Wilcoxson v. Golden Gate Nat'l Senior Care, LLC

• Decision Date: 19 November 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-00144
• Parties: DEBRA WILCOXSON, as Administratrix of the Estate of CORNELIA STEARMAN Plaintiff v. GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC, d/b/a GOLDEN LIVING, et al. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

DEBRA WILCOXSON, as Administratrix of the Estate of CORNELIA STEARMAN Plaintiff v. GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC, d/b/a GOLDEN LIVING, et al. Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-00144

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION

Date: November 19, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants'¹ Motion to Dismiss Resident's Rights Claims. (Docket No. 5.) Plaintiff Debra Wilcoxson, as Administratrix of the Estate of Cornelia Stearman, deceased, has responded in opposition, (Docket No. 10), and Defendants have replied, (Docket No. 11). This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion will be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiff's Complaint, Cornelia Stearman was a resident of Golden Living Center-Green Hill in Greensburg, Kentucky, from on or about January 9, 2013, until her death on February 8, 2013. (Docket No. 1, at 3.) Plaintiff, as Administratrix of Stearman's Estate, asserts claims of negligence, negligence per se, medical negligence,corporate negligence, violations of long-term-care resident's rights pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.510 et seq., and wrongful death. (Docket No. 1, at 10-19.) In regard to her resident's rights claim, Plaintiff alleges the following violations:

a) Violation of the right to be treated with consideration, respect, and full recognition of her dignity and individuality, including privacy in treatment and in care for her personal needs;

b) Violation of the right to have a responsible party or family member or guardian notified immediately of any accident, sudden illness, disease, unexplained absence, or anything unusual involving the resident;

c) Violation of the right to have an adequate and appropriate resident care plan developed, implemented and updated to meet her needs;

d) Violation of the right to be free from mental and physical abuse and neglect; and

e) Violation of the statutory standards and requirements governing licensing and operation of long-term care facilities as set forth by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, pursuant to provisions of KRS Chapter 216 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as the applicable federal laws and regulations governing the certification of long-term care facilities under Titles XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act.

(Docket No. 1, at 17-18.)

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's resident's rights claim. Defendants argue that the claim allowed under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.515(26) does not survive the residency. Defendants further argue that the right to bring such a claim exists only to enforce a resident's rights against the facility and not against any other related entities.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including complaints, contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint may be attacked for failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court will presume that all the factual allegations in the complaint are true and will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)).

Even though a "complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). That is, a complaint must contain enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If, from the well-pleaded facts, the court cannot "infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id.

DISCUSSION

Kentucky Revised Statute § 216.515 (the "Kentucky Resident's Rights statute") outlines both the rights of persons admitted as residents to long-term-care facilities operating in Kentucky as well as the duties of such facilities. "Resident" is defined to mean "any person who is admitted to a long-term-care facility as defined in KRS 216.515 to 216.530 for the purpose of receiving personal care and assistance." Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.510(2). "Long-term-care facility" refers to those health-care facilities in the Commonwealth which are defined by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to be family-care homes, personal-care homes, intermediate-care facilities, skilled-nursing facilities, nursing facilities as defined in Pub. L. 100-203, nursing homes, and intermediate-care facilities for the intellectually and developmentally disabled." Id. § 216.510(1). The rights afforded to residents by § 216.515 include such rights as to be free from mental and physical abuse, to retain the use of their personal clothing, to not be detained against their will, to be suitably dressed at all times and given proper assistance in maintaining proper hygiene and grooming, and to have their medical records documented and communicated to persons of their choosing. To enforce these rights, the statute provides residents a private cause of action when their rights are violated:

Any resident whose rights as specified in this section are deprived or infringed upon shall have a cause of action against any facility responsible for the violation. The action may be brought by theresident or his guardian. The action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce such rights and to recover actual and punitive damages for any deprivation or infringement on the rights of a resident. Any plaintiff who prevails in such action against the facility may be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs of the action, and damages, unless the court finds the plaintiff has acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or that there was a complete absence of justifiable issue of either law or fact. Prevailing defendants may be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. The remedies provided in this section are in addition to and cumulative with other legal and administrative remedies available to a resident and to the cabinet.

Id. § 216.515(26)

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a resident's rights claim on behalf of Stearman. Defendants reason that the language of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.510(26) expressly vests the right to assert a cause of action solely in the resident or her guardian, not in the personal representative of the resident or the administratrix of the estate of a deceased resident. Plaintiff responds, arguing that the Kentucky legislature did not include language providing for a personal representative of a deceased resident to bring a cause of action because there was no need to include such language, given that personal representatives already have the authority and standing to sue on behalf a decedent under Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 411.133, 411.140 and 413.180.

It is well established that in construing a statute, the Court must strive to give effect to the intent of legislature. E.g., Dept. of Revenue, Fin., & Admin. Cab. v. Cox Interior, Inc., 400 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Ky. 2013). To the extent possible, the Court derives that intent from the language chosen by the legislature, "either as defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the context of the matter under consideration." Id. (quoting Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551(Ky. 2011)). The Court must presume that the legislature "intended for the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and for it to harmonize with related statutes." Id. (quoting Shawnee, 354 S.W.3d at 551). Accordingly, the Court "must not be guided by a single sentence of a statute but must look to the provisions of the whole statute and its object and policy." Samons v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Ky. 2004)).

Furthermore, when enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to be cognizant of previously enacted statutes and existing laws. E.g., Lewis v. Jackson Energy Coop., 189 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Ky. 2005). Among the existing laws at the time of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.515's enactment were §§ 411.140, 411.133, and 413.180. Section 411.140 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o right of action for personal injury . . . shall cease or die with the person . . . injured." Section 411.133 permits joinder of personal injury and wrongful death claims: "[T]he personal representative of a decedent who was injured by reason of the tortious acts of another, and later dies from such injuries, [may] recover in the same action for both the wrongful death of the decedent and for the personal injuries from which the decedent suffered prior to death . . . ." Finally, § 413.180 sets forth the applicable limitations period for actions by a decedent's personal representative: "If a person entitled to bring any action...