Wilcox v. Brown

• Decision Date: 05 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-7596,16-7596
• Citation: 877 F.3d 161
• Parties: Torrey F. WILCOX, Rastafarian, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Betty BROWN, Chaplain; Dwayne Terrell, Superintendant, Marion Correctional Institution ; Randy Teague, Superintendant of Programs (Assistant), Marion Correctional Institution ; Chaplain Menhinick, Marion Correctional Institution, Defendants—Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

877 F.3d 161

Torrey F. WILCOX, Rastafarian, Plaintiff—Appellant,

v.Betty BROWN, Chaplain; Dwayne Terrell, Superintendant, Marion Correctional Institution ; Randy Teague, Superintendant of Programs (Assistant), Marion Correctional Institution ; Chaplain Menhinick, Marion Correctional Institution, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 16-7596

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 25, 2017

Decided: December 5, 2017

ARGUED: Charlie Hogle, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. Ryan Y. Park, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David M. Shapiro, Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, Illinois, for

Appellant. Josh Stein, Attorney General, Kimberly D. Grande, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Duncan joined.

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:

Torrey F. Wilcox appeals a district court order dismissing his in forma pauperis § 1983 action, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

Wilcox is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina. He brought this in forma pauperis § 1983 action in federal district court, alleging the following facts.

Wilcox is an adherent of the Rastafarian faith. The Rastafarian worship services at the prison where he was housed, Marion Correctional Institution ("MCI"), were suspended on September 12, 2013, by Superintendent Dwayne Terrell and Assistant Superintendent of Programs Randy Teague. With no chaplain on staff, the prison administration refused to provide certified non-custodial staff to monitor the group service even though it had done so for other religious groups. The discontinuation of the service deprived Wilcox of "a reasonable opportunity to worship according to [his] Rastafarian tenets, beliefs, customs, and practices." J.A. 4.

Wilcox filed a grievance challenging the discontinuation of the services and appealed the resulting adverse decision through all three steps of the grievance process that the North Carolina Department of Correction provides for prison complaints. See Moore v. Bennette , 517 F.3d 717, 721-22 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing process). At Step One, Wilcox was told that the Office of Religious Services, which was headed by Betty Brown, had authorized Terrell and Teague to close the service. At Step Two, an administrative investigator reviewing Wilcox's grievance determined that the prison had "adequately addressed" his complaint. J.A. 10. In the final step of the procedure, an inmate grievance examiner adopted that determination and concluded that no further action was warranted. The final decision was issued on November 22, 2013.

MCI hired Chaplain Menhinick on or about November 20, 2013. Menhinick told Wilcox on December 12, 2013, that the Rastafarian service would restart on December 16, 2013. However, on December 13, 2013, Menhinick informed Wilcox that "Terrell had made an executive decision to not open the Rastafarian worship service." J.A. 5.¹

Wilcox's lawsuit names Brown, Terrell, Teague, and Menhinick as defendants and requests damages from each in the amount of $75,000, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.²

The district court ordered Wilcox to affirmatively show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies relating to his claim. In response, Wilcox filed a verified statement asserting that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, and he submitted a copy of the Step-Three decision of the Inmate Grievance Resolution Board disposing of his grievance. The district court subsequently ordered Wilcox to provide his Step-One grievance and the response thereto. Wilcox responded by filing a sworn declaration stating that the grievance was lost and a discovery request asking that Defendants provide copies of the grievance records.

The district court then performed the required screening under Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), determining whether the complaint, or any portion thereof, "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court identified two possible claims in the complaint, one under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2), and one under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The court analyzed these claims simultaneously.

The court dismissed the claims against Chaplain Menhinick on the basis that Menhinick could not be liable for simply following Terrell's order not to resume the services.

The remainder of the court's analysis is fairly sparse. The district court observed that according to the North Carolina Prisons Religious Practices Guide, the Rastafarians at all times were free to pray privately or could attend group worship so long as the service was conducted by an approved worship leader. And, the court noted that Wilcox could have applied to be a prisoner-leader of a Rastafarian faith group. The district court did not explain how these observations supported dismissal of the complaint, however. Finally, the court determined that Wilcox had not exhausted his administrative remedies since he did not file a new grievance concerning the prison's failure to resume the Rastafarian services once Chaplain Menhinick was hired.

II.

Wilcox argues that the district court erred in dismissing his Free Exercise claim against all defendants.³

The district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to § 1915A for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. See Jehovah v. Clarke , 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015) ; see also De'lonta v. Johnson , 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that standards for dismissal under § 1915A for failure to state a claim are the same as for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ). A plaintiff has stated a claim when he alleges facts allowing the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). When evaluating the complaint, the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Smith v. Smith , 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009). Additionally, when a plaintiff raises a civil rights issue and files a complaint pro se , the court must construe pleading requirements liberally. See id.

A.

Wilcox first challenges the district court's conclusion that dismissal of his claim was warranted by virtue of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree that failure to exhaust was not a proper basis for dismissal.

Because Wilcox's claims are governed by the PLRA, he was required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, he was not required to affirmatively show exhaustion in his complaint. See Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Rather, failure-to-exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant. See id. And a district court, at the pleadings stage, may not dismiss a claim based on the plaintiff's failure to affirmatively show exhaustion, even when the court has first allowed the plaintiff to address the issue. See Custis v. Davis , 851 F.3d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, despite the fact that failure-to-exhaust is an affirmative defense, a prisoner's complaint may be dismissed for non-exhaustion "in the rare case where failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint." Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc. , 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005).

In this case, the parties agree that no failure to exhaust was apparent from the face of the complaint. Accordingly, the district court erred to the extent it dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.⁴

B.

Wilcox also contends that the district court erred in concluding that other reasons supported dismissal of his complaint. In order to state a claim for violation of rights secured by the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate, as a threshold matter, must demonstrate that: (1) he holds a sincere religious belief; and (2) a prison practice or policy places a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Defendants place a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise when they "put[ ] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." See id. When deciding whether the prison's practice substantially burdens a religious exercise, "courts must not judge the significance of the particular belief or practice in question." Lovelace v. Lee , 472 F.3d 174, 187 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006).

1.

Wilcox alleged that the prison's continued refusal to allow the Rastafarian group service deprived him "of a reasonable opportunity to worship according to [his] Rastafarian ... beliefs." J.A. 4. Defendants initially contend that Wilcox's complaint fails to satisfactorily allege a substantial burden because it did not specifically allege that the group services were a required component of his observation of the Sabbath. However, we conclude that the complaint, construed liberally, alleged exactly that.⁵ Additionally, Defendants contend that Wilcox did not adequately allege a substantial burden on his religious practice because his complaint did not explain why his beliefs required him to participate in the group service. But Defendants point to no case in which the court held that a...