Wiggins v. Ssa Atl., LLC

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:19-02291-RMG
• Parties: Antonette Wiggins, Plaintiff, v. SSA Atlantic, LLC, f/k/a SSA Cooper, LLC; International Longshoreman's Association Local 1442; and International Longshoreman's Association Local 1771, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Antonette Wiggins, Plaintiff, v. SSA Atlantic, LLC, f/k/a SSA Cooper, LLC;

International Longshoreman's Association Local 1442;

and International Longshoreman's Association Local 1771, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-02291-RMG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

September 30, 2020

ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 63) recommending the Court grant Defendant International Longshoreman's Association Local 1771's ("Local 1771") motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 53) and deny International Longshoremen's Association Local 1442's ("Local 1442") motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 54). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in whole the R & R as the Order of the Court.

I. Background

On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Defendants Local 1422, Local 1771, and SSA Cooper, LLC ("SSA") alleging sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Dkt. No. 51).

Plaintiff alleges she works at the Wando Terminal in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina and is employed by SSA. (Id. ¶ 14) ("On May 5, 2018, June 8, 2018, and September 8, 2018, the Plaintiff was paid by, and thus employed by, Defendant SSA Cooper."). Plaintiff allegedly "began working with [Local] 1422 in or around March 2016, and at all times was effective and efficient in her work." (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges Cliff Inabinett was "employed through [Local] 1771." (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges Inabinett harassed her on account of her sex. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20). Plaintiff continues:

21. Despite the Plaintiff reporting this harassment and discrimination to her header, Larry Nesmith, and submitting formal complaints to ILA1422, nothing was done and Plaintiff was forced to continue working with her harasser.

22. Once the Plaintiff made a formal complaint to ILA 1422, representatives from ILA 1422 notified ILA 1771.

23. Despite ILA 1771 being made aware of the harassment and discrimination, nothing was done to stop the harassment or to remove Plaintiff from the environment.

24. Further, after Plaintiff complained of the harassment and discrimination, a Port Grievance Committee, comprised of representatives from all defendants, met to discuss an investigation into the matter. It was specifically after this meeting that the retaliation against the Plaintiff escalated.

. . .

27. In addition, as a result of Plaintiff's complaints of gender discrimination and harassment, she was retaliated against by multiple supervisors; and the discrimination, harassment, and retaliation became so severe that Plaintiff had to leave work on multiple occasions, while Mr. Inabinett remains employed with Defendants.

(Id. ¶¶ 21-24, 27).

On May 26, 2020, Local 1771 and Local 1422 filed respective motions to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 53, 54). On June 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed oppositions to both motions, (Dkt. Nos. 58, 59), to which, on June 16, 2020, Local 1422 filed a reply, (Dkt. No. 60).

On August 27, 2020, the Magistrate Judge filed an R & R recommending that the Court grant Local 1771's motion to dismiss but deny Local 1422's motion to dismiss. On September 10, 2020, both Plaintiff and Local 1422 filed timely objections to the R & R. (Dkt. Nos. 64 &65). On September 24, 2020, Local 1771 filed a reply to Plaintiff's objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 67). On September 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply to Local 1422's objections. (Dkt. No. 68). Local 1771 and Local 1422's motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

a. Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court that has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). This Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R Plaintiff specifically objects to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (b)(2). Where Plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, "a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). (internal quotation omitted). "Moreover, in the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the recommendation." Wilson v. S.C. Dept of Corr., No. 9:14-cv-4365-RMG, 2015 WL 1124701, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2015). Both Plaintiff and Local 1422 filed objections to the R & R, and the R & R is reviewed de novo.

b. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action if the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of the claim, or the applicability of defenses. . . . Our inquiry then is limited towhether the §allegations constitute a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is obligated to "assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint's allegations." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Although the Court must accept the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Id. Generally, to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint must provide enough facts to "'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). Although the requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability requirement at this stage, the complaint must show more than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint has "facial plausibility" where the pleading "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

I. Discussion

a. The R & R Correctly Recommended Local 1771's Motion to Dismiss Be Granted.

After review of the record, the R & R, and Plaintiff's objections, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge accurately determined that Local 1771's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted in its entirety. Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Local 1771 be dismissed from this action and the Court addresses Plaintiff's objections below.

Plaintiff objects that: "[T]he Magistrate's Report and Recommendation hinges on the notion that Plaintiff has merely alleged 'passive acquiescence' on the part of ILA 1771. As explained more thoroughly in Plaintiff's Response to Defendant ILA1771's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff views ILA 1771's involvement as ratification or support, more so than 'passive acquiescence.'" (Dkt. No. 64 at 2). Plaintiff also objects that while "it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not employed by ILA 1771 . . . ILA 1771 may have been the employer of Plaintiff's harasser, Mr. Inabinett. If ILA 1771 does in fact turn out to be Mr. Inabinett's employer at any time relevant to the Complaint, he would have been acting as an agent of that union." (Id. at 3). In sum, Plaintiff objects that her amended complaint adequately alleges (1) Local 1771 "ratified" or "supported" Inabinett's actions against her and (2) the Magistrate Judge failed to address the possibility that Inabinett was an "agent" of Local 1771.

As to her discrimination and hostile work environment claims, the Magistrate Judge accurately noted that, despite having been previously granted leave to amend her complaint, Plaintiff nowhere "allege[s] any facts showing that she herself is a member of Local 1771, an applicant of the union, represented by the union for purposes of collective bargaining, or otherwise affiliated in any way with Local 1771." (Dkt. No. 61 at 9) (noting union affiliation is generally required to bring claims under § 2000e-2(c)) (citing Johnson v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, Local 815 AFL-CIO, 520 F. App'x 452, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A union is liable under Title VII for discriminating against its members when performing union functions, such as job referrals, but it is not liable for an employer's actions.") (emphasis added)); E.E.O.C. v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting "the EEOC's contention that unions have an affirmative duty to prevent racial harassment or other forms of unlawful discrimination in the workplace"). Relatedly, the Magistrate Judge correctly foundthat, to the extent Local 1771 owed Plaintiff any type of duty, under an agency theory or otherwise, "Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Local 1771 performed any affirmative act supporting discrimination or causing the employer to discriminate against Plaintiff. She does not allege that Local 1771 directed Mr. Inabinett, or anyone else, to harass or discriminate against her or that Mr. Inabinett was acting as an agent of Local 1771 when he allegedly engaged in this conduct." (Id. at 10); Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am. Local 310, 398 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting "a union may be held liable under Title VII if the [u]nion itself instigated or...