Wilburn v. Topgolf Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:19-cv-493 |
| Citation | 461 F.Supp.3d 320 |
| Parties | Stephanie WILBURN, Plaintiff, v. TOPGOLF INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Joshua Harry Erlich, The Erlich Law Office PLLC, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff.
Christopher Eric Humber, Jaclyn Lee Hamlin, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Liam O'Grady, United States District Judge This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 39, and Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. 42. The motions were fully briefed and the Court dispensed with oral argument because it would not aid in the decisional process.
Defendants ("Topgolf") moved for partial summary judgment on four grounds. First, Topgolf claims the overtime sought by Plaintiff ("Wilburn") is not recoverable because she was exempt from overtime requirements by the Highly Compensated Employee exemption during the entire period for which she seeks to recover. Second, Topgolf argues that Wilburn was exempt from overtime requirements for the first year of her maximum recovery period, under the Retail or Service Establishment exemption. Third, Topgolf argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of willfulness and that Wilburn's recovery period is therefore limited to two years. Fourth and finally, Topgolf argues that Wilburn's workweek fluctuated in hours, she knew this by the beginning of the recovery period, and consequently she cannot recover "straight time" pay. Instead, Topgolf asserts that any overtime due to her should be calculated using the fluctuating workweek method.
Wilburn, on the other hand, argues that evidence which would have defeated Topgolf's fluctuating workweek defense was lost or destroyed due to Topgolf's failure to issue a litigation hold. She asks the Court to sanction Topgolf by entering judgment against it on the fluctuating workweek defense, precluding the use of that defense and effectively requiring straight time calculation of damages.
Topgolf operates retail dining and sports gaming venues. In 2015, the company was undergoing rapid growth and sought to open a new venue in Loudoun County, Virginia. Wilburn applied to work there, was interviewed, then hired as a corporate Event Sales Manager ("ESM").
ESMs were tasked with conducting sales. Specifically, they sought corporate or large-scale clients and booked those clients' events at Topgolf. In doing so, they assisted the clients in choosing from Topgolf's menu of available options and coordinated the events. When Topgolf created the ESM position, it classified the position as exempt from overtime requirements. It was a salaried position, and ESMs were paid a combination of salary and commission. Topgolf created the full-time position believing it would generally require 40 to 45 hours per week, but ESMs were not required to record work hours.
Wilburn worked as an ESM beginning in June of 2015, and the Loudoun venue opened in September. She was scheduled to work 45 hours weekly, but the unscheduled work hours increased as time went on and she found that completing her required tasks within 45 hours was not possible. She began to work weekends as well, and discovered that the work is seasonal to some extent. Notably, she booked three separate events with over 900 invitees, and with budgets over $130,000.
On February 4, 2019, Topgolf replaced the ESM position with a new position, entitled "Sales Account Manager" ("SAM"). Topgolf classified the SAM position as non-exempt from overtime requirements, and SAMs such as Wilburn began tracking their hours and became eligible for overtime pay.
On April 23, 2019, Wilburn sued Topgolf, alleging that it willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by willfully misclassifying her as exempt from overtime requirements while she was an ESM.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing the basis for its motion and identifying the evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the opposing party may show by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). While the facts and all justifiable inferences should be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd , 718 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2013), courts must not resolve disputed facts, weigh the evidence, or make credibility determinations, Foster v. University of Md.-Eastern Shore , 787 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French , 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007) ).
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). "A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am. , 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). "Mere speculation by the non-movant cannot create a genuine issue of material fact." JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc. , 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) ( Cox v. County of Prince William , 249 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2001) ). Where the nonmoving party fails to make a showing on an essential element of the claim for which he bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
"The right to impose sanctions for spoliation arises from a court's inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation, but the power is limited to that necessary to redress conduct which abuses the judicial process." Silvestri v. General Motors Corp. , 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have broad discretion when deciding whether to impose spoliation sanctions. Turner v. United States , 736 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2013).
Topgolf moves for partial summary judgment on four grounds. The first two are claims that Wilburn's was exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. First, Topgolf argues Wilburn fell within the Highly Compensated Employee exemption during the entire three-year recovery period she asserts. Second, Topgolf argues that she was exempt under the Retail or Service Establishment exemption for one year, and that her maximum recovery is therefore limited to two years. Third, and alternatively, Topgolf argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of willfulness, and that Wilburn's recovery is accordingly limited to two years. Fourth and finally, Topgolf argues that Wilburn's recovery should be limited because she knew by the time of her recovery period that her workweek fluctuated in hours, and that as a result, her overtime should be calculated using the fluctuating workweek method. This fourth issue is directly related to Wilburn's motion for sanctions, in which she seeks entry of judgment against Topgolf on the fluctuating workweek defense.
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or "the Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. , "generally requires that employers pay overtime in the amount of one-and-a-half times an employee's ‘regular rate’ for each hour their employees work in excess of 40 per week." Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 809 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) ). "Employees are entitled to overtime compensation according to the general rule unless their employer proves that one of the Act's many exemptions applies." Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC , 809 F.3d 103, 104 (4th Cir. 2015).
Whether an employee is exempt from the overtime requirements of FLSA is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 109. In FLSA exemption cases, how employees spend their working time and the significance of an employee's duties are questions of fact. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington , 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986) ; Shockley v. City of Newport News , 997 F.2d 18, 26 (4th Cir. 1993) ; accord Calderon , 809 F.3d at 120. The ultimate question of whether the exemption applies is a question of law. Calderon , 809 F.3d at 120 ; see also Icicle Seafoods, Inc. , 475 U.S. at 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, ("The question whether their particular activities excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law."). Binding Fourth Circuit precedent requires that employers "prove by clear and convincing evidence that an employee qualifies for exemption." Williams , 809 F.3d at 109 (citing Shockley , 997 F.2d at 21 ).1 In making this determination, the Supreme Court recently clarified that exemptions should be given a "fair (rather than a ‘narrow’) interpretation." Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142, 200 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)...
To continue reading
Request your trial