Wilcox v. State, 49A02-0008-CR-537.

• Decision Date: 30 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0008-CR-537.,49A02-0008-CR-537.
• Citation: 748 N.E.2d 906
• Parties: Simata WILCOX, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

748 N.E.2d 906

Simata WILCOX, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-0008-CR-537.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 30, 2001.

Transfer Denied July 19, 2001.

Eric K. Koselke, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

Simata Wilcox ("Wilcox") brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of her Motion to Dismiss on the ground that her prosecution for Battery subjected her to Double Jeopardy. We affirm.

Issue

The sole issue presented is whether revocation of Wilcox's bail subjected her to "jeopardy" such that Double Jeopardy principles preclude her pending criminal prosecution for the same conduct that supported the revocation of her bail.

Facts and Procedural History

On June 16, 1999, the State charged Wilcox with one count of Criminal Mischief, a Class D felony, two counts of Battery, both as Class A misdemeanors, and one count of Criminal Conversion¹ stemming from an altercation between Wilcox, her ex-boyfriend Sean Woodard ("Woodard"), and Woodard's girlfriend, Shaila Mulholland ("Mulholland"). On August 6, 1999, Wilcox agreed that, as a condition of her release upon bail prior to trial, she would have no contact with Woodard or Mulholland. Wilcox was subsequently released on bond. On October 29, 1999, the court amended the no contact order and permitted Wilcox to contact Woodard on the condition that Wilcox refrain from abuse, threats, or disturbances of the peace.

On March 17, 2000, Wilcox allegedly confronted Woodard and struck him with an object and argued with Mulholland in violation of the standing no contact order. Based upon this incident, the State on April 12, 2000 charged Wilcox with Battery as a Class B misdemeanor and with Invasion of Privacy, a Class B misdemeanor², for allegedly striking during a March 17, 2000 confrontation. Additionally, on April 13, 2000, the State sought pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5(d) to revoke the original bond Wilcox posted for the arrest arising from the June 16, 1999 incident between Wilcox, Woodard and Mulholland. A hearing was held May 4, 2000, after which the court remanded Wilcox to the custody of the Sheriff. On May 8, 2000, the court ruled that Wilcox had violated the no contact order by failing to leave Woodard's apartment when she saw Mulholland, and by attacking Woodard. The court went on to rule that Wilcox would be "sentenced" to a total of ten days for the violation. The court gave her five days of credit for time served and released her that day. The court then reinstated Wilcox's bond. Wilcox did not appeal the trial court's revocation of her bail.³

On June 14, 2000, Wilcox filed her Motion to Dismiss the April 12, 2000 Battery and Invasion of Privacy charges, claiming that prosecution for these offenses would violate the Double Jeopardy clauses of both the federal and Indiana constitutions because she had already been subjected to jeopardy for the same matters during the bond revocation proceedings.⁴ At the conclusion of a hearing on the motion held on July 17, 2000 the judge ruled against Wilcox, but advised that it would certify the question for interlocutory appeal. Wilcox accordingly filed her petition to certify the court's order for interlocutory appeal on July 17, 2000, which the court granted on July 25, 2000. This court agreed to accept jurisdiction over the appeal by order dated September 5, 2000.

Discussion and Decision

A. Standard of Review

The issue before us, whether principles of double jeopardy preclude the use of the same facts to support both the revocation of a pre-trial release bond and a subsequent criminal prosecution, is a pure question of law. We accordingly conduct a de novo review. See Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied.

B. Analysis

1. State's Motion to Strike

We initially note that the State has filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of the record and citations thereto contained in the Brief of Appellant. The State complains that Wilcox has included in the record certain items from the court's file regarding the original charges, including the transcript of the bail revocation hearing, which are records of an unrelated proceeding under another cause number, and which were not attached to Wilcox's Motion to Dismiss and thus not before the trial court. Inclusion of and citation to these items, according to the State, would violate the rule against consideration of matters outside the record. See Chesterfield Management, Inc. v. Cook, 655 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). To the extent that any of the facts recounted above are derived from the portions of the record to which the State objects, they are not pertinent to the legal issues here and simply provide context. The salient and undisputed facts necessary to the resolution of the purely legal questions involved here are that Wilcox's bail was temporarily revoked for the same conduct that gave rise to her subsequent pending charges of Battery and Invasion of Privacy. These facts are evident from the portions of the record to which the State does not object. Thus, if Wilcox has improperly included materials in the record here, such inclusion was harmless.

2. Criminal Punishment, Civil Remedies, and Constitutional "Jeopardy"

Wilcox argues that her prosecution for Battery and Invasion of Privacy under the April 12, 2000 charges are barred by the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and Indiana constitutions. In particular, Wilcox claims that she was already subjected to jeopardy for the same conduct that gave rise to those charges as a result of the bond revocation proceedings.

In general, both the United States and Indiana constitutions prohibit a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. See Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind. Ct.App.1998). The question whether an offense is the "same" as a subsequent one for double jeopardy purposes differs depending upon whether the double jeopardy claim is brought under the Indiana constitution or the federal constitution. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (two statutory offenses are the "same" under the federal constitution if neither offense contains an element not contained in the other); Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 50-55 (Ind.1999) (under the Indiana constitution, offenses are the "same" if neither offense contains an element separate and distinct from the other such that the same evidence is not necessary to convict for both offenses, or when the actual evidence presented at trial fails to show that each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts). In this case, the State does not dispute Wilcox's claim that her pending Battery and Invasion of Privacy charges stem from the identical facts and constitute the same offenses at issue in the bond revocation proceedings. Rather, the State contends that the bond revocation hearing was not a criminal prosecution and therefore did not subject Wilcox to "jeopardy."

Double jeopardy prohibitions against repeat prosecutions and multiple punishments extend to the criminal reprosecution of a defendant in limited circumstances following proceedings outside the realm of traditional criminal prosecutions. See Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 1995) (holding that assessment of controlled substance excise tax against defendant was a form of jeopardy precluding subsequent prosecution on the State's charges that the defendant failed to pay the tax and that he grew and possessed the marijuana subject to the tax); State v. Klein, 702 N.E.2d 771 (Ind.App.1998), trans. denied, (holding that civil forfeiture of defendant's car constituted punishment for criminal confinement and attempted rape committed in car, and barred defendant's subsequent prosecution for those crimes). The United States Supreme Court clarified the application of federal double jeopardy principles⁵ in such cases in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). The court in Hudson confirmed that individuals may be subjected to constitutional "jeopardy" in ostensibly civil proceedings only when those proceedings are intended by the legislature to result in penalties that are essentially criminal in nature, because "[t]he clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense . . . and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings." Id. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (citations omitted).

According to Hudson, to determine whether the legislature intended the penalty to be a civil sanction or criminal punishment, a reviewing court must first look to the face of the statute giving rise to the penalty in question. Id. Even if the terms of the statute indicate that the legislature did not intend to impose a criminal sanction, a court should determine "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). The court in Hudson outlined the following "useful guideposts" for making this determination:

(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it"; and (7) "whether it appears

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