Wilcox v. Ives, Civ. No. 85-0342-P.

• Decision Date: 29 December 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 85-0342-P.
• Citation: 676 F. Supp. 355
• Parties: Gloria WILCOX, Mary McCann, Carol Shaw, Laurie Saucier, Thomasina Downing, Pamela Thoits Moreau and Pamela Smith, each on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. H. Rollin IVES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services, and The Maine Department of Human Services and Otis R. Bowen, in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

676 F. Supp. 355

Gloria WILCOX, Mary McCann, Carol Shaw, Laurie Saucier, Thomasina Downing, Pamela Thoits Moreau and Pamela Smith, each on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. H. Rollin IVES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services, and The Maine Department of Human Services and Otis R. Bowen, in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendants.

Civ. No. 85-0342-P.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

December 29, 1987.

Thomas H. Kelley, Portland, Me., Mary T. Henderson, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Augusta, Me., for plaintiffs.

Robert E. Mittel, Portland, Me., for Pam Moreau.

Katherine Greason, Raymond E. Ritchie, Christopher C. Leighton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, Me., for defendants.

Richard S. Cohen, U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., F. Mark Terison, David R. Collins, Asst. U.S. Attys., for Otis Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services; Joyce Elise McCourt, Asst. Regional Atty., Boston, Mass., of counsel.

Carmen L. Coulombe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, Me., for Michael R. Petit.

GENE CARTER, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE STIPULATED RECORD

This matter comes before the Court on the respective parties' motions for judgment on a stipulated record.

In this class action, Plaintiffs receive, or have received, public assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. As a condition of receiving AFDC benefits, each Plaintiff has assigned her right to child support payments to the Maine Department of Human Services (DHS). However, the DHS must "pass through" to the recipient family the first $50 of a child support payment. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1). Plaintiffs assert three causes of action against H. Rollin Ives, Commissioner of DHS;¹ DHS itself (hereafter "state Defendants"); and Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (hereafter "federal Defendant"). In Count I, Plaintiffs assert that the state Defendants violate Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(28) by failing to "pass through" the first $50 of monthly child support payments to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Plaintiffs further assert that the federal Defendant's regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 302.51, which restricts the amount that DHS can "pass through" to Plaintiffs in a given month, also violates Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1).

Count II asserts that the state Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq., by failing to take adequate and necessary measures to insure timely payment of child support by absent parents, and that the federal Defendant violated Plaintiffs' rights by failing to insure that the Maine child support enforcement program was in compliance with federal law. After Defendants undertook several steps to remedy these problems, the parties agreed to stipulate to a dismissal of Count II without prejudice. The Court approved the settlement regarding Count II on September 8, 1987.

In Count III, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) and the due process clauses of the Constitution's fifth and fourteenth amendments by failing to provide Plaintiffs with an accounting of child support collected, notice of amounts withheld, the reasons for any withholding, and an opportunity to challenge any withholding. In a partial consent decree, Plaintiffs and state Defendants agreed that Plaintiffs are entitled to written notice of the amounts of child support collected by DHS through assignments of support rights from the Plaintiff class; written notice of the amounts of such support forwarded to Plaintiff class; an opportunity for an administrative hearing when there is a disagreement about the amount of support forwarded to the Plaintiff class; and written notice of the opportunity for such a hearing. The parties did not agree on the issue of "what class relief may be appropriate with respect to Count III." Partial Consent Decree at 2. Secretary Bowen did not enter the Partial Consent Decree. The Court approved the decree as to Plaintiffs and state Defendants on September 9, 1987.

For the reasons set out below, the Court finds that 45 C.F.R. § 302.51 impermissibly contradicts 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) to the extent that the regulation prohibits the state Defendants from making multiple pass-through payments when DHS receives two or more support payments in a given month. The regulation is therefore invalid in that respect. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to notice relief.

