurse was hired for the day shift and would not agree to the employer changing her duty to nights.She deemed herself incapable of handling violent patients during the night shift and also had previously suffered a nervous breakdown after such duty.The agency found the nurse did not quit her work; rather, her work was terminated with cause attributable to her employer. ...