Wilder v. Wilder

• Decision Date: 27 October 1917
• Citation: 116 Me. 389,102 A. 110
• Parties: WILDER. v. WILDER et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

102 A. 110

116 Me. 389

WILDER.

v. WILDER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 27, 1917.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Waldo County, in Equity.

Forcible entry and detainer by Frank B. Wilder, trustee, against Estella L. Wilder, trustee, and others. Case reported. Judgment for plaintiff.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and MADIGAN, JJ.

Dunton & Morse, of Belfast, for plaintiff.

A. S. Littlefield, of Rockland, for defendants.

CORNISH, C. J. This is an action of forcible entry and detainer. The legal rights of the parties depend upon the construction to lie given to the words "child or children" as used in a certain clause in a trust deed from Andreas Blume to Frank B. Wilder, trustee, dated January 23, 1892. This trust deed granted a life estate in certain property in Waldo county to William L. Wilder, and, at his decease, an estate to Minnie E. Wilder, the wife of William L., during her life or her widowhood. Then follows the clause in controversy:

"And on her marriage, or if she shall not marry again, on her death, [the trustee] to transfer and convey said premises and trust estate in fee simple to the child or children of said William L. Wilder, free and discharged of all trusts."

Minnie E. Wilder was divorced by her husband, William L., in 1903. She married again, and now disclaims all interest in the subject-matter of this suit. William L. subsequently married Estella L. Morse, one of the defendants, who had been previously married and had a son by the former husband. On August 14, 1908, 16 years after the trust deed was given, this son was duly adopted by his stepfather, William L. Wilder, and took the name of Walter Morse Wilder. He is the codefendant. William L. Wilder died on May 4, 1915, leaving no children of his body, but leaving this adopted son. Without going further into the chain of title it is sufficient to state that it is agreed that if this adopted son takes the property under the terms of the trust deed, judgment is to be rendered for the defendants; otherwise for the plaintiff. The single question therefore is whether this adopted son is to be deemed a "child" of William L. Wilder within the purview of this trust deed. Under the settled law of this state we must answer this question in the negative.

The defendants base their contention upon the statute governing adoption, which is in these words:

"By such decree the natural parents are divested of all legal rights in respect to such child, and he is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to them; and, for the custody of the person and all rights of inheritance, obedience and maintenance, he becomes to all intents and purposes, the child of his adopters, the same as if born to them in lawful wedlock, except that he shall mot inherit property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adopters, nor property from their lineal or collateral kindred by right of representation," etc. R. S. c. 72, § 38.

Neither of these exceptions is involved here. The adopted child is not, to all intents and purposes whatever, declared to be the child of his adopters the same as if born to them in lawful wedlock, but "for the custody of the person and all rights of inheritance, obedience and maintenance." The limitation is plain. The original statute in this state had even a narrower scope. It provided that a child so adopted should be deemed to have the same rights as the child of the body, merely "for the custody of the person and the right of obedience." Pub. Laws 1855, c. 189, § 6. The qualified right of inheritance was added by Pub. Laws 1878-80, c. 183.

What is the legal effect of the present statute regulating adoption so far as property rights are concerned? In strictness it simply fixes the status of the adopted child in case of the intestacy of his adopters, where the rights of inheritance are involved. It is also held to have a bearing upon the intention of the grantor or testator who is himself the adopter. But it is of no particular aid in determining whether an adopted child is within or without the designation of "child" or "children" as used in a deed or will where the grantor or testator is other than the adopter. The right of inheritance by the adopted child is a matter of statutory creation; the taking under a deed or a will depends upon the intention of the grantor or testator, as revealed by the instrument itself construed in the light of the surrounding facts and conditions. Where the grantor or testator is the adopting parent it is reasonable to presume that the adopted child was within the intended bounty of such grantor or testator. But where he is a stranger to the adoption such presumption does not prevail. The distinction between the limitation of the statute to the inheritance rights of the adopted child and the rule governing the construction of a deed or will of a stranger to the adoption is clear, and it has been observed in previous decisions of this court. A leading case in each line will serve as illustrations.

In Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948, 17 L. R. A. 435, 30 Am. St. Rep. 370, the testatrix devised the residue of her estate, share and share alike, to various relatives, each legatee being entitled to one-eleventh. One legatee predeceased the testatrix, leaving no issue of his body, but leaving an adopted child. Under the statute, then and now in existence, when a relative of the testator, having a devise of real or personal estate, dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, the devise does not lapse as at common law, but those descendants take such estate as would have been taken by such deceased relative if he had survived. R, S. 1916, c 79, § 10. The precise question before the court in that case was whether an adopted child is made a lineal descendant by the statute of adoption, and as such could prevent the lapsing of the legacy. Lineal descendants are those to whom the property would descend in a line, were there no will. Who they may be is prescribed in this state by the statutes regulating descent. The statute of adoption makes an adopted child inherit from its adopters the same as a child born to them in lawful wedlock, with certain exceptions not here involved, and to that extent constitutes a part of the statute of descent. Therefore the child by adoption answers the requirement of lineal descendant, and the court so held in that case. The only question was that of inheritance from the adopter, as was made clear by the court in stating the rights of the adopted child:

"He does not 'inherit' the legacy from the testator. He takes as a lineal descendant of the legatee by force of the statute. * * * Not as a lineal descendant by birth, but as a statutory lineal descendant, and as lawfully in the line of descent as if he were placed there by birth. It is as competent for the Legislature to place a child by adoption in the direct line of descent as for the common law to place a child by birth there."

The construction of the word "child" in a will, as including an adopted child, was not involved in that case; simply the construction of the words "lineal descendants" in another statute, as including an adopted child under the provisions of this statute. The gift was to the legatee alone. There was no limitation as to child or children. There was no suggestion as to where the testatrix desired that share to go in case of the legatee's death...