Wiggins v. Planet Home Lending, LLC
Decision Date | 26 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 5:14-CV-862-D,5:14-CV-862-D |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Parties | MYRAD. WIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. PLANET HOME LENDING, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Myra D. Wiggins ("Wiggins" or "plaintiff") is upset about a state-court foreclosure action, and filed a pro se complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief. See Compl. [D.E. 1]. On December 23, 2014, Planet Home Lending, LLC, formerly known as Green Planet Servicing, LLC ("Planet Home"), Thomas O'Connell, Philip A. Glass, Theodore A. Nodell, Charlee Eades, and Lenny Cicero (collectively, "defendants") moved to dismiss Wiggins's complaint. See [D.E. 17]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6).1 On January 20, 2015, the court notified Wiggins about the motion to dismiss, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline [D.E. 22]. On January 21, 2015, Wiggins moved to amend her complaint. See [D.E. 23, 23-1]. On February 4, 2015, defendants responded in opposition to Wiggins's motion to amend her complaint. See [D.E. 25]. On February 10, 2015, Wiggins replied to the defendants' response concerning the motion to amend. See [D.E. 26]. As explained below, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss and denies Wiggins's motion to amend as futile.
On May 29, 2010, Wiggins executed a promissory note in the amount of $94,366.00 in favor of Mortgage Investors Corporation. See [D.E. 17-1].2 Wiggins also executed a deed of trust to secure the note. See [D.E. 17-2]. The security under the deed of trust was property located in Zebulon, North Carolina ("property"). Id. 4. After the loan closed, Mortgage Investors Corporation transferred the note to Planet Home. Cf. [D.E. 1-4].
Wiggins was required to make monthly payments under the terms of the note and deed of trust. See [D.E. 17-1] 1; [D.E. 17-2] 5. Wiggins made some payments, but she eventually failed to make the monthly payments required under the terms of the note and deed of trust.
Planet Home accelerated the balance of the loan due under the note and deed of trust. On October 1, 2014, an appointment of substitution of trustee was recorded in the Johnston County Register of Deeds, which substituted Philip A. Glass, Charlee Eades, or Lenny Cicero as the substitute trustee under the deed of trust. See [D.E. 1-4], On October 8, 2014, Philip A. Glass filed a notice of foreclosure hearing, with a foreclosure hearing date of November 6, 2014. See [D.E. 1-6].
On November 6, 2014, the Johnston County Clerk of Court conducted a foreclosure hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. §45-21.16. See [D.E. 1-9]. Wiggins unsuccessfully contested the foreclosure. On November 6, 2014, the clerk entered an order allowing the foreclosure to proceed. Clerk'sForeclosure Order (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2014); see [D.E. 25-1] 4. On November 10, 2014, Wiggins filed a notice of appeal of the clerk's order allowing the foreclosure. [D.E. 1-9]; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d1). On January 26, 2015, Johnston County Superior Court considered Wiggins's appeal and concluded that the foreclosure was proper under North Carolina law and that the substitute trustee was entitled to complete the foreclosure under the deed of trust. See [D.E. 25-1]. Wiggins did not appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
In this federal action, Wiggins asserts that she does not owe a debt to Planet Home. See [D.E. 1-2]. Wiggins, however, raised this issue at the foreclosure hearing and lost. See [D.E. 25-1].
In moving to dismiss Wiggins's complaint, defendants initially argue that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the court's "statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see Hollowav v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood. Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Wiggins asserts that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction, she must prove that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
Wiggins's complaint fails to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, Wiggins's complaint simply lists various federal laws, but fails to provide any explanation regarding how or why defendants violated the federal laws. See Compl. 2-4. Thus, her complaint fails to establishsubject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005); Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999); Jacobs v. Campbell, No. 7:13-CV-240-D, 2014 WL 4261584, at *1-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2014) (unpublished).
Alternatively, Wiggins's complaint is barred by collateral estoppel. Wiggins's claims arise from the November 2014 foreclosure proceeding under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16 in Johnston County Superior Court. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies." Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986). This doctrine requires (1) a prior suit resulting in a final judgment on the merits; (2) identical issues involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit and necessary to the judgment; and (4) the issue was actually determined. See id. at 429, 349 S.E.2d at 557; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980); Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2008); Meehan v. Cable, 127 N.C. App. 336, 339-40, 489 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1997).
In North Carolina, the Clerk of Superior Court presides over power of sale foreclosure actions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d). A clerk's judgment "will stand as [the] judgment of the court." In re Atkinson-Clark Canal Co., 234 N.C. 374, 377, 67 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1951). Any issue that the clerk decides in a foreclosure proceeding pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d) is conclusive unless appealed and reversed and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent lawsuit. See Haughton v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 737 S.E.2d 191, 2013 WL 432575, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (unpublished table decision); see also Newton v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC., No. 7:14-CV-16-D, 2015 WL 3413256, at *2 (unpublished); Carmichael v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., No.5:14-CV-122-D, 2014 WL 7205099, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 2014) (unpublished); Lewis v. Kesterson, No. 7:12-CV-352-BO, 2013 WL 5525663, at *1-2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished); Oketch v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00102, 2012 WL 2155049, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 13, 2012) (unpublished); Jones v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. RWT 09CV2904, 2011 WL 382371, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2011) (unpublished); Coleman v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Civil Case No. L-10-2297, 2010 WL 5055788, at *3-4 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2010) (unpublished); Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cobb, No. 5:07-CV-129-D, 2008 WL 6155804, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished); Douglas v. Pennamco, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 644, 646, 331 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1985); Phil Mech. Constr. Co. v. Haywood, 72 N.C. App. 318, 320-23, 325 S.E.2d 1, 1-3 (1985). A party may appeal a decision of the clerk of court to the superior court, where the decision is reviewed de novo. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16(d1); Phil Mech. Contr. Co., 72 N.C. App. at 322, 325 S.E.2d at 3. In conducting its review, the superior court may consider evidence of legal defenses tending to negate any of the clerk's findings required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16. See In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust, 334 N.C. 369, 374-75, 432 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1993). The review is limited to these findings, and the superior court has no equitable jurisdiction to enjoin foreclosure on any ground other than those stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16. See id. 334 N.C. at 374, 432 S.E.2d at 859; In re Helms, 55 N.C. App. 68, 71-72, 284 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1981).
Essentially, the issues that Wiggins raises in her complaint are identical to those that the clerk determined on November 6, 2014, and that the Superior Court affirmed on January 26, 2015. Here, Wiggins collaterally challenges that a valid debt exists and whether Planet Home is the holder of the subject note and deed of trust. These claims pertain solely to issues decided against Wiggins in theforeclosure action and are barred by collateral estoppel.3 Moreover, Wiggins's claims in her complaint fail to implicate federal law or any other grounds for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Citimortgage, Inc. v. Grampus, No. 3:13CV22-MOC-DSC, 2013 WL 1196582, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2013) (unpublished); Tr. Servs. of Carolina, LLC v. Rivera, No. 3:12CV146-MOS-DSC, 2012 WL 1645599, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Mar 27, 2012) (unpublished); Simpson v. Simpson, No. 3:11CV576-M0C-DSC, 2012 WL 1021773, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2012) (unpublished); Nationwide Tr. Servs., Inc. v. Rivera, No. 3:11CV528-RJC-DSC, 2012 WL 1395557, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2012) (unpublished); Ashford v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 7:10-CV-162-D, 2010 WL 4117402, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (unpublished); In re Foreclosure by David Simpson, No. 3:10CV112-RJC-DSC, 2010 WL 1838181, *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 2010) (unpublished). Thus, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Alternatively, the Rooker-Feldman...
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