Wight v. Police Jury of Parish of Avoyelles, La.

Decision Date18 June 1919
Docket Number3341-3344.
Citation264 F. 705
PartiesWIGHT v. POLICE JURY OF PARISH OF AVOYELLES, LA., et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

W. B Spencer, of New Orleans, La. (Howe, Fenner, Spencer & Cocke of New Orleans, La., on the brief), for appellant.

Lewis R. Graham, of New Orleans, La. (G. L. Porterie, of Marksville, La., and Sigur Martin, of New Orleans, La., on the brief), for appellees police jury of Avoyelles parish and others.

D. C. Scarborough, of Shreveport, La., and Phanor Breazeale and M. L. Dismukes, both of Natchitoches, La. (J. F. Stephens, of Coushatta, La., and Breazeale & Breazeale and Scarborough & Carver, all of Natchitoches, La., on the brief), for appellees police jury of Natchitoches parish and others.

John Ransdell Hunter, of Alexandria, La., for appellees police jury of Rapides parish and others.

E. B. Dubuisson, W. J. Sandoz, and Peyton R. Sandoz, all of Opelousas, La., for appellees police jury of St. Landry parish and others.

Before PARDEE and BATTS, Circuit Judges, and GRUBB, District Judge.

BATTS Circuit Judge.

The receiver of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company instituted suits against the police juries of the parishes of Avoyelles, Natchitoches, St. Landry, and Rapides, to restrain the collection of taxes in road districts in the parishes named. The allegations of the several bills present the same major issues.

Due Process of Law-- Notice and Hearing.

The cases depend upon construction of provisions of the Constitution and statutes of Louisiana authorizing creation of road districts and the levy of taxes and issue of bonds by the districts, and upon a determination of whether these laws as written and as practically applied take property of taxpayers without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The first proposition made by complainant is that--

'The Constitution and laws of Louisiana, relative to the creation of road districts and the imposition of special taxes for the construction and maintenance of roads therein, in and of themselves, as interpreted and applied by police juries, are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that they deprive petitioners of their property without due process of law.'

Article 292 of the Constitution of Louisiana, as published after the convention of 1913, provides for the division of parishes into road districts, and defines the taxing and the bond-issuing capacity of the districts. Such legislation as is necessary to make the constitutional provisions effective is provided by Act No. 183 of 1914 and preceding statutes. The Constitution provides that 'Police juries of this state may form their respective parishes into road districts. ' No provision is made by the Constitution or a statute for notice to taxpayers of contemplated action by the police jury in the formation of districts, and in none of the cases under consideration was notice given. Provisions are made for notice of bond and tax elections, and for publication of the result, and the terms of the law have, in these respects, in each instance been observed.

It is contended that the law as written and administered is unconstitutional, because the law does not require notice, and no opportunity is in fact given the taxpayers to be heard on the questions of the necessity or advisability of the creation of a road district, nor as to boundaries, nor as to whether property to be included would be benefited, nor as to the rate and duration of the tax, or the amount of the bonds.

Communication, transportation, and commerce are distinguishing elements of civilization. To their development highways are essential. The construction and maintenance of good roads has been accepted universally as a function of government. In the United States there was an early recognition of the right of the general government to construct, or aid in the construction of, national highways; but the duty of providing roads was primarily in the states, and in the states the duty remains.

After the success of the steam railroads was demonstrated, the attention of the federal and state governments was, for a number of years, especially directed towards their development. Aid was extended by the United States, by the states, by counties, parishes, and municipalities. Though these highways have, ordinarily, been privately owned, the right of the states to levy taxes and appropriate property to help in their construction, and to authorize like action by their governmental subdivisions, has almost uniformly been sustained.

The extraordinary development of the country has brought about conditions under which the needs for transportation facilities can no longer be met by the railroads, and by the inferior dirt roads along which the pioneers have made their weary and wasteful way. Communities which have heretofore recognized the necessity of freeing themselves from the burdens of ignorance, and have provided public schools, have come to realize that getting out of the mud is another essential step to that end. They realize that good roads are the complement of the schoolhouse; that isolation is not only an ally of ignorance, but of poverty; that prosperity in farming, trading, or manufacturing waits on transportation and communication.

A tardy recognition of these fundamental facts has brought about activity in the issue of bonds and the levy of taxes for road purposes. The national government is taxing all the people that great interstate highways may be constructed. States are taxing all their people that roads within the state may be built. In many states subdivisions have been made, or recognized, and authority given to the taxpayers therein to supplement the efforts of the state and national governments. These subdivisions for roads do not, ordinarily, take the form of improvement districts, in which specific property receiving peculiar benefits is assessed in proportion to the benefits, but are based upon the idea that the taxpayers are doing a proper part in the building up of systems of roads connecting all the sections of the country, and from which they, and everybody else, must derive a benefit.

In the state of Louisiana, the parish is primarily used as the unit for road purposes; but, lest this division of the state should not bring the necessary local co-operation and supervision, provisions have been made for dividing the parishes into road districts, which, under the terms of the Constitution, became governmental subdivisions of the state. The legislation as to these governmental units recognizes that the needs of the public with reference to roads may be more imperative in some parts of the state than in others. It recognizes, also, that in some parishes or parts of parishes the people may be willing to tax themselves for good roads, while in others the conditions may be such that the taxes cannot be levied.

The creation of road districts is vested by the Constitution in the police juries of the several parishes. It is a legislative authority doubtless well assigned. It may be assumed that the necessary action can better be performed by a body more familiar with local conditions and needs than by the state Legislature. No taxpayer, and no other person, would ordinarily have a right to interfere with or participate in the exercise of this power. It is conceivable that, even in defining the necessary governmental subdivisions, the people, acting in their primary power in the formation of their Constitution, or acting through their Legislature, or acting through a special legislative body, as in the present case, might lay off the lines in such an arbitrary, unjust way, with such a palpable purpose to destroy or confiscate property, that the protection of the Constitution would not be denied. But such a possible case is not immediately under consideration.

Complainant makes the proposition that the grant of power to the police jury violates the Constitution of the United States, because no provision is made by which he, as a taxpayer, may be heard with reference to the advisability of action under the authority, or in the manner in which the authority is to be exercised. There is no constitutional requirement of special notice to any particular individual of contemplated action of a general nature by a governmental body exercising general legislative or administrative functions. The taxpayer in a proposed road district has no more right to notice of a division of the state by the proper authority into road districts than to notice of the creation of a new parish or of the division of the parish into justice wards.

The governmental functions are carried on in a public way. The forces which exist to compel conformity of public action to public opinion are open to everybody. Except in those cases in which action is contemplated directly affecting the right of an individual, as distinguished from action affecting the public generally, no person has more right to specific notice than all other persons. It is assumed that all people interested in public affairs will acquire a knowledge of what is taking place among those to whom the conduct of public affairs has been trusted. And so long as the officers are acting within their authority, redress for improper conduct is political, instead of judicial.

There are certain classes of improvement districts, not supported by direct taxation, and with reference to which definite rules for determining benefits and assessments have not been prescribed by the law, where the rule may be different. Drainage, irrigation, sewerage, and street-paving districts may be of this character. In districts of this kind,...

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