Count I

The gravamen of Count I is Plaintiffs' assertion that the regulation, 45 C.F. R. § 302.51, impermissibly conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1). The statute directs that a portion of the child support payment, when received by the state from the absent parent, be "passed through" to the AFDC recipient without affecting the recipient's eligibility for assistance:

The first fifty dollars of such amounts as are collected periodically which represent monthly support payments shall be paid to the family without affecting its eligibility for assistance or decreasing any amount otherwise payable as assistance to such family during such month.

42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1). All parties agree that the statute requires the DHS to pass through to the family the first fifty dollars of each monthly payment that the DHS receives and processes in the month the payment is due. All parties also agree that the obligation to make the pass through is not created until the monthly support payment is collected by DHS. The dispute arises from the federal regulation's provision prohibiting state Defendants from passing through the first $50 of payments which are somehow delayed until a later month or which are made in a lump sum.

Defendants assert that an AFDC recipient is not entitled to a fifty-dollar pass-through unless DHS receives the support payment from the absent parent during the month in which the payment is due. The federal regulation provides, in pertinent part:

The State plan shall provide as follows: (b)(1) Of any amount that is collected in a month which represents payment on the required support obligation for that month, the first $50 of such amount shall be paid to the family.... If the amount collected includes payment on the required support obligation for a previous month or months, the family shall only receive the first $50 of the amount which represents the required support obligation for the month in which the support was collected.... No payment shall be made to a family under this paragraph for a month in which there is no child support collection.

45 C.F.R. § 302.51. In effect, the regulation provides that only a single fifty-dollar pass-through may be forwarded to the AFDC recipient in cases where the absent parent fails to make any payment in one month but makes a multiple payment in a following month. Plaintiffs argue that under 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1), the AFDC family should receive a multiple pass-through payment whenever DHS receives a multiple support payment.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' policy adversely affects them in various ways. For example, the father of Plaintiff Wilcox's child is obligated under a divorce decree to pay $25 per week for child support directly to DHS. Stipulation Nos. 19-20. In March 1985, DHS received four checks for $25 each from the father, and DHS passed through $50 to Plaintiff Wilcox. Attachment C. DHS did not receive any checks from the father in April. Id. In May, DHS received a total of nine checks for $25 each from the father. Id. Each check represented a separate weekly support payment for April and May, as was indicated clearly on the bottom left-hand corner and the back of each check. Attachment D.² DHS passed through $50 from the support collected in May, but refused to pass through the first $50 of the amount collected for April because the payments were not received by DHS in April. Stipulation No. 22. At a subsequent administrative hearing on the matter, the DHS Hearing Officer expressly found that the $225 received by DHS in May included the support obligation for April. Attachment E. Nevertheless, the Hearing Officer determined that Defendants' policy precluded a pass-through for April because DHS did not receive the support payment until May. Id. Plaintiffs argue that Plaintiff Wilcox is entitled to a $50 pass-through for April because the payments fit within the requirements of the statute.

Plaintiffs are also affected adversely where a portion of the absent parent's wages are assigned to DHS for child support. For example, the father of Plaintiff Saucier's child is employed by a contractor in Waterville, Maine. Since June 1985, the father's employer has deducted $40 per week ($30 for current support and $10 for arrearages) from his wages, and forwards that amount to DHS. Stipulation No. 36. DHS did not receive any payments from the father's employer from July through September 1985, then received $400 on October 8 and $320 on December 6. Attachment C. DHS sent $50 pass-through checks to Plaintiff Saucier for October and December. Id. DHS refused to make multiple pass-throughs to Plaintiff Saucier, despite the fact that the October payment amounted to approximately two and one-half months of payments. Similarly, the payment received by DHS in December amounted to two months of wage assignments, but DHS refused to pass through $50 for November. Plaintiffs contend that the October and December payments should be split to reflect the number of monthly payments, and a $50 pass-through should be issued for each month. Thus, Plaintiff Saucier should have received five $50 pass-throughs (one each for August, September, October, November, and December) instead of the two $50 pass-throughs which she actually...