Wilcox v. Lancour

Decision Date22 January 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 2:20-cv-183
PartiesSTEVEN JOHN WILCOX, Plaintiff, v. J. LANCOUR, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion
I. Factual allegations

Plaintiff presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following LMF officials: Grievance Coordinator J. Lancour; Deputy Warden Scott Sprader; Assistant Deputy Wardens Gregory Schram and Benny Mercier; Correctional Officers John Does ##1 and 2 (Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1); and National Guard Officers Jane Roes ##1 and 2 (Unknown Part(y)(ies) 2).

Plaintiff alleges that, on May 6, 2020, he was confined in segregation at LMF. At least four individuals wearing face masks, face shields, and gowns appeared at his cell window. Defendant Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1 (John Doe #1) ordered Plaintiff to back up to the food slot with his hands behind his back, so that he could be handcuffed. Plaintiff complied. The cell door was opened, and Defendant Schram ordered Plaintiff to step out of his cell and put his back against the hallway wall.

After Plaintiff complied, Jane Roe #1, believed to be a Michigan National Guard member, ordered Plaintiff to tilt back his head. Jane Roe #2 then inserted a swab into Plaintiff's nostril, allegedly hitting Plaintiff's nasal-pharangeal passage, causing Plaintiff to gag and his eyes to burn and water. Plaintiff complains that he did not consent to the test and would not have consented to it if asked. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that he was not physically forced to submit to the test, he alleges that he was coerced because any failure to comply would subject him to disciplinary action and/or the use of force. Plaintiff allegedly suffered for weeks from bloody nasal discharge, headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, vomiting, and painful nasal passages.

On the date of the nasal swabbing, Plaintiff sent a kite to Defendants Sprader and Mercier, complaining about the incident and demanding that video of the incident be retained for future investigation and litigation. He received no response. On May 11, 2020, he wrote a grievance on the issue and sent it to Defendant Lancour. Lancour rejected the grievance as a challenge to MDOC Director's Office Memorandum (DOM) 2020-30R, which is non-grievable.Defendant Sprader approved the rejection. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sprader had actual knowledge that Defendant Lancour had a pattern and practice of rejecting grievances or refusing to process them. He asserts that Defendants violated both prison policy and due process.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Sprader, Schram, and Mercier knew that the COVID-19 testing protocol did not comply with MDOC Policy Directive 03.04.105, which requires consent for medical procedures, and that they violated that policy by forcing him to submit to testing. Plaintiff also complains that, by requiring him to be tested, Defendants have demonstrated deliberate indifference to his right to refuse medical care. He also asserts that Defendants' conduct violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Plaintiff's next series of allegations is general and sweeping. He contends that LMF policies allow the spoliation of evidence and otherwise deprive him of due process and his right to access the courts. He also alleges that, as a segregation prisoner, he is not allowed to access state and federal case law and other research materials necessary to allow him to prosecute other actions he has filed, ostensibly in violation of his right to access to the courts. In addition, he broadly states that, since filing his grievance on May 11, 2020, he has

been subject to numerous and repeated acts of intimidation and reprisals at the hands of the defendants, their agents and subordinates, including but not limited to, verbal and mental abuse, harassment and ridicule, the denial of basic hyg[i]enic necessities, outdoor exercise, denials of photocopy services, legal writer services, the destruction of my personal property and impeding and obstructing my access to the U.S. mail.

(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants are liable for the alleged retaliation because such retaliation is foreseeable.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, together with compensatory and punitive damages.

II. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "'to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is toidentify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

III. Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that, by rejecting his grievances, Defendants Lancour and Sprader prevented him from exhausting his grievances and thereby interfered with his right to access the courts. He also alleges that Defendant's failures to provide legal research and copying and failure to retain evidence violate his right to access the courts.

It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The principal issue in Bounds was whether the states must protect the right of access to the courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. Id. at 817. The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates with "paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them." Id. at 824-25. The right of access to the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate's access to the courts. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).

An indigent prisoner's constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not, however, without limit. In order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show "actual injury." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the shortcomings in the prison legal assistance program or lack of legal materials have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413,416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury:

Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their
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