Wiggins v. the City of Chicago.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 68 Ill. 372,1873 WL 8365
• Parties: DAVID WIGGINSv.THE CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

68 Ill. 372

1873 WL 8365 (Ill.)

DAVID WIGGINS

v.THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding.

This was a suit, brought by the city of Chicago against David Wiggins, to recover the penalty for violating the provisions of an ordinance relating to auctioneers in the city. The ordinance required that all sales of goods, chattels, or personal property at public auction, except when made under legal process, should be made by an auctioneer, his co-partner or clerk, who should first have obtained a license, under the hand of the mayor and seal of the city, and have paid to the city collector at the rate of $200 per annum, and have executed a bond, with two sureties, to the city, to be approved by the mayor, in the penal sum of $1000, conditioned for the due observance of the ordinances and regulations of the common council.

That all licenses should be made to expire on the last day of April next after the date thereof, and be subject to revocation by the mayor, whenever it should appear, to his satisfaction, that the party so licensed had violated any provision of any ordinance of the city relating to auctions or auction sales, or any condition of his bond.

The third section provided a penalty of $50 for selling or attempting to sell at public auction, etc., without having a license.

Messrs. KNOWLTON & HUMPHREVILLE, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. I. N. STILES, and Mr. JOHN LEWIS, for the defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

The first question presented is, whether the criminal court of Cook county had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal prosecuted from the justice of the peace. It is a matter of no consequence how the case was transferred from the police magistrate Scully to the police magistrate Banyon, as appellant appeared before the latter, and went to trial, and appealed the case to the criminal court. The magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, there can not be the slightest question that he also acquired jurisdiction of the person of appellant, when he entered his appearance to the suit. Roberts v. Formhalls, 46 Ill. 66, and the cases there cited.

The criminal court, however, is limited in its jurisdiction by our present constitution. It provides that it shall have the jurisdiction of a circuit court in all cases of a criminal and quasi criminal nature, arising in the county of Cook, etc. And all recognizances and appeals taken in that county in criminal and quasi criminal cases, shall be returnable and taken to that court. It is, then, necessary to determine whether this case is of a quasi criminal nature, as it is not claimed to be criminal. Wharton, in his Law Lexicon, defines quasi crime to be the act of doing damage or evil involuntarily. But this can not be the sense in which the framers of our constitution intended to use the term. When the entire section is considered, in the light of our jurisprudence, we must conclude that it was intended to embrace all offenses not crimes or misdemeanors, but that are in the nature of crimes--a class of offenses against the public which have not been declared crimes, but wrongs against the general or local public which it is proper should be repressed or punished by forfeitures and penalties. This would embrace all qui tam actions and forfeitures imposed for the neglect or violation of a public duty. A quasi crime would not embrace an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply forfeitures for a wrong done to the public, whether voluntary or involuntary, where a penalty is given, whether recoverable by criminal or civil process; and it would embrace prosecutions for bastardy, and informations in the nature of a quo warranto, etc.

In accordance with these views, it was held in the case of Naylor v. The City of Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285, that a suit to recover a penalty for the violation of a city ordinance was a quasi criminal prosecution. That case is conclusive of this question, and under it we must hold that the appeal was properly taken to the criminal court of Cook county, and it thus acquired jurisdiction.

The case was submitted to the court below, and tried without a jury; and after hearing the evidence, the court announced that he found the defendant “guilty,” and in rendering the judgment it was ordered that “the defendant be fined the sum of $50, and pay the costs,” and awarded execution in favor of the plaintiff. It has been repeatedly held by this court, that it is immaterial what the form of the verdict may be, so that it has the substance of a proper finding. Minkhart v. Hankler, 19 Ill. 48; Bates v. Williams, 43 Ill. 494; Jarrard v. Harper, 42 Ill. 457; and Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Vanduzor, 49 Ill. 489. In this case it was immaterial whether the court said that he found the issues for the plaintiff, and found its debt to be $50, or found defendant guilty, and rendered judgment for that sum. This court has never inclined to apply strict technical rules in cases before justices of the peace, or on appeal, as in cases where there are written pleadings. In such cases substance and not form is regarded. We have been unable to find that any precise form of a verdict is given in the books. The rules require that it shall be responsive to the issue, but works on practice lay down as a rule that the verdict may be pronounced in open court, when it is entered in form by the clerk, who should then read it to the jury, to avoid all mistake.

It is urged that the court below entered a judgment for a fine, and not a formal judgment in debt. It is true that the judgment does not possess the formal parts of a judgment in debt, but it orders and adjudges that defendant be fined $50 and pay the costs of the proceeding, and awards execution for its collection. The judgment is...