Wiggins v. Town of Somers

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CONWAY; DESMOND; DESMOND
• Citation: 149 N.E.2d 869,173 N.Y.S.2d 579,4 N.Y.2d 215
• Decision Date: 03 April 1958
• Parties: , 149 N.E.2d 869 Bennie WIGGINS, Respondent, v. TOWN OF SOMERS, Appellant.

Page 579

173 N.Y.S.2d 579 4 N.Y.2d 215, 149 N.E.2d 869 Bennie WIGGINS, Respondent,
v.
TOWN OF SOMERS, Appellant. Court of Appeals of New York. April 3, 1958.

Page 581

[149 N.E.2d 870] [4 N.Y.2d 216] Harry H. Chambers, New York City, for appellant.

[4 N.Y.2d 217] Arthur H. Ellis, Mount Vernon, for respondent.

CONWAY, Chief Judge.

The issue presented by this appeal is the validity of an ordinance of the town of Somers which provides, in substance, that no person may transport or dump [4 N.Y.2d 218] within the town garbage 'originating outside of the Town of Somers'. In this suit to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance, the town's counterclaim to restrain plaintiff's violation thereof has been [149 N.E.2d 871] dismissed for legal insufficiency (Rules Civ.Prac., rule 109, subd. 5). It is the correctness of that determination which must be decided.

We note at the outset that the statutory inhibition is directed against two activities, (1) transporting, and (2) dumping. Disposing first of the less substantial question, we hold that the broad prohibition against the use of the roads in Somers (which include a State and a Federal highway) is invalid in that it exceeds the power of the town board to regulate traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71, §§ 54, 90; Town Law, Consol.Laws, c. 62, § 130, subd. 7; People v. Grant, 306 N.Y. 258, 117 N.E.2d 542; Donovan v. Town of New Windsor, 132 Misc. 860, 231 N.Y.S. 82). Upon this point all the members of this court agree. But there is a disparity of view upon the question of the validity of the ordinance insofar as it prohibits the dumping of non-Somers garbage within the town.

The plaintiff contends that the ordinance is arbitrary on its face because it attempts to make a qualitative distinction between Somers and non-Somers garbage, when in fact there is none. The town, on the other hand, takes the position that the purpose and effect of the ordinance is simply and obviously to reduce the quantity of garbage which may be dumped in Somers by limiting such dumping to garbage which is collected in Somers. We agree with the town and have no difficulty in concluding that this ordinance is an entirely reasonable and proper exercise of the police power.

The principles which are applicable to this case are familiar indeed. Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, i. e., they are presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature

Page 582

(Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634; East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 293 N.Y. 622, 627-628, 59 N.E.2d 625, 626-627, affirmed 326 U.S. 230, 66 S.Ct. 69, 90 L.Ed. 34; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 210, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281). While this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt (Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 540-541, 132 N.E.2d 829, 830-831; Matter of Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 206, 207, 52 N.E.2d 97, 98, 99; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369). Particularly apropos is the rule that [4 N.Y.2d 219] the law may not be arbitrary and it must be reasonably related to some manifest evil (Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, supra; Fisher Co. v. Woods, 187 N.Y. 90, 79 N.E. 836, 12 L.R.A.,N.S., 707; Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940), which, however, need only be reasonably apprehended (Stubbe v. Adamson, 220 N.Y. 459, 469, 116 N.E. 372, 375). And we must be guided by the familiar principle that 'it is only as a last resort' that courts strike down legislative enactments on the ground of unconstitutionality (Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 303 N.Y. 545, 555, 104 N.E.2d 898, 903, affirmed 344 U.S. 367, 73 S.Ct. 340, 97 L.Ed. 395; Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, supra, 309 N.Y. at page 541, 132 N.E.2d at page 830). Applying these principles to this record, the ordinance must be sustained as reasonable.

The situation in the town of Somers is this. There is a parcel of real property located about 1,700 yards from the town hall. It is used by the plaintiff as lessee for the purpose of dumping and disposing of the garbage he collects in his carting business. This parcel serves as the dump not only for the garbage collected in Somers, but for all of the garbage collected from customers outside the town in outlying and surrounding communities, villages and towns. Indeed, the garbage from these outlying places represents a [149 N.E.2d 872] substantial portion of the garbage dumped and, what is more, plaintiff conducts his operation with the object of obtaining the patronage of customers outside Somers. Thus, garbage is dumped into Somers which originates in the towns of Bedford, North Salem, and Pound Ridge, the communities of South Salem, Salem Center, Purdys, Croton Falls, Goldens Bridge, Waccubuc, Truesdale Lake, and the outskirts of Mount Kisco, all in northern Westchester County, and Brewster, the town of Southeast, and as far as Patterson in Putnam County. Moreover, non-Somers garbage is dumped upon this parcel by other carters with the permission of the plaintiff. Some other dumps in northern Westchester County outside the town of Somers have been closed in past years and the garbage was diverted to plaintiff's dump in Somers.

Page 583

However, it appears that some other disposal areas are still available outside Somers, though they are farther away. The operation of this dump and disposal area is...