Wikman v. City of Novi

Decision Date02 July 1982
Docket NumberNo. 6,No. 62843,62843,6
PartiesJack L. WIKMAN and Mary S. Wikman, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross- Appellants, v. CITY OF NOVI, a Michigan municipal corporation, and Evelyn Natzel, Treasurer of the City of Novi, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. Cal.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Draugelis, Ashton & Scully, by Edward Draugelis, Michael Pollard, Plymouth, for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.

Lampert & Fried, by David M. Fried, Gary E. Levitt, Southfield, for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.

COLEMAN, Chief Justice.

As a preface to this opinion, an abbreviated sequential history is appropriate. An opinion initially was filed addressed to the issues briefed and argued by the parties. 1 All proceeded by accepting the consistent rulings of the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals that challenges to special assessments levied by a governmental unit for public improvements relating to real property are within the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. The key issue was whether the claim for injunctive relief on this set of facts can remove the case from the tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction.

Now an opinion has been filed which turns upon a question neither briefed nor argued by the parties. It concludes that the Tax Tribunal has no jurisdiction over municipal special assessments such as herein concerned, so there is no question of removal. It is the opinion of my colleague that the words "ad valorem" must be read into the Tax Tribunal jurisdictional statute preceding the words "special assessments". Otherwise, the words must be read as referring only to the ministerial acts involved in the collection of special assessments. Essentially, the argument is that the Legislature made a mistake.

For purposes of structure, this opinion will address both the issues as briefed and argued and those raised by my colleague. We hold that the Tax Tribunal Act, M.C.L. Sec. 205.701 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(1) et seq., grants the Tax Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over this proceeding seeking direct review of the governmental unit's decision concerning a special assessment for a public improvement.

I

The Tax Tribunal Act is a culmination of numerous attempts by the Legislature to secure the prompt and fair resolution of disputes concerning the collection of government revenues. The efficient resolution of such disputes is important to both the taxpayer and the government. In Eddy v. Lee Twp., 73 Mich. 123, 129-130, 40 N.W. 792 (1888), this Court acknowledged this fact, stating:

" 'The object of that law, as it is of this, is to enable the government to collect its revenues without delay. The obligations of the government must be met promptly, and it is better that the citizen should resort to his common-law remedies to secure his rights, so far as a mere payment of what he claims may be an illegal tax is concerned, than the government should be embarrassed in the collection of revenues necessary to defray its expenditures.

" 'Courts have frequently remarked upon the impossibility of the government calculating with any certainty upon its revenues, if the collection of taxes was subject to be arrested in every instance in which a tax-payer or tax collector could make out prima facie a technical case for arresting such collection, and it is justly said to be much better to let the individual pay to the government the demands it makes upon him, and, if he considers them in whole or in part illegal, apply for the refunding of the money, with interest afterwards.' Cooley, Tax'n (2d ed), 762.

"This same learned jurist remarks that--

" 'So serious have been the embarrassments by an improvident employment of the writ of injunction, and other obstructive process, that the legislature has in some cases deemed it necessary to interpose and forbid the issue of injunction, replevin, or other specified writs, the tendency of which would be to embarrass collections.' "

The significant public interest underlying the collection of revenues by the government resulted in limitations upon a taxpayer's ability to contest tax assessments and obtain refunds of general revenue taxes. Similar, although possibly less compelling, considerations imposed limitations on a landowner's ability to challenge a local special assessment for a public improvement.

In attempts to remove some of these limitations and provide a forum in which aggrieved taxpayers could obtain relief, the Legislature created statutory procedures for taxpayers to utilize in contesting the legality of their taxes. Statutes provided that a taxpayer could appeal to the State Tax Commission, see M.C.L. Sec. 211.152; M.S.A. Sec. 7.210, or pay the tax under protest and bring an action in circuit court for a refund, see M.C.L. Sec. 211.53; M.S.A. Sec. 7.97. 2 Challenges concerning special assessments were governed by different standards. M.C.L. Sec. 211.53; M.S.A. Sec. 7.97, 3 provided that one could pay a special assessment under protest and sue for a refund in circuit court. However, the most common way to contest a special assessment was to sue to enjoin the collection of it, see Brill v. Grand Rapids, 383 Mich. 216, 174 N.W.2d 832 (1970). 4 The proliferation of these available remedies created problems of forum shopping and increased the possibility of inconsistent decisions. 5 These problems led to the passage of the Tax Tribunal Act with its provisions for exclusive jurisdiction.

The Tax Tribunal is a "quasi-judicial agency" 6 designed to provide a forum in which taxpayers may obtain relief from adverse agency decisions. The primary functions of the Tax Tribunal are to find facts and review the decisions of agencies within its jurisdiction. The Tax Tribunal specializes in reviewing these determinations. To assure that it possesses the necessary expertise to resolve these cases efficiently, the Tax Tribunal Act requires that certain members of the tribunal have special qualifications. 7

II

The facts in the instant case, except for the substantive issue of whether plaintiff's property benefited from the public improvement, are not in dispute. On April 26, 1976, the Council of the City of Novi passed a resolution confirming special assessment rolls for the paving of a portion of Taft Road. Plaintiffs claim the tax bills for the special assessments were mailed on May 14, 1976. On June 9, 1976, plaintiffs, owners of properties abutting that portion of Taft Road, filed suit in circuit court seeking injunctive relief and claiming that the assessments were determined in an arbitrary and inequitable manner. Plaintiffs requested the court to preliminarily enjoin collection during the pendency of this case, to determine that their properties were not especially benefited, to adjudge the assessments null and void with any liens thereof discharged, and to grant any other relief the court determined just and equitable.

The court issued a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the court found that the properties received no additional benefit from the improvement not received by the general public and that the assessments were higher than the benefits received. The court declared the assessments void and permanently enjoined collection of them. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Tax Tribunal.

III

Because our first task is to resolve a question of Tax Tribunal jurisdiction, we look to the statutory provisions of this relatively new act (effective July 1, 1974).

M.C.L. Sec. 205.731; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(31) provides:

"The tribunal's exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be:

"(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under property tax laws.

"(b) A proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws." (Emphasis added.)

A "proceeding" is defined as an "appeal" in M.C.L. Sec. 205.703; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(3). The tribunal's jurisdiction is based either on the subject matter of the proceeding (e.g., a direct review of a final decision of an agency relating to special assessments under property tax laws) or the type of relief requested (i.e., a refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws). In the instant case, the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal is governed by the first subsection since plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin permanently the collection of a special assessment rather than to obtain a refund of a tax. 8

Although neither party raises the issue, my colleague's opinion concludes that these municipal special assessments cannot be within the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. We disagree.

A

Whether the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal includes special assessments is an issue of statutory construction. The primary and fundamental rule of statutory construction is that it is the court's duty to ascertain the Legislature's purpose and intent as expressed in the provision in question, White v. Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979). In reviewing such questions, the court first considers the language of the statute in order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, Kalamazoo City Education Ass'n v. Kalamazoo Public Schools, 406 Mich. 579, 281 N.W.2d 454 (1979). Every word of the statute should be considered and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 409 Mich. 639, 297 N.W.2d 387 (1980); State v. Levenburg, 406 Mich. 455, 280 N.W.2d 810 (1979).

Focusing on the language of the statute and applying the rules mentioned above, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the Tax Tribunal exercise jurisdiction over this case.

B

M.C.L. Sec. 205.731; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(31) grants the Tax Tribunal jurisdiction over proceedings challenging both assessments and special assessments. In the...

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