Wiggins v. City of Montgomery

Decision Date20 September 2019
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 2:17cv425-SMD
PartiesMARY WIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On July 5, 2017, Mary Wiggins ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against the City of Montgomery, Alabama, ("Defendant") alleging claims of unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA"); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"). See (Doc. 1). This Court's jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39), Plaintiff's opposition thereto (Doc. 43), and Defendant's reply (Doc. 44). Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and the pleadings of the parties, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall grant a motion for "summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute "is 'genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. A[] [dispute] is 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion[,]" and alerting the court to portions of the record which support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is then similarly required to cite to portions of the record which show the existence of a material factual dispute. Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1970 as a typist with the Police Department. In 1993, Defendant promoted Plaintiff to the position of Clerk III. In 1995, Defendant promoted Plaintiff to a position with Defendant's Finance Department. From 1996 to the time of her retirement in December 2015, Plaintiff worked as an Account Clerk II with the License and Revenue Division of Defendant's Finance Department. As an Account Clerk II, Plaintiff worked at the front desk in the License and Revenue office and was responsible for handling the daily activities of assisting customers, gathering information, and making determinations on what type of licenses customers needed. In 2007, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to the position of Revenue Examiner and was subsequently denied. In 2013, Plaintiff applied again for the position of Revenue Examiner and was denied again. She met the minimum qualifications to hold the position—i.e., she had a high school diploma or the equivalent thereof, and two years of delinquent account collection work.

On April 15, 2015, Plaintiff applied for one of two open Revenue Examiner positions. The Revenue Examiner job posting for the 2015 opening states that the "fundamental reason this classification exists is to enforce revenue and/or license laws and regulations." The posting notes that "[w]ork involves inspecting business premises in an assigned geographical location for violations and verifications." Under a section titled "WORKING CONDITIONS," the posting advises that "[w]ork is performed primarily in the field involving travel to and visits to local business locations, which may requireworking in inclement weather, visiting construction sites, climbing stairs, walking over rough terrain, minimal lifting of boxed documents and/or laptop and printer, etc."

Similarly, the Revenue Examiner job description (which is a separate document from the Revenue Examiner job posting discussed above) states the following "essential function" of the position:

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION: Collects revenues and enforces revenue ordinances using a computer, telephone, receipt book, collection's envelope and automobile to travel to work locations following departmental guidelines, state revenue law in order to collect delinquent revenue and ensure compliance of revenue law requirements.

Under this heading, the job description further notes that the employee will be required to "visit[ ] business establishments for collection of delinquent revenues." The job description lists another "essential function" as follows:

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION: Visits business activities of permanent and transient businesses for enforcement of business license ordinances using a computer, calculator, citations and an automobile to travel to work locations following departmental guidelines and city ordinances relative to revenue collection in order to ensure proper business licenses have been obtained and are properly displayed and the required conditions to possess such licenses are met.

Under this heading, the job description further notes that the employee will be required to "[c]heck[ ] the computer for new businesses in the community for business licenses" and, if the business is not licensed, "make[ ] a personal visit." Finally, at the end of the job description document and outside of the section listing essential functions, the job description identifies the same working conditions listed within the job posting—i.e., that "[w]ork is performed primarily in the field involving travel to and visits to local business locations which may require working in inclement weather, visiting construction sites,climbing stairs, walking over rough terrain, minimal lifting of boxed documents and/or laptop and printer, etc."

Plaintiff submitted her application for the 2015 Revenue Examiner positions on April 15, 2015. In her application, Plaintiff stated that, due to a right knee injury, she "use[d] a walker when walking long distances and for knee support," and that she "cannot walk out in rough terrain, as the recent job announcement goes."1 Plaintiff sustained her knee injury in 2000 when she fell down the stairs in the parking deck after work. Since that time, Plaintiff has used a walker on a daily basis for ambulatory support. Due to the injury, Plaintiff claims that she is "limited in the major life activities of walking and breathing." Along with noting her physical limitations, Plaintiff also stated in her application that the "Finance Director advised that we could use one or two inside Revenue Examiner[s]" and that she "could benefit in working a[n] inside position." She complained within her application that she had been passed over for the position in the past due to her age and echoed the Finance Director's position that "this division needed one or two inside revenue examiners to work on sales tax," noting that her supervisor "chooses not to fill that position until years down the line." Finally, Plaintiff reiterates in the application: "And as this recent job notification states, you must be able to walk on rough terrain which I cannot do - I feel like no one[ ] cares about me and my situation."

On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff, along with four other applicants, interviewed for the two open Revenue Examiner positions with Faye Comer ("Comer"). Comer, who is theRevenue Supervisor for the License and Revenue Division of Defendant's Finance Department, was Plaintiff's direct supervisor, and had supervisory and decision making authority with regard to interviewing, hiring, promotion, and discipline. According to Comer, Plaintiff told her during the interview that she was "limited on climbing a lot of stairs"; visiting construction sites"; "walking on rough terrain"; "walking on terrain that was not safe"; and "working in inclement weather." Comer also acknowledged that Plaintiff complained during the interview that she felt she had been discriminated against in the past due to her age. Comer was unable to recall if Plaintiff complained about disability discrimination during the interview.

On June 2, 2015, Comer recommended that Patrick Vines ("Vines") and J.C. Jones ("Jones") be promoted to fill the two vacant Revenue Examiner positions. At that time, Vines was thirty-one years old and Jones was twenty-eight. Jones had been working for Defendant for one year as an Account Clerk when he was promoted; Vines had been working for Defendant for eleven years as an Account Clerk. Neither Jones nor Vines had a visible disability. Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on June 17, 2015, claiming discrimination based upon age, disability, and retaliation. Plaintiff also sent a letter to Defendant on June 22, 2015, which complained that she was being overlooked based upon her age and disability.

A third Revenue Examiner position became available shortly thereafter, and Comer recommended that Cheryl Urquhart ("Urquhart") fill the position on July 9, 2015. At that time, Urquhart was fifty years old, and had no visible disability. Comer filled the third vacant position from the candidates who...

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