Wilcox v. Comm'r of Corr.
Decision Date | 02 February 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 37276.,37276. |
Citation | 129 A.3d 796,162 Conn.App. 730 |
Parties | Howard WILCOX v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Peter A. McShane, state's attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).
Jennifer B. Smith, assigned counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).
SHELDON, KELLER and HARPER, Js.
The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court granting the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Howard Wilcox. On appeal, the respondent claims that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner (1) established good cause for failing to raise an instructional error claim at trial or on direct appeal, and (2) established that he suffered actual prejudice from the trial court's jury instructions. We reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case to that court with direction to dismiss the petition.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In 1997, the petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92 (a)(2)(A), one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(1), one count of attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2) and 53a–70 (a)(1), one count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–61 (a)(1), and one count of falsely reporting a motor vehicle theft in violation of General Statutes § 14–198. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration, execution suspended after thirty-four years, followed by ten years of probation. The defendant appealed his conviction to this court and our Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself pursuant to General Statutes § 51–199(c) and Practice Book § 65–1.
In 2000, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, at which time it set forth the following facts underlying the crimes: "During the evening of September 16, 1996, the victim1 walked the short distance from her home in East Haddam to J.R.'s Cafe [J.R.'s] in Moodus. The [petitioner], with whom the victim was not acquainted, already was at the bar when she arrived. The victim remained at J.R.'s for approximately one and one-half to two hours during which time she had several drinks, danced, and conversed with acquaintances. The victim also asked the [petitioner] to dance, tugging his arm to encourage him to join her on the dance floor. After dancing with the victim, the [petitioner] bought the victim a drink and they conversed for a few minutes thereafter.
During this period the [petitioner] told the victim that she ‘deserved it.’ While the [petitioner] again attempted to perform oral sex on her, the victim managed to kick him away and flee through the woods, pulling up her shorts and underpants as she ran. As the victim ran away, she lost one of her shoes, a sock and her driver's license, which she had kept in her sock. The victim hid for a period of time beneath a tree.
(Footnotes altered.) State v. Wilcox, 254 Conn. 441, 444–48, 758 A.2d 824 (2000).
Following the petitioner's criminal trial and his direct appeal, our Supreme Court issued two watershed decisions pertaining to kidnapping crimes, State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), and Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 12 A.3d 817 (2011). Pursuant to the holdings of these decisions, a defendant who has been convicted of kidnapping may collaterally attack his kidnapping conviction on the ground that the trial court's jury instructions failed to require that the jury find that the defendant's confinement or movement of the victim was not merely incidental to the defendant's commission of some other crime or crimes. See State v. Salamon, supra, at 546–50, 949 A.2d 1092 ; see also Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 773, 12 A.3d 817 () .
On July 11, 2011, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he amended on February 4, 2014. In his amended petition, the petitioner challenged his kidnapping conviction on the ground that the instructions given to the jury during his criminal trial were not in accordance with State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 550, 949 A.2d 1092.2 On February 24, 2014, the respondent filed a return to the amended petition, alleging the special defense of procedural default. The petitioner filed a reply on February...
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