Wilcox v. Birtwhistle

• Decision Date: 22 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. S074519.,S074519.
• Citation: 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260,987 P.2d 727,21 Cal.4th 973
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Mark Lee WILCOX, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William BIRTWHISTLE, Defendant and Respondent.

90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260

21 Cal.4th 973

987 P.2d 727

Mark Lee WILCOX, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William BIRTWHISTLE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S074519.

Supreme Court of California.

November 22, 1999.

Allan Lerch & Associates, San Francisco, and Richard J. Reilley for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Dummit, Faber & Briegleb, Randall R. McKinnon, Sacramento; and Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for Defendant and Respondent.

Catherine I. Hanson, San Francisco, and Fred L. Main for the California Chamber of Commerce, California Medical Association, California Dental Association and California Healthcare Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

McIntire Law Corporation and Christopher D. McIntire, Big Bear Lake, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

In this case we consider whether a party who fails to respond to a request for admissions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033 and has a "deemed admitted order" entered against him may withdraw or amend these deemed admissions pursuant to subdivision (m)of that statute.¹ We conclude that subdivision (m) permits the withdrawal or amendment of admissions deemed admitted for failure to respond.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are undisputed. Mark Lee Wilcox, a minor appearing by and through his mother and guardian ad litem, Maria J. Wilcox, and Jerry Lee Wilcox, Mark's father (collectively the Wilcoxes), filed a medical malpractice action against William Birtwhistle, M.D.² Soon after, Dr. Birtwhistle served Mark with a request for admissions (RFA). The RFA contained nine requests and asked Mark to admit, among other things, that Dr. Birtwhistle "was not negligent in any manner in which he provided medical care to" Mark and that Mark "has not suffered any personal injury as a result of the medical care which was provided by" Dr. Birtwhistle.

When Mark did not respond to these requests, Dr. Birtwhistle filed a motion to have them deemed admitted pursuant to subdivision (k). The trial court held a hearing on the motion approximately one month after its filing. Mark did not oppose the motion but served responses to the RFA before the hearing. He, however, failed to verify these responses. Accordingly, the court granted Dr. Birtwhistle's motion and ordered the requests "deemed admitted."

Approximately 16 days later, the Wilcoxes' new counsel served verified responses to the RFA and filed a motion for reconsideration of and relief from the deemed admitted order. A declaration from the Wilcoxes' former counsel accompanied the motion and explained that the failure to serve timely responses occurred because of his own mistake or negligence. Although the trial court expressed its inclination to grant the motion in the interests of justice, the court ultimately denied it because St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 843, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 (St. Paul) — which precluded any relief from a deemed admitted order — controlled.

Armed with the deemed admitted order, Dr. Birtwhistle moved for summary judgment.³ The Wilcoxes' opposition included an expert declaration from David Stevenson, M.D., a professor of pediatrics and chief of the division of neonatal and developmental medicine at Stanford University, opining that Dr. Birtwhistle was negligent. The trial court, however, refused to consider Dr. Stevenson's declaration and granted summary judgment solely based on the deemed admissions.

The Court of Appeal reversed. Disagreeing with Courtesy Claims Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal. App.3d 52, 268 Cal.Rptr. 30 (Courtesy Claims), St Paul, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 843,3 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, and their progeny, the Court of Appeal held that subdivision (m) permits the withdrawal or amendment of deemed admissions. According to the court, such an interpretation better harmonizes subdivision (m) with subdivisions (k) and (n) and is more consistent with the legislative history.

We granted Dr. Birtwhistle's petition for review to determine whether a party may withdraw or amend admissions deemed admitted for failure to respond upon a showing of "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect" and no substantial prejudice pursuant to subdivision (m).

II. DISCUSSION

Because the trial court granted summary judgment solely based on the deemed admissions, we must look through the summary judgment to the deemed admitted order and determine whether subdivision (m) permits relief from this order. (See Brigante v. Huang (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 1569, 1587, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 354.) Dr. Birtwhistle contends that subdivision (m) only permits withdrawal or amendment of admissions contained in an actual response — and not admissions deemed admitted for failure to respond pursuant to subdivision (k). The Wilcoxes contend that subdivision (m) applies to all admissions, including deemed admissions. We agree with the Wilcoxes.

When construing a statute, we must "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 523, 853 P.2d 978.) The words of the statute are the starting point. "Words used in a statute ... should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature ...." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (Lungren).) If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court looks "to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) After considering these extrinsic aids, we "must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.)

The statutory language provides little guidance in this case because it is equally susceptible to both interpretations. Enacted as part of the 1986 Civil Discovery Act, subdivision (m) states: "A party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits." (Italics added.) The second sentence ostensibly places no restriction on the types of admissions that may be withdrawn or amended. The first sentence, however, limits the scope of subdivision (m) to "admissions made in response to a request" and appears to exclude deemed admissions because a nonresponding party, by definition, makes no response.

Although the plain meaning rule is not helpful, reading subdivision (m) in light of two other subdivisions enacted at the same time — (k) and (n) — offers convincing evidence that subdivision (m) covers deemed admissions. Subdivision (k) provides that a propounding party who fails to receive a timely response may move for an order that "matters specified in the requests" are deemed admitted.⁴ The nonresponding party can avoid the deemed admitted order by serving a verified response before the hearing on the motion. (Ibid.) The failure to do so, however, results in automatic entry of the order. (Ibid.) Subdivision (n) defines the effect of an admission and provides that "[a]ny matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under subdivision (m)."⁵ (Italics added.) By enacting subdivision (n), the Legislature codified the case law existing at the time — which held that matters admitted in an actual response or deemed admitted for failure to respond constitute binding judicial admissions. (See 1 Hogan & Weber, Cal. Civil Discovery (1997) Admission Requests, § 9.20, pp. 507-508 (Hogan & Weber); Discovery, State Bar/Judicial Council of Cal., J. Com. on Discovery, Reporter's Notes to the Proposed Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (Reporter's Notes), reprinted at 2 Hogan & Weber, supra, appen. C, at p. 448.) Because subdivision (n) covers matters deemed admitted pursuant to subdivision (k), we can only harmonize these subdivisions by concluding that a deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein. (See Lungren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735,248 Cal.Rptr. 115,755 P.2d 299 [court must adopt the interpretation "that leads to the more reasonable result"].)

This harmonization of the language of section 2033 compels the conclusion that subdivision (m) provides relief from deemed admissions. Like subdivision (n), subdivision (m) refers to admissions "made in response to a request for admission." Because words or phrases given a particular meaning in one part of a statute must be given the same meaning in other parts of the statute, this reference in subdivision (m) — like the analogous language in subdivision (n) — must encompass deemed admissions. (See Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 52, 210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153.)

The legislative history further reveals that this interpretation...