Wilber v. Walsh

• Decision Date: 10 May 1960
• Citation: 160 A.2d 755,147 Conn. 317
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Richard E. WILBER et al. v. Timothy J. WALSH, Jr., et al., Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Shelton. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 755

160 A.2d 755

147 Conn. 317

Richard E. WILBER et al. v. Timothy J. WALSH, Jr., et al., Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Shelton.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 10, 1960.

Bronislaw Winnick, Shelton, with whom was Harry T. Pryplesh, Shelton, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

George J. Finn, Shelton, for the appellees (defendants).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

MELLITZ, Associate Justice.

The ordinances of the city of Shelton provide that an applicant for appointment to the police department must have been a resident of the city for a term of five years next prior to his application for appointment and that any person who shall be appointed to any position in the police department by any false representation shall be dismissed therefrom. Shelton Ordinances, c. 12, §§ 11, 12 (1944). The plaintiffs, Richard E. Wilber and Richard A. Moore, were supernumerary police officers, Moore having first been appointed in June, 1957, and Wilber in May, 1958. Thereafter, they resigned; they were reappointed on November 15, 1958. On February 2, 1959, following the appointment of a new board of police commissioners, the plaintiffs were notified that they were suspended because they had failed, at the time of their original appointments, to meet the residency requirements, and for 'other reasons.' They appealed to a judge of the Court of Common Pleas under § 20 of the Shelton charter; 28 Spec.Laws 892, No. 676; from a judgment dismissing their appeal they have appealed to this court.

The provision of the charter under which the plaintiffs appealed is similar to that involved and construed in Pierce's Appeal, 78 Conn. 666, 668, 63 A. 161. It is designed to permit the judge summarily to set aside an order of suspension or removal if any essential formality has been omitted or the order was the result of arbitrary action or an abuse of discretion on the part of the police board. Id., 78 Conn. 669, 63 A. 161; Sullivan v. Martin, 81 Conn. 585, 591, 71 A. 783; Avery v. Studley, 74 Conn. 272, 284, 50 A. 752.

Under § 20 of the Shelton charter, the police board is given the power to appoint the members of the police department, and to suspend, remove or expel any member from the department for cause. 'Cause' implies a reasonable ground as distinguished from a frivolous one. It negates the idea of suspension at pleasure. If the cause assigned is a reasonable one, then the question whether there is a sufficient basis for the suspension is for the board to decide; whether the assigned cause, of itself, constitutes a proper ground is for the judge to determine. Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113, 118, 157 A. 2d 590; McNiff v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 43, 46, 72 A. 572. The notice given to the plaintiffs stated that they were suspended because they had failed to meet the residency requirements, and for 'other reasons.' The parties treated this statement as a charge (a) that the plaintiffs had misrepresented the period of their residency in Shelton and (b) had submitted untruthful information, under oath, in the applications for their original appointments. If either of these charges was true, the plaintiffs were liable to dismissal from the department. In any employment, an employer is entitled to expect of his employees the qualities of truthfulness, honesty and integrity. Stanulus v. Budd, 1 Ill.App.2d 334, 337, 117 N.E.2d 655. In the case of police officers of a municipality, these qualities are particularly essential. There can be no question as to the propriety or reasonableness, as a ground...