Wilder v. Muhlenberg Cnty. Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-1499-WC |
| Parties | BILL WILDER APPELLANT v. MUHLENBERG COUNTY COAL CO.; HONORABLE MONICA RICE-SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; MURRAY ENERGY CORPORATION; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Thomas E. Springer, III Madisonville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MUHLENBERG COUNTY COAL CO.: Donald J. Niehaus Taylor L. Oldham Lexington, Kentucky
BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, AND McNEILL, JUDGES.
Bill Wilder petitions for review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board (the "Board") which reversed an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") award of benefits to Wilder for his hearing loss. We affirm in part reverse in part, and remand.
Wilder worked in the coal mining industry for many years. Relevant here, Wilder worked for Ken America Resource, sometimes called Ken American in the record, ("Ken America") from April 2013 to February 2019. From February 2019 until December 2019, Wilder worked for Muhlenberg Coal Company ("Muhlenberg Coal"). Murray Energy Corporation ("Murray Energy") owns Ken America and Muhlenberg Coal.
Wilder, via counsel, filed two applications for workers' compensation benefits in June 2020 - one for hearing loss and one for cumulative trauma, naming "Murray Energy Corp./Pride Mine" as the defendant in each claim. In August 2020, Murray Energy filed a terse "notice of correct employer" which Record ("R.") at 84. That notice did not seek to have Murray Energy dismissed as a defendant. An ALJ issued an order providing in relevant part that Wilder's R. at 96. Thus, Wilder's claim proceeded against both Muhlenberg Coal and Murray Energy, who generally made little distinction between themselves.
An ALJ held a combined final hearing/benefit review conference ("BRC") in March 2021. The transcript of that proceeding shows that when the ALJ asked if pre-existing impairment was a contested issue, defendants' counsel responded: "Yes, pre-existing impairment and also benefits applicability of [Kentucky Revised Statute] KRS 342.7305, the hearing loss." R. at 338. In relevant part, KRS 342.7305(4) states that "the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for a minimum duration of one (1) year of employment shall be exclusively liable for benefits." It is undisputed that Wilder worked for Muhlenberg Coal for less than a year.
Soon thereafter, that ALJ's term of office expired, so Wilder's claims were assigned to a second ALJ, who held her own final hearing in April 2021. At the beginning of that hearing, the ALJ noted that the evidence included a transcript of the BRC/final hearing held by the first ALJ. In their post-hearing brief, defendants repeated their assertion that Wilder's employment with Muhlenberg Coal R. at 471. Again, however, Murray Energy did not seek dismissal as a defendant.
In June 2021, the ALJ issued a decision awarding Wilder benefits on his hearing loss claim. The ALJ noted the parties' stipulation that an employment relationship existed between Wilder and "the defendant/employer . . . ." R. at 484. Thus, the opinion did not analyze whether Murray Energy was Wilder's employer.
The ALJ ordered "Murray Energy/Muhlenberg County Coal" to pay disability benefits and related medical expenses to Wilder. Though the opinion and award listed "[b]enefits per KRS 342.7305" as a contested issue, it contained no substantive discussion thereof. R. at 485.
Muhlenberg Coal filed a petition for reconsideration; Murray Energy did not. Muhlenberg Coal argued that Wilder "did not work for the Defendant/Employer for more than one year, which precludes the award of any benefits for alleged hearing loss against Muhlenberg." (Emphasis added.) The petition for reconsideration did not facially allege that Murray Energy was not Wilder's employer. Toward that end, in his response to the petition, Wilder maintained that he worked for Murray Energy and had done so long enough to meet the requirements of KRS 342.7305(4).
The ALJ held that Wilder had "established he worked in excess of one year for Murray Energy." R. at 500. So, the ALJ amended the opinion and award to reflect that Murray Energy alone was responsible for paying Wilder's disability benefits. In other words, the ALJ relieved Muhlenberg Coal from being responsible for Wilder's disability benefits. However, likely by oversight, the ALJ did not concomitantly amend the portion of the opinion and award making Muhlenberg Coal and Murray Energy jointly liable for Wilder's compensable medical expenses.
Muhlenberg Coal appealed to the Board; neither Wilder nor Murray Energy did. Murray Energy's lack of active participation in Muhlenberg Coal's appeal is highlighted by the fact that Muhlenberg's brief to the Board stated that its author "represents Muhlenberg not Murray . . . in this action."[1] R. at 549. Muhlenberg Coal's main argument was that it had to be dismissed as Wilder "should not be allowed to recover from Muhlenberg [Coal] as the language in KRS 342.7305(4) clearly precludes the same." R. at 542. But, as Muhlenberg Coal noted in its brief, the ALJ on reconsideration had amended the opinion and award to "only include Murray Energy[,]" as being responsible for paying Wilder's disability benefits. Id.
In November 2021 the Board issued an opinion purporting to reverse the ALJ's decision to require Muhlenberg Coal to pay disability benefits to Wilder. The gist of the Board's conclusion was that Wilder had not worked for Muhlenberg Coal for one year, as required by the plain language of KRS 342.7305(4). Of course, the ALJ had already amended the opinion and award to reflect that Muhlenberg Coal was not responsible for Wilder's disability benefits. Next, the Board remanded the matter to the ALJ to "determine whether Murray Energy constitutes the employer with whom Wilder was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise and was employed for a minimum of one year." R. at 605. Wilder then filed this petition for review.
Briefly, we agree with the Board that Muhlenberg Coal adequately preserved its arguments regarding KRS 342.7305(4) by, for example, raising the issue at the first BRC and in its post-hearing brief. We also agree with the Board that the plain language of KRS 342.7305(4) meant that Muhlenberg Coal cannot be responsible for Wilder's hearing loss since he worked for Muhlenberg Coal for less than a year. But those are academic concerns, given the fact that the ALJ's decision on reconsideration no longer required Muhlenberg Coal to pay Wilder's disability benefits.
We also agree with the Board that the ALJ erred by making Muhlenberg Coal and Murray Energy jointly responsible for paying Wilder's compensable medical expenses. As the Board aptly noted, Muhlenberg Coal cannot be held financially responsible at all for matters stemming from Wilder's hearing loss under the plain language of KRS 342.7305(4). Thus, when the ALJ relieved Muhlenberg Coal from its responsibility for making income payments to Wilder, the ALJ should concomitantly have relieved Muhlenberg Coal from its joint responsibility for Wilder's compensable medical expenses.
We now turn to the heart of this petition for review, Wilder's challenge to the Board's decision to remand the matter to the ALJ to analyze further whether Murray Energy was Wilder's employer. The potential impact of that remand upon Wilder is obvious. Without that remand, he was entitled to recover benefits and related medical expenses from Murray Energy. On remand, however, his ability to receive those benefits could be eliminated if the ALJ were to determine that Murray Energy was not his employer. We agree with Wilder's bottom-line argument that the remand was improper, though our analysis does not precisely track the contents of his petition for review.
For reasons not apparent from the face of the record, Wilder never named Ken America as a defendant.[2] Consequently, only Murray Energy could be responsible for paying benefits to Wilder. And, in turn, Murray Energy could only be responsible if it had been Wilder's employer since KRS 342.7305(4) provides in relevant part that "the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for a minimum duration of one (1) year of employment shall be exclusively liable for benefits." (Emphasis added.)
In a typical case involving similar facts, an ALJ would have to engage in rigorous analysis to determine whether the parent entity could be deemed the employer, for workers' compensation purposes, of someone who worked directly for one of the parent's subsidiaries. See, e.g. Inter-Tel...
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